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Mint
01-06-2025
- Politics
- Mint
Nitin Pai: How to dissuade Pakistan from deploying terrorism
One of the biggest misconceptions about the recently suspended military conflict between India and Pakistan has been around the concept of deterrence. A number of commentators have used it as a frame to assess the objectives and outcomes of the brief but intense bout of warfare between the two countries. Some have argued that the terrorist attack in Pahalgam in Jammu and Kashmir marked a failure of deterrence. Others claim that Operation Sindoor restored that deterrence. Yet others claim that Sindoor itself is a failure because it will not prevent Pakistan from instigating terrorist attacks in the future. Much of the confusion comes from the lazy—and inappropriate—use of the term 'deterrence' in the context of terrorism and its punishment. Also Read: Nitin Pai: Operation Sindoor leaves India better placed for the next round Deterrence is a situation in which an adversary is persuaded not to take a particular action by holding out a threat of punishment. In the context of India and Pakistan, we can say that there is mutual nuclear deterrence because each side knows that it would suffer unacceptably severe damage. So, neither side will use nuclear weapons unless its red lines are crossed. These deliberately set the bar very high: India will not use nuclear weapons unless it is first attacked with them; Pakistan will use them only if its existence is threatened. Now here's the point: the existence of nuclear deterrence does not mean other types of conflicts are also deterred. Since the mid-1980s, Pakistan believed —and convinced many foreign strategists—that it could use its nuclear weapons to deter a conventional military attack. This emboldened its leaders to pursue a proxy war first in Punjab and later in Jammu and Kashmir with impunity. The calculation was that nuclear weapons not only neutralized India's stronger conventional forces, but also afforded Pakistan space to promote terrorism and insurgency. Also Read: World should take note of Pak's nuclear bombs The post-Uri surgical strikes, the Balakot operation and now Operation Sindoor have shown that Pakistan can no longer assume that it can deter India at the conventional level. Operation Sindoor, particularly, demonstrated New Delhi's willingness and capacity to hit Pakistani targets along the entire length of the border. Contrary to subsequent media hype, the targets were chosen to keep the nuclear angle out of the picture. The message was clear: nuclear weapons will not deter India from engaging in conventional warfare with a punitive intensity. India, for its part, had never been able to deter Pakistan from using terrorism. The bad news is that despite the military response, it will remain nearly impossible to do so in the future. As I have argued in recent columns, India has over the past three decades raised Pakistan's costs, leading to a reduction in the frequency and intensity of terror attacks. Also Read: Nitin Pai: Operation Sindoor sets a new normal for India's strategy Operation Sindoor has managed to ratchet up those costs significantly. It is possible to raise them further, but, unfortunately, never to a level that is prohibitive to the other side. So, it is a matter of time before another Pakistani general is tempted to take another—albeit more expensive—shot at the country's old game. Operation Sindoor is, thus, about dissuasion, discouragement and disincentivization. Contrary to intuition, the fact that India is prepared to suffer damage in order to punish Pakistan makes this strategy all the more credible. The Pahalgam attacks are a reminder that the task of dissuasion is continuous and multipronged. It starts with policies that reduce the impact of terrorism. It is obvious that the Pakistani establishment uses terror attacks not only to trigger a disproportionate security response that alienates the local population in Kashmir, but also to spark communal tensions across the country. To the extent that Indian society is united, harmonious and at peace with itself, even a big terror attack will only have a small political impact. Second, India should continue to systematically engage Pakistan's key foreign partners and persuade them that terrorism being fuelled by Pakistan is not in their interests. Over the past three decades, Indian diplomacy has been successful in getting the United States, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates to stop rewarding Rawapindi's capers. There should be no let up on this front and it is a job for India's professional diplomats. Third, intelligence capabilities and the security architecture need constant attention. This is all the more challenging because the restoration of democratic politics and normal life in Jammu and Kashmir requires a relaxation of security arrangements. It is not surprising that the Pahalgam attack took place in a period of transition. Finally, the military balance must overwhelmingly be in India's favour across the Line of Control as well as the border. This is a corollary of the post-Sindoor normal. It is not just a comparison of troop numbers and arsenals, but a matter of the size of the qualitative edge. There are indications that China's support for Pakistani military operations went beyond supplying equipment. This ought to change our calculations of the military balance required to dissuade Rawalpindi's generals. The author is co-founder and director of The Takshashila Institution, an independent centre for research and education in public policy.
News18
14-05-2025
- Politics
- News18
The Limits of Classical Deterrence
Last Updated: From the Kargil infiltration to the Parliament attack, the 2008 Mumbai carnage, and 2019 Pulwama suicide bombing, Pakistan has demonstrated that terrorism is not a deviation Deterrence is not a static possession; it is a performance, an act of will repeatedly staged before an audience of adversaries who test its authenticity with every provocation. As Thomas Schelling argued, it is not brute force that deters, but the artful manipulation of risk and consequence. However, when the adversary is not a rational state pursuing defined interests, but a militarised theocracy masquerading as a republic, one that nurtures jihadist proxies as instruments of state policy, deterrence ceases to function in classical terms. It becomes unstable, reactive, and dangerously porous. Robert Jervis long warned that deterrence depends less on capability than on perception, and misperceptions, especially when willful, can cause it to collapse altogether. Pakistan's deep state does not merely misunderstand signals; it distorts them, weaponises ambiguity, and thrives on the fog of war it helps create. Pakistan's doctrine of 'death by a thousand cuts" is an institutional strategy cultivated over decades. First articulated in the wake of the 1971 war, and pursued with renewed intensity after the failures of conventional engagements, this doctrine reflects the Pakistani Army's conviction that it cannot match India in open battle, but can bleed it through relentless, low-intensity conflict. Its strategic depth lies not in geography, but in deniability, in a complex ecosystem of terror outfits, training camps, and ideological sanctuaries nurtured by the state and its intelligence agencies. From the Kargil infiltration of 1999, which was planned even as Pakistan feigned diplomacy, to the 2001 Parliament attack, the 2008 Mumbai carnage, and the Pulwama suicide bombing in 2019, Pakistan has repeatedly demonstrated that terrorism is not a deviation. These attacks are not the acts of rogue actors. They are systematically orchestrated by groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, entities headquartered in Pakistan, operating training facilities with impunity in Punjab and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. The cross-border incursions are not aberrations but rituals of strategic signalling, aimed at exhausting India's patience while leveraging nuclear deterrence to shield against conventional retaliation. In effect, Pakistan has treated its territory as both a sanctuary and a launchpad, outsourcing strategic confrontation to non-state actors while insulating itself from direct accountability. This calibrated ambiguity, of plausible deniability wrapped in nuclear doctrine, has long boxed India into a corner, limiting its responses to dossiers and demarches. But the strategic calculus has shifted significantly post-Uri and Balakot, and now Operation Sindoor. India is beginning to articulate its own doctrine: one that recognizes that restraint without consequence is mistaken for weakness, and that strategic credibility must occasionally be demonstrated in fire, not words. Traditional deterrence theory, developed during the Cold War by thinkers like Bernard Brodie, Thomas Schelling, and Glenn Snyder, presupposed a set of strategic conditions: rational unitary actors, a clear hierarchy of command, and an ability to link action with consequence through reciprocal threat. But the rise of state-sponsored non-state actors—terrorist groups, proxies, and ideological militias—has ruptured this framework. In such scenarios, the deterrer confronts what political theorist Martha Crenshaw termed 'strategic fragmentation"—where the actor initiating violence is insulated from punishment, while the state enabling that violence hides behind legal and diplomatic ambiguity. As Daniel Byman (2005) has argued, 'the state sponsor calculates the benefits of plausible deniability as outweighing the costs of global condemnation," turning the non-state actor into both weapon and shield. This renders classical deterrence largely ineffective, as the key requirement of attribution collapses. India's evolving strategy represents a meaningful attempt to reimagine deterrence under these conditions. By holding the sponsor accountable for the surrogate's actions, New Delhi is reconfiguring the deterrence relationship from dyadic (State A vs State B) to triadic (State A vs State B + Proxy), targeting the violence ecosystem, not just the visible actor. Operation Sindoor further advances this framework by demonstrating that India will no longer distinguish between proximate actors and the strategic architecture that enables them. In doing so, India is operationalising a doctrine of hybrid deterrence, one that speaks to the moral hazard of outsourcing war and offers a doctrinal template for other democracies navigating grey-zone conflict, from Israel's campaign against Hamas and Hezbollah to the U.S. post-9/11 counter-terror posture. Operation Sindoor was a paradigm shift towards creating deterrence for both state and non-state actors. With Operation Sindoor, India has made a few things very clear. First, it has established a template of predictable consequences. A pre-announced expectation that terrorism will trigger punishment. This reduces strategic ambiguity for both domestic and international audiences, but most importantly for Pakistan's deep state. It will shift the cost-benefit calculus in Rawalpindi, from viewing cross-border terrorism as a low-cost, high-deniability enterprise to one that carries an assured price. Second, predictable retaliation may paradoxically enhance deterrence credibility, especially in the context of repeated provocations. As Robert Jervis warned, deterrence often fails not due to weakness but due to mismatched perceptions, where adversaries underestimate resolve because previous actions were one-off, reactive, or too surprising to set a precedent. Therefore, by creating a pattern of anticipated and delivered response, India is attempting to recalibrate Pakistan's perception of its threshold for retaliation. Third, this predictability will also reduce the risk of miscalculation on India's side while transferring the burden of escalation onto Pakistan. Unlike surprise operations, which may spark panic or overreaction in a nuclear-armed state, a publicly telegraphed strike enables crisis management mechanisms to activate in advance. India retains escalation dominance by striking only terror infrastructure, thereby distinguishing between the Pakistani state and its proxies, while still raising the political cost of harbouring such proxies. top videos View all Lastly, from the perspective of international diplomacy, this shift also aids legitimacy. When retaliation is signalled, proportional, and avoids civilian or military targets, it is harder to cast India as the aggressor. The pre-emptive communication of intent aligns with emerging doctrines of 'responsible retaliation" seen in counter-terror campaigns globally, particularly post-9/11 doctrines espoused by the US and Israel. First Published: May 14, 2025, 13:42 IST
New Indian Express
13-05-2025
- Politics
- New Indian Express
Modi spells out the new normal in dealing with terror
In Prime Minister Narendra Modi's first televised address to the nation since the April 22 Pahalgam massacre, the focal point of interest was his counter to US President Donald Trump's bombast earlier in the day about leveraging trade to force a 'full and immediate ceasefire'. Modi punctured the claim, saying that retaliatory action under Operation Sindoor against Pakistan's terror and military infrastructure had only been paused, adding that future decisions would depend on Pakistan's response. If the post-Uri surgical strike in 2016 and the Balakot air strike in 2019 had created new parameters for India's response to terror attacks, Operation Sindoor signalled the policy's latest 'benchmark', the PM underlined. It has three prongs. One, in the event of any future terror attack, India would go after the roots of the outfit in Pakistan that is responsible for it. Two, the country has zero tolerance for nuclear blackmail. And three, India would not differentiate between the government sponsoring terrorism and the masterminds of terrorism. This, Modi asserted, was the 'new normal'. The bit about nuclear blackmail was also directed at Trump, as he and a few other world leaders had become uneasy amid claims of Pakistan considering a strategic response. Word had gone out that a meeting of the National Command Authority, the apex body on Pakistan's nuclear weapons, had been called. This sent the global community into overdrive and Trump later claimed credit for averting a nuclear flashpoint. A similar drama was enacted in the wake of the Pulwama attack and the Balakot counterstrike in 2019, but India and the then Trump administration showed steel by staring Pakistan down.
Economic Times
12-05-2025
- Business
- Economic Times
Check emotions at the door' – Warren Buffett's lesson resonates in volatile times: Amar Ambani
In times of market turbulence, it's not always the smartest investor who wins—but the most emotionally disciplined one. Amid heightened geopolitical tensions, global policy shifts, and uncertain domestic triggers, Amar Ambani, Executive Director at YES SECURITIES, reflects on Warren Buffett's timeless investing wisdom: 'Check your emotions at the door.' In a candid conversation on the latest segment of ETMarkets Smart Talk, Ambani shares why Warren Buffett's words are more relevant than ever in today's volatile markets, and how investors can navigate uncertainty with patience, prudence, and a contrarian mindset. Edited Excerpts – ADVERTISEMENT Thanks for taking the time out. The month of May started off on a volatile note with the tariff war & now India-Pakistan tensions. What is your take on markets?A) Just as the 90-day pause on Trump's tariff plans brought some relief, fresh tensions with Pakistan have reintroduced uncertainty. History suggests such geopolitical flashpoints rarely cause lasting damage to Indian equities - be it Kargil, the Parliament attack, 26/11, or Pulwama. The post-Uri correction coincided with demonetization, which had a far deeper economic impact. With the market already down ~15% from its peak, some downside is priced in. That said, I expect continued volatility and a rangebound trend over the next 5–6 months. Relations with Pakistan could worsen, and any escalation may trigger knee-jerk reactions. Compounding this is the absence of strong domestic triggers - earnings remain muted and consumption recovery is still long-term investors, this phase could offer attractive entry points. But broadly, 2025 looks more like a consolidation year than a breakout one. ADVERTISEMENT Q) Why this sudden selloff in the pharma space? There is some chatter after US President Donald Trump signed an executive order to ramp up domestic drug manufacturing.A) The recent selloff in the pharma space is driven by renewed concerns around US policy. President Trump's executive order to boost domestic drug manufacturing has added to the overhang, especially following earlier comments on imposing 100% tariffs on imported companies like Sun Pharma and Lupin have US plants, majority of Indian pharma's revenues still come from exports. The executive order also asks the US FDA to fast-track approvals for domestic facilities, potentially giving US-based competitors an edge. ADVERTISEMENT Though a trade deal between the US and India is likely, uncertainty around tariffs and regulatory timelines continues to weigh on the fundamentals side, Indian pharma's US revenues have been growing in low single digits since 2022. The acute segment in the domestic market has also been weak for the past two years. Additionally, the recent appreciation of the INR is eroding the currency benefit that had supported earnings. ADVERTISEMENT Q) May has been relatively good for bulls as Nifty closed with gains in 7 out of the last 10 years. With FIIs on a selling spree – will we see 'sell in May & go away'?A) FIIs were heavy sellers in prior months, leading to some under-ownership in Indian equities. And there's been a notable shift recently, with FIIs turning net buyers over the past couple of a broader return will depend on how the geopolitical situation with Pakistan evolves, global trade clarity and relative valuations. ADVERTISEMENT That said, the macro environment is turning supportive: the INR has stabilised and appreciated, the US dollar is softening, and US bond yields are near-term volatility, the structural case for Indian equities remains intact. I believe the best phase of FII flows into India still lies ahead. Q) What is happening with Crude oil? We are seeing some wild swings in commodities. Lower crude oil will help the economy. How do you see the scenario for India? A) The current crude oil price range of $60-70 per barrel is in line with our house view and appears sustainable. It helps avoid inflationary surprises, however, any incremental benefit may be limited, as the government has already adjusted fuel taxes, keeping retail prices elevated in spite the fall in oil import bill stood at around $175 billion in FY24 and is expected to remain at similar levels in FY25 and FY26. So, the incremental economic impact from benign oil is likely to be capped from said, softer crude prices still bring meaningful indirect advantages. They help stabilise the rupee, improve sentiment, and enhance the relative attractiveness of Indian equities for foreign investors. Q) What is your take on earnings and how the next few quarters are likely to pan out? A) Revenue growth has been fairly steady at around 7% year-on-year over the past few quarters-excluding Q2, which came in at 4.2%-and we expect Q4 FY25 to follow a similar real story this quarter, however, could be on the margin front, where we're likely to see a positive surprise of around 20 basis points, translating into a profit beat vs ahead, with inflation under control, signs of a rural consumption revival, and the base effect kicking in from Q2 FY26, we expect corporate earnings to accelerate. FY26 earnings growth is likely to come in around 12-13%, driven by improved operating leverage and stability in input costs. Q) It looks like we have entered a sideways market, and money-making might not be that easy. Patience and right stock selection might be the key. Staying on cash just like Buffett is the right strategy? A) The fact that Warren Buffett raised Berkshire's cash pile to over $342 billion, an all-time high both in absolute terms and as a percentage of the company's size, speaks volumes. He's been early, cautious, and right yet again - it's like scoring a century in your farewell test said, for most investors, if you had already raised cash earlier, this is the time to start deploying selectively. For those who didn't, I wouldn't recommend panic selling at this stage unless you're sitting on significantly overvalued positions. Plenty of quality stocks are now available at reasonable valuations and present good entry pockets of froth still exist even after the correction, and those should be trimmed. This is truly a stock-picker's market now, not one where you can rely on the tide to lift all boats. Q) What is your take on the recent Warren Buffett AGM? Any learnings that you have gathered from the speech/note? A) It's always insightful to hear from the master. Sometimes, it's not about learning something entirely new, but about having timeless principles reinforced in a way that makes you pause and words this time really hit home, especially when he said, 'People have emotions, but you've got to check them at the door when you invest.' That's a powerful reminder in today's volatile standout line for me was, 'We will make our best deals when people are the most pessimistic.' It underscores the value of contrarian thinking and emotional discipline, principles that are easy to understand, but hard to practice ability to remain calm, rational, and opportunistic in the face of market noise is what continues to set him apart. Q) Equity is good but there is some chatter on the Street that bonds might do well in the short term. What are your views? What should be the ideal asset allocation? A) Personally, I'm 100% into equities - that's just my preference (smiles). But asset allocation is critical for most investors and should always be tailored to individual factors like age, risk appetite and risk capacity, liquidity needs, and financial goals. There's no one-size-fits-all inflation likely to undershoot the RBI's 4% target, real rates are reasonably high. At a 6% repo rate, the real rate is over 2%, which opens the door for rate cuts. We could see up to three cuts, bringing the repo rate down to around 5.25%.In that scenario, bond yields will ease further and the 10-year could drift to below 6%. However, the short end may see more yield compression, especially after the distortions of the past couple of years. That could lead to a steepening of the yield curve. (Disclaimer: Recommendations, suggestions, views, and opinions given by experts are their own. These do not represent the views of the Economic Times)
Time of India
07-05-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
'Picture abhi baki hai': Former Indian Army chief Naravane as India strikes Pakistan. Is more attacks being planned?
India attacks Pakistan Terror Locations Retired Army chief backs strike, says 'more to come' — ManojNaravane (@ManojNaravane) Pahalgam attack left 26 dead, mostly tourists from Gujarat India anticipates more terror strikes, essential to counter them, says Foreign Secretary Live Events You Might Also Like: Who is Colonel Sophia Qureshi, the decorated Army officer who briefed media on Operation Sindoor? Experts say strike follows India's post-Uri and Balakot doctrine Opposition seeks all-party briefing Public reaction mixed but supportive What's next: situation under watch India launched a targeted military strike across the Line of Control (LoC) on Monday night, days after 26 Indian tourists were killed in a terror attack in Jammu and Kashmir's Pahalgam last month. The Indian and Pakistan governments confirmed the strike was aimed at camps linked to the group suspected to have planned the Indian Army said it carried out the strike based on 'credible intelligence' inputs. Officials said the operation was limited to 'precision targets' inside Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and was completed without any reported Indian casualties. Defence sources said the strike was not meant as a full-scale escalation but to send a strong Indian Army chief General (Retd.) Manoj Naravane reacted to the strike by stating, 'Abhi picture baki hai,' a Hindi phrase meaning 'the story isn't over yet.' He said India has the capacity to respond strongly and will act when necessary. Naravane added that this strike was 'a step' and not the 'final response.'The Pahalgam terror attack on April 27 killed 26 people, most were tourists visiting the region during a long weekend. The attack was carried out using explosives on a bus, followed by gunfire. No group claimed responsibility, but Indian agencies have linked the planning to terror networks across the Secretary Vikram Misri on Wednesday said intelligence inputs have flagged the possibility of further terror attacks on Indian soil. "Our intelligence agencies monitoring terrorist activities have indicated that there could be more attacks on India, and it was felt essential to both stop and tackle them," Misri said while addressing a government press briefing on Operation Sindoor Strategic experts said Monday night's operation reflects India's continued approach of targeted response to cross-border attacks, similar to its strikes after the 2016 Uri attack and 2019 Pulwama incident. The strikes indicate India's policy of using measured force to deter terror activities without triggering a full-scale leaders welcomed the Army's action but called on the government to provide an all-party briefing. Congress leader Mallikarjun Kharge said national security issues should be above politics and demanded transparency. Other parties urged for careful handling to avoid media saw a wave of support for the Indian Army. Hashtags related to the strike trended online. Many users quoted Naravane's 'Abhi picture baki hai' remark as a sign of ongoing resolve. Some citizens, however, expressed concern about the risk of further agencies remain on high alert, especially in Jammu and Kashmir. Officials said India will continue to monitor Pakistan's response. Meanwhile, diplomatic channels have been activated to prevent tensions from rising further.
