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First Post
16-07-2025
- Politics
- First Post
Not America's protégé: Rebutting Ashley Tellis' US-India analysis
Ashley Tellis, in his article 'How New Delhi's Grand Strategy Thwarts Its Grand Ambitions,' published on June 17, 2025, in Foreign Affairs, outlines a perspective on US-India relations that is rooted in an outdated and somewhat condescending strategic framework. His argument, though detailed and data-backed, reflects assumptions, predictions, and a tone that portrays India as a subordinate actor rather than an autonomous, civilisational power charting its own course in the international system. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Tellis writes, 'Since the turn of the century, the United States has sought to help India rise as a great power.' He begins by recounting how the US, since the turn of the century, has supported India's rise: from the civil nuclear deal under George W Bush to defence industrial cooperation under Obama to intelligence sharing and advanced technology access under Donald Trump and the jet engine tech transfer under Joe Biden. This chronological account is framed in a way that suggests the US has done India a series of favours. But the reality is that none of these moves were altruistic. The US does not support or arm nations unless it serves its own strategic interests. These engagements were mutually beneficial, and portraying them as one-sided largesse from the US ignores the realist, Kissingerian logic that drives American foreign policy. He criticises India for not aligning fully with the US, especially because it champions a multipolar world rather than endorsing US primacy. But complete alignment is neither possible nor necessary. History offers no example of two sovereign countries—even allies—being perfectly aligned on every issue. Moreover, India's support for multipolarity is not an ideological or anti-US stance; rather, it is a strategic calculation. India sees multipolarity not as an end in itself but as a means to better protect and promote its interests. As the international system transitions—from the unipolarity of the post–Cold War era to a more fluid and fragmented order—India is responding to changes it neither initiated nor can halt. World order was never static: it was multipolar before the First World War, then bipolar during the Cold War, followed by a unipolar moment. The world is once again shifting, and India can neither halt this process nor afford to ignore it. Tellis' observation that India 'obsessively guards its strategic autonomy… maintaining ties with Western adversaries such as Iran and Russia' is presented almost as a flaw. Yet strategic autonomy is a hallmark of every sovereign state's foreign policy. The very structure of the international system, as per realism, is anarchic. If the US guards its freedom to act by engaging with whomever it wants—even adversaries—why should India be expected to surrender that same agency? The notion that India should align with US preferences on Russia or Iran or abandon its membership in forums like Brics or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation smacks of a colonial hangover, where the West reserves the right to moralise and dictate. Ashley Tellis seems stuck in the early 2000s Bush strategic mindset, when the US pursued a balance-of-power approach to Asia and listed India as a strategic partner. The US has changed significantly since then. Under Trump, it became more transactional and less committed to alliances, often showing open disregard for them. It expects allies to shoulder more responsibility, even in Nato. If the US itself is withdrawing from global commitments, why is India being told to 'do more'? The US is not the same strategic anchor it once claimed to be. Tomorrow, Trump could make a deal with China even at the expense of Taiwan, and everything Tellis projects would collapse. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Tellis also overestimates his ability to predict long-term outcomes. He assumes India will rise, but not fast enough to match China or the US, and that multipolarity will remain elusive. These are speculative claims. History is filled with surprises. Karl Marx misjudged the inevitability of communism. No one predicted the First World War or the collapse of the Soviet Union. History is non-linear and unpredictable. India's trajectory, like that of any major power, is contingent and evolutionary. Assuming static futures and prescribing fixed alignments is intellectually limiting. The assumption that by 2050 only the US and China will matter is deterministic and reflects more of Tellis' strategic bias than grounded foresight. Just as Fukuyama's End of History thesis was challenged by resurgent nationalism and conflict, Tellis' vision of a binary future overlooks the inherent unpredictability of global politics. He also claims that because India won't form alliances, it might struggle to secure external support as the US grows more transactional. But if the US becomes transactional, why should India not act the same? Strategic alignment must be mutual, not one-sided compliance. It is unfair to demand India subordinate its policies to US preferences. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Moreover, the US is no longer the same power that once believed in the hub-and-spoke alliance system. Today, it wants its allies to shoulder more responsibility. American society has changed—there is growing resistance to spending taxpayer money on foreign wars or propping up other countries. Trump is not an aberration; he is a clear reflection of this shift in American public sentiment. The US no longer seeks formal alliances—it prefers loose, informal partnerships where others are expected to do more and not be seen as burdens on American taxpayers. Moreover, Ashley argues that India doesn't do enough on China, that it won't support the U.S. in a Taiwan contingency, and that its desire for multipolarity is inconvenient. This has been his central argument across many of his past writings. But what exactly is the US doing to contain China? If Beijing is expanding its influence, the blame doesn't lie solely with India. It is primarily the failure of the US, which hasn't done enough itself. The US has more direct strategic allies in the region—Japan, South Korea, and Australia—yet its own contradictions (like supporting Pakistan for tactical reasons) weaken its position. If Washington wants India to be a balancer, it must itself be consistent in both the Indo-Pacific and South Asia. The recent Trump outreach to Pakistan undermines India's regional standing. That's not India's failure—it's America's strategic incoherence. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD He asserts that India plays other powers against each other—claiming, 'India played the Soviet Union against the United States to benefit itself' during the Cold War—and implies this as a negative trait. But every nation maximises its options. That is the essence of diplomacy. The US engages China, Russia, and even adversaries when it suits its interests. Why deny India the same strategic space? He also says that India's membership in non-Western institutions like Brics and SCO could become liabilities if the US grows less tolerant. This again suggests that India must seek approval from Washington before charting independent global pathways. He warns that 'a more jaundiced government, like Trump's, might penalise India' for its decisions. This tone resembles a colonial master issuing ultimatums. The very idea that India could be 'penalised' for trading in local currencies or preserving ties with Iran and Russia reflects an alarming tendency to see the US as a global disciplinarian. This is not a partnership—it's a hierarchy. He further says the US 'deliberately overlooked' India's behaviour—implying that India must now repay that favour. But the US pursued the civil nuclear deal and other engagements to serve its own interests. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Tellis suggests that India may drift closer to China. He writes, 'India may edge closer to China as circumstances demand.' This ignores the geopolitical and security realities of India's position—its border disputes, strategic rivalry, and civilisational contrast with China. India balances China not because Washington wants it to, but because it must. Its engagement with non-Western forums like Brics and SCO stems from strategic hedging, not ideological alignment. Moreover, he asserts that shared democratic values held the relationship together. But during the Cold War, both were democracies and still adversaries. Values alone never drove US-India ties—strategic interests did. The US has supported numerous non-democracies for decades. Let us not whitewash American foreign policy. His conclusion warns India to be 'wary of multipolarity' because it might have to assume more burdens and lose US-supplied global goods like maritime security. He argues, 'India would benefit less from the collective goods the United States supplies… such as protecting sea-lanes.' But sovereignty comes with responsibility. If India wants to be a leading power, it will bear costs. Yet the suggestion that these burdens are too heavy, or that India is incapable of carrying them, reveals a lack of faith in Indian capacity and vision. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Even in his treatment of Indian democracy, Tellis credits the Constitution but strategically downplays India's civilisational ethos. Democracy thrived in India not only because of institutions but also because of ingrained cultural values: tolerance, pluralism, and civilisational continuity. Other post-colonial states had constitutions too— many failed. India's success lies in its long-standing civilisational political culture, not merely its legal frameworks. Ultimately, Tellis' article is built on selective assumptions and strategic nostalgia. He ignores how the US has transformed under Trump and how the world order itself is shifting. He indirectly praises China while telling India to 'do more.' He frames India's choices as selfish but ignores America's own self-serving behaviour. This is not scholarship—it is strategic sermonising. Conclusion India is a civilisational state—confident, capable, and clear-eyed about its place in the world. It does not take dictation. It will align with the United States when interests converge and stand alone when they don't. That is the essence of strategic autonomy—not a hurdle to partnership, but its most stable foundation. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Ashley Tellis, in his critique, makes too many assumptions, adopts a prescriptive tone, and promotes a worldview in which India is expected to subordinate its priorities to those of the US. He seeks to shape India's trajectory in a particular direction and comes across as authoritarian and dominating in the language of the article. India's independent stance on Ukraine has especially troubled Western thinkers. The geopolitical agenda becomes evident when one reads between the lines—this is a piece marked by an assertive, almost coercive tone. India of today is not a postcolonial appendage. It will engage with the US as a partner, not as a client. A true India-US relationship must rest on mutual respect—not on expectations of alignment or veiled warnings of 'penalties'. As Karl Popper reminded us, all knowledge is provisional. Predictions in international politics often fail. India's choices will be shaped by its national interest, and no amount of moralising can change that fundamental principle. Imran Khurshid is a visiting research fellow at the International Centre for Peace Studies, New Delhi. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost's views.
AllAfrica
17-06-2025
- Politics
- AllAfrica
Philippine naval upgrade more spectacle than strategy
As tensions rise with China in the South China Sea, the Philippines may be advancing a naval modernization strategy centered more on signaling and alignment than actual deterrence. This month, USNI News reported that the Philippine Navy (PN) launched its first Rajah Solayman-class offshore patrol vessel (OPV) in Ulsan, South Korea, marking a significant step in its maritime modernization. Named after a 16th-century Filipino hero, BRP Rajah Solayman (PS20) is the first of six ships procured from South Korea's Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) under a 2022 contract aimed at reinforcing the country's overstretched fleet. Initially designed as a 1,500-ton vessel, the OPV was later expanded to 2,400 tons under HHI's HDP-2200+ design, which enhanced its range and endurance for extended patrols. Armed with an Oto Melara 76-millimeter main gun and Aselsan SMASH 30-millimeter remote-controlled weapon systems, the ship is built for maritime security operations amid increasing tensions in the South China Sea. Philippine military officials have emphasized that the six-vessel program will replace aging patrol assets, supplement forces in critical maritime areas and enhance the country's sovereignty defense posture. The ship's 5,500 nautical mile range and 30-day endurance ensure prolonged operational capability. While production is slated to conclude by 2028, South Korea is already positioning itself for further defense contracts in the 2030s, including potential frigate and corvette programs under the Philippines' next phase of military modernization. Yet, beneath these moves is a crucial strategic question: Are they aimed at real deterrence, or are they crafted more for show, particularly to China? In line with the Philippines' de facto 'assertive transparency' strategy to name and shame China's assertive actions in the South China Sea and galvanize international support for its cause, Manila requires high-profile, high-visibility assets, such as frigates, OPVs, and light combat aircraft, to effectively respond to China's gray zone challenges. However, the survivability of such assets in the event of escalating tensions with China may be questionable. As seen in Taiwan's case, high-visibility platforms, such as surface warships and fighter jets, are vulnerable to rapid destruction in a Chinese first strike, prompting substantial investment in asymmetric warfare assets, including submarines. But with Philippine submarine procurement still in the early planning phase, the Brahmos missile system has become the centerpiece of the country's asymmetric deterrent posture. However, as Ashley Tellis notes in a July 2024 article for The Print, without supporting Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) infrastructure for dynamic targeting, these missiles will remain largely symbolic. Tellis says those deficiencies mean the missiles will be useful only against fixed, nearby targets, such as the contested Scarborough Shoal, and are not credible tools for flexible or long-range deterrence. Furthermore, China could easily repair or replace damaged or destroyed warships, given its massive shipbuilding capabilities. Underscoring this capability, a 2025 US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report states that China's shipbuilding capacity is 230 times that of the US. If the Philippines truly recognized the urgency of building asymmetric capabilities, it might be willing to make more difficult defense trade-offs. For example, Felix Chang mentions in a November 2019 Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) article that Vietnam, a similarly challenged maritime neighbor, acquired six Kilo-class submarines from Russia in 2009 at a cost of US$2 billion, equivalent to half its defense budget. While Vietnam's proximity to China and history of conflict justify such investment, the Philippines has not demonstrated the same urgency or strategic commitment to undersea deterrence. Yet, such stealth investments appear to be mismatched with the Philippines' budget constraints and its current emphasis on diplomatic visibility through multilateral defense engagement. In line with this, the Philippines has been signing military access agreements with 'like-minded' countries, such as Japan, Australia and New Zealand, with the possible goal of maintaining a high tempo of high-publicity multinational naval exercises in the South China Sea. 'We have noted a marked decrease in the illegal and coercive actions of the PLA each time there is a multilateral or bilateral maritime cooperative activity… No PLA Navy, Coast Guard, or maritime militia noted within proximity,' says Philippine Navy spokesperson Admiral Roy Trinidad, as quoted by Defense Post in a February 2025 article. Still, when push comes to shove in the South China Sea, it is unclear whether the Philippines' 'alternative' defense partners will come to its aid. Even the US, its most capable and only treaty partner, has more than once prioritized its broader strategic interests over Philippine concerns during past incidents with China. At the political level, multinational naval exercises may also serve as part of Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr's broader effort to claim legitimacy among wealthy liberal democracies, thereby securing economic assistance and political support despite the historical controversies associated with the Marcos dynasty. Moreover, since the US has indefinitely stationed the Typhon and NMESIS missile systems in the Philippines, nominally for training purposes, it provides Marcos Jr with a strategic buffer that reinforces his domestic position. Typhon is armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles that can reach mainland China from the Philippines, while NMESIS is an anti-ship system that could hit Chinese warships transiting the Bashi Channel. The 2022 US National Defense Strategy prioritizes Taiwan and the broader Indo-Pacific region, while accepting a higher risk in theaters such as Europe. This focus gives Marcos Jr room to rely on US support to enhance his security credentials and consolidate domestic legitimacy. According to a February 2025 Social Weather Station (SWS) survey, 78% of Philippine respondents support political candidates who assert sovereign rights against China's aggressive actions in the South China Sea. With such strong public sentiment, Marcos Jr could frame his administration as resolute on sovereignty, even with limited military muscle. However, the Philippines does not face any existential threat on the level of Taiwan, Ukraine, Israel and South Korea, as no country since World War II has threatened its destruction. The country's primary threats are internal, including poverty, political instability, insurgency and terrorism. While China has been a troublesome neighbor for the Philippines, it does not seek the destruction of the Philippine state, making China more of a challenge to be managed than a threat to be dealt with. Even if Philippine policymakers understand that nuance, and Marcos Jr courts Chinese investment while under rising economic pressure, his previous hardline stance and the Philippines' longstanding dependency on US politico-military ties may prevent anything substantial from happening in the near term. But as long as Philippine defense planning is shaped by external validation rather than internal resolve, its military buildup risks remaining more symbolic than strategic.
The Star
14-05-2025
- Politics
- The Star
India-Pakistan: conflict with no clear winner
PARIS: A ceasefire between India and Pakistan has calmed fears of all-out war and despite conflicting claims, experts say no clear victor emerged in the brief conflict between the nuclear-armed foes. - No clear winner - Both South Asian countries claim to have achieved their goals in their worst conflict since 1999, without admitting significant losses. Four days of intense fighting began last Wednesday (May 7) when India launched strikes against what it described as "terrorist infrastructure" in Pakistan. India claims Pakistan backs the militants it says were behind an April attack in which 26 people were killed in Indian-administered Kashmir -- a charge Islamabad denies. "If victory is defined by who lost the most manned aircraft, then India certainly lost this one," said Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie think tank. "But India also succeeded in effectively interdicting a range of Pakistani surface targets and imposing significant costs on Pakistan," Tellis told AFP. "Both sides continue to claim air-to-air kills, but clear evidence remains unavailable at the time of writing," said Fabian Hoffmann from the University of Oslo. "What stands out is the extensive use of conventional long-range strike systems by both sides to target military infrastructure deep within enemy territory, including sites near their capitals," he added. - Nuclear powers - While slow to begin with, the international community, including the United States, eventually intervened, alarmed by the possibility of further escalation. Hoffmann said the bitter foes showed little restraint despite the absence of "deliberate strikes on critical civilian infrastructure". "Any shift in that direction would... potentially bring the conflict closer to the threshold of nuclear use," said Hoffmann. The global trend towards violence, especially by states facing internal turmoil, demands greater international vigilance, according to Tellis. The fact that both countries are nuclear powers "makes the conventional balances all the more important. But the fact remains that neither side has a decisive conventional edge in a short war," said Tellis. - Drones on the frontline - Like other modern conflicts, this one confirmed the "widespread" use of drones for warfare, according to Oishee Majumdar from British intelligence firm Janes. Israel Aerospace Industries' exploding drones Harop and Harpy, as well as reconnaissance drone Heron were used by India, Majumdar told AFP. According to specialist site Military Balance, India also deployed Indian drones Nishant and Drishti. Indian media said New Delhi also used French SCALP and Indian BrahMos cruise missiles, and AASM Hammer bombs developed by France's Safran. The Pakistani army used Songar drones developed by Turkey's Asisguard, according to Janes. Military Balance said Islamabad was also armed with Chinese combat and reconnaissance drones -- CH-3 and CH-4, Wing Loong -- and Turkey's Akinci and TB2 drones. - Chinese neutrality? - At the start of the conflict, China urged restraint from both sides and promised to play a "constructive role". But experts say Beijing has clearly picked a side. China said it considered Pakistan an "ironclad friend" and that it "understands Pakistan's legitimate security concerns", said Chietigj Bajpaee from think tank Chatham House. Bajpaee also said that "over 80 percent of Pakistan's arms imports over the last five years have come from China". "Beijing supplies Islamabad with key systems" including the HQ-9/P surface-to-air missile system, the LY-80 medium-range air defence and FM-90 defence systems, said John Spencer, an ex-US army officer and researcher at the Modern War Institute. But Islamabad's "reliance on Chinese exports has created a brittle illusion of strength", said Spencer, adding that the systems are "designed to provide layered protection" but "failed" against India's strikes last week. - Rafale jet claims - Pakistan claims to have shot down five Indian fighter jets, including three advanced French Rafale aircraft, all of which were in Indian airspace at the time. India has not disclosed any losses. Rafale maker Dassault did not comment. According to a European military source, it is "very unlikely" that three Rafales were destroyed, but "credible" that at least one was. Analysts suggest that Indian aircraft were shot down by a Chinese air-to-air missile, the PL-15E, with a range of 145 kilometres (90 miles) in the version acquired by Islamabad, and whose debris was found in Indian territory. "India lost at least one Rafale to a Pakistani J-10C firing a PL-15 air-to-air missile in an ultra-long-range air engagement," said Carnegie's Tellis. This type of missile can target a position while remaining undetected "until its own radar is activated a few dozen kilometres away, or a few seconds" from its target, according to a French fighter pilot interviewed by AFP. "You can't escape it". - AFP
New Indian Express
14-05-2025
- Politics
- New Indian Express
India-Pakistan: Conflict with no clear winner
Paris, France: A ceasefire between India and Pakistan has calmed fears of all-out war and despite conflicting claims, experts say no clear victor emerged in the brief conflict between the nuclear-armed foes. No clear winner Both South Asian countries claim to have achieved their goals in their worst conflict since 1999, without admitting significant losses. Four days of intense fighting began last Wednesday when India launched strikes against what it described as "terrorist infrastructure" in Pakistan. India claims Pakistan backs the militants it says were behind an April attack in which 26 people were killed in Kashmir -- a charge Islamabad denies. "If victory is defined by who lost the most manned aircraft, then India certainly lost this one," said Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie think tank. "But India also succeeded in effectively interdicting a range of Pakistani surface targets and imposing significant costs on Pakistan," Tellis told AFP. "Both sides continue to claim air-to-air kills, but clear evidence remains unavailable at the time of writing," said Fabian Hoffmann from the University of Oslo. "What stands out is the extensive use of conventional long-range strike systems by both sides to target military infrastructure deep within enemy territory, including sites near their capitals," he added. Nuclear powers While slow to begin with, the international community, including the United States, eventually intervened, alarmed by the possibility of further escalation. Hoffmann said the bitter foes showed little restraint despite the absence of "deliberate strikes on critical civilian infrastructure". "Any shift in that direction would... potentially bring the conflict closer to the threshold of nuclear use," said Hoffmann. The global trend towards violence, especially by states facing internal turmoil, demands greater international vigilance, according to Tellis. The fact that both countries are nuclear powers "makes the conventional balances all the more important. But the fact remains that neither side has a decisive conventional edge in a short war," said Tellis. Drones on the frontline Like other modern conflicts, this one confirmed the "widespread" use of drones for warfare, according to Oishee Majumdar from British intelligence firm Janes. Israel Aerospace Industries' exploding drones Harop and Harpy, as well as reconnaissance drone Heron were used by India, Majumdar told AFP. According to specialist site Military Balance, India also deployed Indian drones Nishant and Drishti.
Zawya
14-04-2025
- Business
- Zawya
US-India tech ties must be driven by market forces, not just state support: Ashley J. Tellis at Carnegie Summit
New Delhi : Ashley J. Tellis, Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs and Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, offered a candid analysis of the evolving US approach to global technology partnerships under a potential second Trump administration and the broader implications for the US-India relationship, at the Carnegie Global Tech Summit held in New Delhi on Friday. On the US-India technology partnership, Tellis argued that while state-led initiatives and subsidies are useful to jumpstart cooperation, they are not a viable long-term model. He stated, "I do not believe that a sustainable path for the US-India Relationship is through state action and state subsidies. Those are very good to jump-start the process, but if we have to keep it sustainable, we need to really have market transformations in both countries that essentially permit innovation to respond to the pressures of the market." Tellis pointed out a shift in US policy priorities, stating, "I think the bias in the Trump administration is to sell services. And given that bias, it is very likely that there will be much greater technology acquisition opportunities over here and for the rest of the world. Now, what it does to a certain conception of global order is a very different question." However, he cautioned that such a transactional approach could undermine long-standing frameworks designed to preserve the global order. He said, "For 70 years now, we tried to help our friends while at the same time maintaining a proliferation regime that would date to a certain conception of order. Now, if we end up in a situation where the price of helping our friends is to engulf the regime simultaneously, I'm not quite sure long-term US interests are at hand, nor am I sure that the interests of our friends are at hand. What is even worse is that I'm not sure the administration has the discipline to understand the issues at hand." Tellis expressed concern over whether future U.S. administrations would have the strategic discipline to manage these complexities. "Time will tell whether, net-net, we come out ahead," he said. © Muscat Media Group Provided by SyndiGate Media Inc. (
