Libya's troubled GNU is not going just yet, further clashes are likely

Libyan Express

09-06-2025

Protesters gathered in Martyrs' Square in Tripoli, to demonstrate against the Government of National Unity led by Abdel Hamid Dbeibah, on May 30, 2025. AFP
Tripoli's Government of National Unity (GNU), led by Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, is under immense strain, but it would be premature to consider it finished. Despite mounting unrest, the GNU remains entrenched, deploying every tool at its disposal—from subtle propaganda and financial incentives to leveraging armed militias—to maintain control.
The turmoil of mid-May may have dealt the most serious blow yet to what many see as Libya's most corrupt and dysfunctional government since the fall of Gaddafi. This post-Gaddafi regime—born from NATO's 2011 intervention, the largest war coalition of the modern era—was sold as a mission of liberation, security, and prosperity, but instead plunged the country into more than a decade of chaos, lawlessness, and foreign interference unlike anything seen since Libya's independence over 70 years ago.
Late in the afternoon of May 12, reports began circulating that Abdulghani Al-Kikli—better known as 'Ghneiwa'—had been killed by the 444th Brigade at a military barracks in southern Tripoli. He had reportedly been lured to his death under the guise of a reconciliation meeting, intended to ease tensions that had been simmering around the capital for weeks. News of his death spread rapidly across social media and independent outlets, while government-linked media remained silent for two days before issuing vague, distorted reports. The government made no official comment until after fighting had already erupted across Tripoli's streets.
A short time after Ghneiwa's death was confirmed, fighting erupted across the capital. It was concentrated initially on the densely populated southern district of Abu Salim, where he had operated with near-total impunity for years. His grip on the area long predated his 2021 appointment as head of the government-sanctioned Stability Support Apparatus (SSA) by then Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj. By midnight on 12 May, the clashes had spread across nearly every major neighbourhood of Tripoli—from Sarraj in the west to the outskirts of Tajura in the east, including the city center.
When a fragile truce finally brought calm to Tripoli, unofficial figures reported eight civilian deaths, over a hundred injuries, and widespread destruction of both public and private property across the city. For all the chaos, it appeared the GNU had once again survived, emerging from one of the most threatening confrontations in its four-year history of lurching from one crisis to the next. However that proved to be a mirage.
On 16 May, fed up with militia infighting, collapsing services, and a host of grievances, protesters poured into the streets of Tripoli in a rare public outburst—united by a single demand: Dbeibah and his government must go. Under mounting pressure and fear, three ministers resigned, while the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) Parliament announced it would begin the process of replacing both the prime minister and his GNU administration. Meanwhile, the Tripoli-based High Council of State accused Dbeibah of losing public trust and openly called for his resignation.
Dbeibah's 18 May televised address was widely derided. Framing the violence as an effort to rid the capital of militias, the prime minister attempted to deflect blame. But many reminded him that he had empowered Ghneiwa himself—appointing him as head of the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA) and granting his militia $132 million in 2022 alone. Rather than calm tensions, Dbeibah's words sparked ridicule and disbelief. Accusations that demonstrators were paid agitators only deepened public anger.
The rare wave of public demonstrations has largely subsided, settling into a quieter pattern of weekly protests held every Friday night—for now, at least. Several factors contributed to the lull, including the Eid al-Adha holidays and a rush to banks amid an unusual window of cash availability. Meanwhile, the House of Representatives (HoR) proceeded with hearings for 14 self-nominated candidates—all men—vying to replace Dbeibah as prime minister. But the process has since stalled, with little expectation that any of the contenders will be chosen. Concerns over a lack of UN and international recognition appear to have convinced the chamber to pause its plans—for the time being.
In the background, the UN mission in Libya quietly released an advisory report prepared by its hand-picked committee, outlining four potential roadmaps to end the country's drawn-out transitional phase and pave the way for elections. All four proposals converge on one key recommendation: the GNU must be replaced by a new government tasked solely with organizing national elections within a fresh 24-month transitional period—arguably too long for a country in crisis, but perhaps the most realistic option under current conditions.
UN envoy Hanna Tetteh is expected to brief the Security Council on 24 June, likely seeking its endorsement of the advisory committee's recommendations—without committing to any single option. The approach would give her the flexibility to shape a roadmap she deems most viable. Meanwhile, the GNU may be weakened, but it's far from finished. Dbeibah, backed by well-armed Misrata militias, is unlikely to step aside quietly—raising the spectre of a new, potentially more destructive round of conflict in an already battered Tripoli.
Dbeibah and the GNU aren't going anywhere anytime soon. The militias still hold sway in the capital, public funds will continue to be squandered, and the prospect of a new government remains distant at best. As one Western diplomat, speaking anonymously, put it bluntly: 'No one wants to be seen as endorsing a failed state—but no one's willing to fix it either.'