Latest news with #Tobruk-based
Mada
31-07-2025
- General
- Mada
Dozens of Egyptians still missing after migrant boat sinks off Tobruk coast
Dozens of Egyptian migrants remain missing after a Europe-bound boat capsized off the Libyan coast in the early hours of July 24. Some of the migrants' families told Mada Masr that identifying and obtaining information about their relatives' whereabouts has been difficult to navigate and that the official response has been slow. Omar Fathy, who buried one of his cousins on Tuesday and is still searching for another, described the process of identifying victims and repatriating their bodies to Egypt as 'haphazard.' The boat, which carried 81 migrants, sank off the coast of Tobruk in Libya on July 24, the city's Maritime Search and Rescue Office announced. Ten people were rescued — including eight Egyptian nationals. A total of 18 bodies were retrieved over the course of the ensuing days, of whom only six have been identified, according to the office's statement. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) said in a statement on Tuesday that roughly 50 people are still missing. 'Three of the six were from our hometown in Badary, Assiut, two were from Sharqiya and one was from Minya,' Fathy said. The Egyptian vice consul told Fathy that three identified bodies — including that of his cousin — were to be repatriated via the land crossing between Libya and Egypt on Sunday. But on his way to Salloum, the official contacted Fathy again to say that there had been a mistake and that his cousin's body had been sent with a dozen unidentified bodies to the morgue in the Libyan city of Derna. The family completed the required procedures — including a National Security Agency interrogation of the victim's brother at the Salloum border crossing — before their relative's body was shipped the following day. Throughout the process, most of the information the families have received came via the Tobruk-based Abereen Foundation and the Tobruk search and rescue office rather than from Egyptian authorities, according to Fathy. The two entities were responsible for informing families when bodies were identified. Relatives then travelled independently to the western border city of Salloum to retrieve their loved ones. The Egyptian Foreign Ministry issued its first statement on the matter on Wednesday, a week after the incident, stating that it is following up on the survivors' cases in preparation for their repatriation from Libya. The statement did not mention the number of fatalities or survivors, but said the ministry is overseeing the transfer of the identified bodies and is participating in efforts to identify the remaining victims. But with around a dozen bodies still unidentified, Fathy believes that Egyptian authorities' delayed and sparse communication with the families has contributed to the ongoing confusion. Families only began on Tuesday to submit DNA samples to the Cairo forensic authority to assist in the identification process, a source at the Egyptian agency told Mada Masr on condition of anonymity. This was after substantial confusion had already taken place. At one point, the Tobruk search and rescue office mistakenly stated it had found and identified the body of Fathy's other cousin, only to retract their announcement after one of the survivors recognized the body in question. A similar mistake was repeated with another body, according to the office's statements. To try and find Fathy's missing cousin, his family submitted a DNA sample at Cairo's central labs on Wednesday. The families first had to obtain a letter from the Foreign Ministry before having samples taken at the Cairo forensic authority, which then coordinates the delivery of the results to the Libyan forensic authorities, the agency source said. The eight Egyptian survivors were held by Libyan authorities until Wednesday, but were later released by the western Tobruk prosecution. They are set to be handed over to Egyptian authorities once deportation procedures are complete. Mostafa Nassir, a relative of three Egyptians who are still missing, told Mada Masr that Libyan authorities rely on survivors to help identify the recovered bodies, which is why they are being held until search and recovery operations conclude. Egyptian authorities could hold them in custody for a few additional days while they file illegal migration reports before releasing them, Nassir explained, citing his past experience having attempted irregular migration himself. According to Nassir, one of the survivors rescued in the afternoon of July 24 said the boat they departed in was in very poor condition, capsizing around eight kilometers into the voyage. The survivor said most of those on board were from the governorates of Assiut, Minya and Sharqia, along with South Sudanese nationals, according to Nassir. Nassir said that five people from Assiut's Badary are thought to be missing, while Ibrahim Mohamed, who is searching for his two nephews, told Mada Masr that 22 young men from his hometown of Bilbeis in Sharqiya are still missing. The bodies of another three Bilbeis residents have been identified. Like many other families who spoke to Mada Masr, the Bilbeis families have been unable to reach the Egyptian intermediaries who convinced their sons to make the journey. Brokers tell the young men that they will be going to a good place with decent housing, the families say, but that is seldom the case. 'Once they arrive in Libya, they're met with humiliation and torture at the hands of smugglers,' Nassir said. 'And when they die, the brokers turn off their phones and disappear.' The IOM described the tragedy as 'a stark reminder of the deadly risks people are forced to take in search of safety and opportunity.' The organization also stressed that Libya continues to serve as a key transit point for migrants and refugees, who face 'exploitation, abuse and life-threatening journeys.' It renewed its call for greater regional cooperation to establish 'safe, regular and dignified migration pathways.' According to the IOM's latest Libya migrant report, covering data from March to April, Egyptian nationals now account for 19 percent of all migrants attempting to reach Europe via Libya. The total number of migrants in Libya has risen to over 867,000, representing 44 nationalities — a 20 percent increase compared to the same period last year, in an upward trend that has continued since December 2023, according to the report. Just this month, weekly reports documented intercepted boats carrying a total of 1,717 migrants.
Libyan Express
09-06-2025
- Politics
- Libyan Express
Libya's troubled GNU is not going just yet, further clashes are likely
Protesters gathered in Martyrs' Square in Tripoli, to demonstrate against the Government of National Unity led by Abdel Hamid Dbeibah, on May 30, 2025. AFP Tripoli's Government of National Unity (GNU), led by Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, is under immense strain, but it would be premature to consider it finished. Despite mounting unrest, the GNU remains entrenched, deploying every tool at its disposal—from subtle propaganda and financial incentives to leveraging armed militias—to maintain control. The turmoil of mid-May may have dealt the most serious blow yet to what many see as Libya's most corrupt and dysfunctional government since the fall of Gaddafi. This post-Gaddafi regime—born from NATO's 2011 intervention, the largest war coalition of the modern era—was sold as a mission of liberation, security, and prosperity, but instead plunged the country into more than a decade of chaos, lawlessness, and foreign interference unlike anything seen since Libya's independence over 70 years ago. Late in the afternoon of May 12, reports began circulating that Abdulghani Al-Kikli—better known as 'Ghneiwa'—had been killed by the 444th Brigade at a military barracks in southern Tripoli. He had reportedly been lured to his death under the guise of a reconciliation meeting, intended to ease tensions that had been simmering around the capital for weeks. News of his death spread rapidly across social media and independent outlets, while government-linked media remained silent for two days before issuing vague, distorted reports. The government made no official comment until after fighting had already erupted across Tripoli's streets. A short time after Ghneiwa's death was confirmed, fighting erupted across the capital. It was concentrated initially on the densely populated southern district of Abu Salim, where he had operated with near-total impunity for years. His grip on the area long predated his 2021 appointment as head of the government-sanctioned Stability Support Apparatus (SSA) by then Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj. By midnight on 12 May, the clashes had spread across nearly every major neighbourhood of Tripoli—from Sarraj in the west to the outskirts of Tajura in the east, including the city center. When a fragile truce finally brought calm to Tripoli, unofficial figures reported eight civilian deaths, over a hundred injuries, and widespread destruction of both public and private property across the city. For all the chaos, it appeared the GNU had once again survived, emerging from one of the most threatening confrontations in its four-year history of lurching from one crisis to the next. However that proved to be a mirage. On 16 May, fed up with militia infighting, collapsing services, and a host of grievances, protesters poured into the streets of Tripoli in a rare public outburst—united by a single demand: Dbeibah and his government must go. Under mounting pressure and fear, three ministers resigned, while the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) Parliament announced it would begin the process of replacing both the prime minister and his GNU administration. Meanwhile, the Tripoli-based High Council of State accused Dbeibah of losing public trust and openly called for his resignation. Dbeibah's 18 May televised address was widely derided. Framing the violence as an effort to rid the capital of militias, the prime minister attempted to deflect blame. But many reminded him that he had empowered Ghneiwa himself—appointing him as head of the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA) and granting his militia $132 million in 2022 alone. Rather than calm tensions, Dbeibah's words sparked ridicule and disbelief. Accusations that demonstrators were paid agitators only deepened public anger. The rare wave of public demonstrations has largely subsided, settling into a quieter pattern of weekly protests held every Friday night—for now, at least. Several factors contributed to the lull, including the Eid al-Adha holidays and a rush to banks amid an unusual window of cash availability. Meanwhile, the House of Representatives (HoR) proceeded with hearings for 14 self-nominated candidates—all men—vying to replace Dbeibah as prime minister. But the process has since stalled, with little expectation that any of the contenders will be chosen. Concerns over a lack of UN and international recognition appear to have convinced the chamber to pause its plans—for the time being. In the background, the UN mission in Libya quietly released an advisory report prepared by its hand-picked committee, outlining four potential roadmaps to end the country's drawn-out transitional phase and pave the way for elections. All four proposals converge on one key recommendation: the GNU must be replaced by a new government tasked solely with organizing national elections within a fresh 24-month transitional period—arguably too long for a country in crisis, but perhaps the most realistic option under current conditions. UN envoy Hanna Tetteh is expected to brief the Security Council on 24 June, likely seeking its endorsement of the advisory committee's recommendations—without committing to any single option. The approach would give her the flexibility to shape a roadmap she deems most viable. Meanwhile, the GNU may be weakened, but it's far from finished. Dbeibah, backed by well-armed Misrata militias, is unlikely to step aside quietly—raising the spectre of a new, potentially more destructive round of conflict in an already battered Tripoli. Dbeibah and the GNU aren't going anywhere anytime soon. The militias still hold sway in the capital, public funds will continue to be squandered, and the prospect of a new government remains distant at best. As one Western diplomat, speaking anonymously, put it bluntly: 'No one wants to be seen as endorsing a failed state—but no one's willing to fix it either.'
Yahoo
30-05-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
Turkey and Russia Hold the Keys to Libya's Future
Recent clashes between pro-government militias in Tripoli once again threatened to unravel Libya's tenuous frozen conflict. Yet beyond the headline-grabbing instability, a quieter power struggle is unfolding, one in which Turkey and Russia are emerging as the most consequential actors, with both Ankara and Moscow utilizing the country's stalemate to entrench their own influence. From a domestic perspective, the risk of that frozen conflict heating back up became clear in May, when clashes erupted between rival militias aligned with the Government of National Unity, or GNU, under Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, killing at least eight people. The fighting broke out when a militia known as the 444th Brigade turned on Dbeibah, who relies on a coalition of armed groups to stay in power. Pro-GNU security forces managed to subdue the revolt, but amid the fighting, Abdel Ghani al-Kikli—the leader of the 444th Brigade—was assassinated. Dbeibah announced a 'ceasefire' two days after the fighting began, but anti-GNU protests broke out in the capital, marking one of the largest such demonstrations since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 and further highlighting the fragility of Libya's status quo. Indeed, speculation loomed that forces loyal to Gen. Khalifa Haftar and the House of Representatives, or HoR—a rival government based in Tobruk, in eastern Libya—might also intervene, which would further destabilize the capital. Still, the political and military fault lines that divide Libya are increasingly shaped by Turkey and Russia, who have settled into what analysts characterize as a 'managed rivalry' or 'adversarial collaboration,' as previously seen in other theaters where their interests simultaneously collide and overlap, such as Syria and the South Caucasus. To get more in-depth news and expert analysis on global affairs from WPR, sign up for our free Daily Review newsletter. The two powers backed opposing sides during Libya's civil war, with Turkey supporting the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord until it was superseded by the GNU in March 2021, while Russia backed Haftar's self-styled Libyan National Army, LNA, which fought in support of the Tobruk-based government. Nevertheless, Ankara and Moscow ultimately reached a tacit agreement not to escalate the conflict, despite deepening their economic and military engagement with their respective camps. Turkey's military intervention in 2020 decisively shifted the balance in Libya's civil war, repelling an offensive on Tripoli launched by Haftar in April 2019 and setting the stage for the United Nations-brokered ceasefire that ended the fighting between the Tripoli and Tobruk governments later that year. Since then, Turkey has remained the GNU's key patron, supplying military equipment such as Turkish-made armored vehicles, drones, air defense systems and artillery. The Turkish parliament has continued to renew the military mandate for its forces in Libya, with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan citing risks to Turkish interests if the GNU were to come under renewed assault. That deep level of support was almost certainly the decisive factor allowing Dbeibah and the GNU to retain the upper hand amid the recent unrest in Tripoli. While Turkey's military intervention had guaranteed it a seat at Libya's political table, Ankara has also secured oil and gas exploration deals with successive Tripoli-based administrations, beginning with a Memorandum of Understanding signed with the GNA in 2019 and later ratified by Dbeibah's government in October 2022. Although the Tripoli Court of Appeal ruled against the deal in February 2024, the GNU ultimately overrode the court's decision. That underscores how Ankara's outreach to Tripoli's powerbrokers has advanced its maritime and energy interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, even as Turkey's offshore territorial claims sparked tensions with Greece and Egypt, which said they infringed upon their own sovereignty. Moreover, Turkey's decision to side with Dbeibah in a spat with former Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha, who was previously a key Turkish ally, demonstrated Ankara's willingness to recalibrate quickly to maintain its influence. Indeed, beyond securing Tripoli, Ankara has also set its sights on improving its position in eastern Libya. After Storm Daniel and the collapse of Derna's dams in September 2023—described as 'Libya's 9/11'—Turkey provided swift humanitarian assistance, opening channels of communication with authorities in the East. In April, too, Turkey hosted Saddam Haftar—the son of Khalifa Haftar—for meetings with the Turkish defense minister and other military officials in Ankara, where they discussed supplying equipment and providing training to LNA forces. This marked a striking shift, considering that only a few years earlier, Khalifa Haftar denounced Turkish involvement in western Libya as an 'occupation.' Yet, with Khalifa Haftar now 81, Ankara appears to be hedging its bets by cultivating ties with Saddam, who has positioned himself as his father's successor. Evidently, Turkey is complementing its military power in the West with soft power and defense ties in the East, which would mean that any future political solution to Libya's divisions would almost certainly necessitate Turkish engagement. Russia's engagement in Libya has also been consequential, but was previously subtler. Moscow had initially maintained a modest military presence in the form of Wagner mercenaries and Syrian fighters aligned with Haftar's LNA. Since the October 2020 ceasefire, Russia has deepened its footprint, while cementing considerable influence in Libya's South and East. Moscow has become more open in its ties to Haftar, particularly following the fall of former dictator Bashar Al-Assad's regime in Syria. In May, both Khalifa and Saddam Haftar traveled to Moscow for Russia's World War II Victory Day celebrations, where they met senior officials and discussed expanding military cooperation, for which the elder Haftar expressed his gratitude. The deepening relationship comes at a time when Moscow is looking to reassert its Mediterranean presence following its loss of influence in Syria, which had guaranteed it an Eastern Mediterranean naval base in Tartus. In February, satellite imagery showed Russia's development of the Maaten Al Sarra airbase in southern Libya, where it had shipped S-300 and S-400 air defense systems. Around 1,000 Russian military personnel have also relocated to Libya from Syria. The added forces complement the former Wagner mercenaries—officially incorporated into Russia's military as the Africa Corps following Yevgeny Prighozin's death in 2023—who are already embedded within the LNA. Moreover, Russia reportedly seeks a naval base in Libya, with Tobruk itself cited as a potential location. Russia's growing influence with the LNA would likely make approval for building a naval base easier. Haftar's forces depend on Russia for their logistical networks and reportedly even require Russian approval to use certain military installations, indicating how much leverage Moscow has established over him. Yet rather than being an unconditional ally, Russia arguably views Haftar as a means to an end, a tool to maintain influence in Libya and extend its reach into Africa. Still, the fact Haftar and his son have engaged with Ankara, too, shows that the family is willing to leverage the competing powers to gain recognition. Thus, Russia and Haftar's ties can be deemed a 'marriage of convenience.' Indeed, like Turkey, Russia has also looked to the rival camp to hedge its bets. Moscow's outreach to Tripoli has gained momentum over the past two years, with a delegation traveling to Tripoli to meet with GNU officials—including Dbeibah—as recently as April. Beyond potentially allowing Moscow to use western Libya as a launchpad for power projection deeper into Africa, this balancing act advances Russia's energy interests, as Russian firms are now in talks with the Tripoli-based Presidential Council, which is aligned with the GNU, for exploration deals. Russia's entrenched role serves as a geopolitical bargaining chip, compelling European powers to engage with Moscow and advancing President Vladimir Putin's stated vision of a multipolar world order. There is also a potential risk of Russia of weaponizing Libya's energy sector; Haftar has previously blockaded oil facilities to pressure Tripoli, a tactic Moscow could exploit to disrupt or manipulate European energy supplies. Even short of active sabotage, a future Russian naval base in Libya would almost certainly raise alarm in European capitals. Yet all of this would likely be consolidated within a frozen conflict, one increasingly sustained by competing Russian and Turkish involvement. Still, the balance is increasingly tilting in Ankara's favor. That's showcased by how European states, which have remained reactive to events in Libya, have shifted their approach toward Turkey, especially in light of U.S. President Donald Trump's shaky support for NATO and Ukraine. While France was long a vocal critic of Turkish influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, it has softened its criticism of Ankara's foreign policy moves in recent years. Moreover, under Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Italy has deepened engagement with Turkey, viewing Ankara as indispensable to securing its goals in Libya of stemming migration and securing energy contracts. This was highlighted in Meloni's meeting with Erdogan on April 30, which also saw the two sides strengthen defense ties. Meanwhile, Washington has largely disengaged from Libya's conflict, aside from recent inflammatory suggestions that it would relocate migrants and even displaced Palestinians from Gaza to Libya. Both proposals were swiftly condemned, in part due to the country's lack of security and high risk of human trafficking. With Western involvement waning, any U.N.-backed efforts to unify the rival administrations under a single government, push for domestic reform or hold elections will almost certainly require Turkish buy-in. Persuading Moscow to scale back support for Haftar and relinquish its strategic foothold in the Mediterranean and Africa, will prove far more difficult. One pragmatic antidote to the stalemate could be deeper Western coordination with Turkey on Libya, aimed at forging a political solution. Yet with European Union member states showing varying appetites for engaging with Ankara, combined with Washington's continued detachment, Turkey is likely to maintain its 'adversarial collaboration' with Moscow. Turkey and Russia will likely continue their delicate balancing act and avoid risking direct confrontation. After all, the May 26 meeting in Moscow between President Putin and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan underscored their shared interest in maintaining communication, particularly over Ukraine and Black Sea stability, and avoiding a deeper rupture in ties. As for Libya, a continued stalemate risks entrenching the country's divisions rather than resolving them. If so, May's clashes, like last year's tensions in Tripoli that rattled oil markets and threatened Libya's banking system, may end up being a preview of even worse instability ahead. Jonathan Fenton-Harvey is a British analyst and journalist whose work has focused largely on Gulf Cooperation Council affairs, as well as geopolitical and economic issues pertaining to the wider Middle East and Indo-Pacific. He has worked with or written for a wide range of think tanks and publications based in the U.S., the U.K. and the Middle East. The post Turkey and Russia Hold the Keys to Libya's Future appeared first on World Politics Review.
