Turkey and Russia Hold the Keys to Libya's Future

Yahoo

30-05-2025

Recent clashes between pro-government militias in Tripoli once again threatened to unravel Libya's tenuous frozen conflict. Yet beyond the headline-grabbing instability, a quieter power struggle is unfolding, one in which Turkey and Russia are emerging as the most consequential actors, with both Ankara and Moscow utilizing the country's stalemate to entrench their own influence.
From a domestic perspective, the risk of that frozen conflict heating back up became clear in May, when clashes erupted between rival militias aligned with the Government of National Unity, or GNU, under Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, killing at least eight people. The fighting broke out when a militia known as the 444th Brigade turned on Dbeibah, who relies on a coalition of armed groups to stay in power. Pro-GNU security forces managed to subdue the revolt, but amid the fighting, Abdel Ghani al-Kikli—the leader of the 444th Brigade—was assassinated.
Dbeibah announced a 'ceasefire' two days after the fighting began, but anti-GNU protests broke out in the capital, marking one of the largest such demonstrations since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 and further highlighting the fragility of Libya's status quo. Indeed, speculation loomed that forces loyal to Gen. Khalifa Haftar and the House of Representatives, or HoR—a rival government based in Tobruk, in eastern Libya—might also intervene, which would further destabilize the capital.
Still, the political and military fault lines that divide Libya are increasingly shaped by Turkey and Russia, who have settled into what analysts characterize as a 'managed rivalry' or 'adversarial collaboration,' as previously seen in other theaters where their interests simultaneously collide and overlap, such as Syria and the South Caucasus.
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The two powers backed opposing sides during Libya's civil war, with Turkey supporting the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord until it was superseded by the GNU in March 2021, while Russia backed Haftar's self-styled Libyan National Army, LNA, which fought in support of the Tobruk-based government. Nevertheless, Ankara and Moscow ultimately reached a tacit agreement not to escalate the conflict, despite deepening their economic and military engagement with their respective camps.
Turkey's military intervention in 2020 decisively shifted the balance in Libya's civil war, repelling an offensive on Tripoli launched by Haftar in April 2019 and setting the stage for the United Nations-brokered ceasefire that ended the fighting between the Tripoli and Tobruk governments later that year. Since then, Turkey has remained the GNU's key patron, supplying military equipment such as Turkish-made armored vehicles, drones, air defense systems and artillery.
The Turkish parliament has continued to renew the military mandate for its forces in Libya, with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan citing risks to Turkish interests if the GNU were to come under renewed assault. That deep level of support was almost certainly the decisive factor allowing Dbeibah and the GNU to retain the upper hand amid the recent unrest in Tripoli.
While Turkey's military intervention had guaranteed it a seat at Libya's political table, Ankara has also secured oil and gas exploration deals with successive Tripoli-based administrations, beginning with a Memorandum of Understanding signed with the GNA in 2019 and later ratified by Dbeibah's government in October 2022.
Although the Tripoli Court of Appeal ruled against the deal in February 2024, the GNU ultimately overrode the court's decision. That underscores how Ankara's outreach to Tripoli's powerbrokers has advanced its maritime and energy interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, even as Turkey's offshore territorial claims sparked tensions with Greece and Egypt, which said they infringed upon their own sovereignty.
Moreover, Turkey's decision to side with Dbeibah in a spat with former Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha, who was previously a key Turkish ally, demonstrated Ankara's willingness to recalibrate quickly to maintain its influence. Indeed, beyond securing Tripoli, Ankara has also set its sights on improving its position in eastern Libya. After Storm Daniel and the collapse of Derna's dams in September 2023—described as 'Libya's 9/11'—Turkey provided swift humanitarian assistance, opening channels of communication with authorities in the East.
In April, too, Turkey hosted Saddam Haftar—the son of Khalifa Haftar—for meetings with the Turkish defense minister and other military officials in Ankara, where they discussed supplying equipment and providing training to LNA forces. This marked a striking shift, considering that only a few years earlier, Khalifa Haftar denounced Turkish involvement in western Libya as an 'occupation.' Yet, with Khalifa Haftar now 81, Ankara appears to be hedging its bets by cultivating ties with Saddam, who has positioned himself as his father's successor.
Evidently, Turkey is complementing its military power in the West with soft power and defense ties in the East, which would mean that any future political solution to Libya's divisions would almost certainly necessitate Turkish engagement.
Russia's engagement in Libya has also been consequential, but was previously subtler. Moscow had initially maintained a modest military presence in the form of Wagner mercenaries and Syrian fighters aligned with Haftar's LNA. Since the October 2020 ceasefire, Russia has deepened its footprint, while cementing considerable influence in Libya's South and East.
Moscow has become more open in its ties to Haftar, particularly following the fall of former dictator Bashar Al-Assad's regime in Syria. In May, both Khalifa and Saddam Haftar traveled to Moscow for Russia's World War II Victory Day celebrations, where they met senior officials and discussed expanding military cooperation, for which the elder Haftar expressed his gratitude.
The deepening relationship comes at a time when Moscow is looking to reassert its Mediterranean presence following its loss of influence in Syria, which had guaranteed it an Eastern Mediterranean naval base in Tartus. In February, satellite imagery showed Russia's development of the Maaten Al Sarra airbase in southern Libya, where it had shipped S-300 and S-400 air defense systems. Around 1,000 Russian military personnel have also relocated to Libya from Syria. The added forces complement the former Wagner mercenaries—officially incorporated into Russia's military as the Africa Corps following Yevgeny Prighozin's death in 2023—who are already embedded within the LNA. Moreover, Russia reportedly seeks a naval base in Libya, with Tobruk itself cited as a potential location.
Russia's growing influence with the LNA would likely make approval for building a naval base easier. Haftar's forces depend on Russia for their logistical networks and reportedly even require Russian approval to use certain military installations, indicating how much leverage Moscow has established over him.
Yet rather than being an unconditional ally, Russia arguably views Haftar as a means to an end, a tool to maintain influence in Libya and extend its reach into Africa. Still, the fact Haftar and his son have engaged with Ankara, too, shows that the family is willing to leverage the competing powers to gain recognition. Thus, Russia and Haftar's ties can be deemed a 'marriage of convenience.'
Indeed, like Turkey, Russia has also looked to the rival camp to hedge its bets. Moscow's outreach to Tripoli has gained momentum over the past two years, with a delegation traveling to Tripoli to meet with GNU officials—including Dbeibah—as recently as April. Beyond potentially allowing Moscow to use western Libya as a launchpad for power projection deeper into Africa, this balancing act advances Russia's energy interests, as Russian firms are now in talks with the Tripoli-based Presidential Council, which is aligned with the GNU, for exploration deals.
Russia's entrenched role serves as a geopolitical bargaining chip, compelling European powers to engage with Moscow and advancing President Vladimir Putin's stated vision of a multipolar world order. There is also a potential risk of Russia of weaponizing Libya's energy sector; Haftar has previously blockaded oil facilities to pressure Tripoli, a tactic Moscow could exploit to disrupt or manipulate European energy supplies.
Even short of active sabotage, a future Russian naval base in Libya would almost certainly raise alarm in European capitals. Yet all of this would likely be consolidated within a frozen conflict, one increasingly sustained by competing Russian and Turkish involvement.
Still, the balance is increasingly tilting in Ankara's favor. That's showcased by how European states, which have remained reactive to events in Libya, have shifted their approach toward Turkey, especially in light of U.S. President Donald Trump's shaky support for NATO and Ukraine.
While France was long a vocal critic of Turkish influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, it has softened its criticism of Ankara's foreign policy moves in recent years. Moreover, under Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Italy has deepened engagement with Turkey, viewing Ankara as indispensable to securing its goals in Libya of stemming migration and securing energy contracts. This was highlighted in Meloni's meeting with Erdogan on April 30, which also saw the two sides strengthen defense ties.
Meanwhile, Washington has largely disengaged from Libya's conflict, aside from recent inflammatory suggestions that it would relocate migrants and even displaced Palestinians from Gaza to Libya. Both proposals were swiftly condemned, in part due to the country's lack of security and high risk of human trafficking.
With Western involvement waning, any U.N.-backed efforts to unify the rival administrations under a single government, push for domestic reform or hold elections will almost certainly require Turkish buy-in. Persuading Moscow to scale back support for Haftar and relinquish its strategic foothold in the Mediterranean and Africa, will prove far more difficult.
One pragmatic antidote to the stalemate could be deeper Western coordination with Turkey on Libya, aimed at forging a political solution. Yet with European Union member states showing varying appetites for engaging with Ankara, combined with Washington's continued detachment, Turkey is likely to maintain its 'adversarial collaboration' with Moscow.
Turkey and Russia will likely continue their delicate balancing act and avoid risking direct confrontation. After all, the May 26 meeting in Moscow between President Putin and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan underscored their shared interest in maintaining communication, particularly over Ukraine and Black Sea stability, and avoiding a deeper rupture in ties.
As for Libya, a continued stalemate risks entrenching the country's divisions rather than resolving them. If so, May's clashes, like last year's tensions in Tripoli that rattled oil markets and threatened Libya's banking system, may end up being a preview of even worse instability ahead.
Jonathan Fenton-Harvey is a British analyst and journalist whose work has focused largely on Gulf Cooperation Council affairs, as well as geopolitical and economic issues pertaining to the wider Middle East and Indo-Pacific. He has worked with or written for a wide range of think tanks and publications based in the U.S., the U.K. and the Middle East.
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