US-Japan alliance will never be the same after Trump
At first glance, this seems like a step in the right direction for bilateral relations. Yet the reality runs deeper and is far more troubling for ties.
The fact that Japan — a key US ally — had to dispatch its top trade negotiator back to Washington to clarify and confirm the details of a deal signed barely weeks earlier is unprecedented.
It underscores a significant deterioration in trust and communication that risks undermining the foundation of the bilateral alliance.
In diplomacy, particularly among allies, clarity and transparency are paramount. When agreements are left ambiguous or appear subject to unilateral reinterpretation, suspicion inevitably grows.
Of course, no trade deal is ever immune to differing interpretations. But the apparent mishandling of this tariff implementation reflects a broader challenge: the unpredictability of American trade policy under the Trump administration, where deals are frequently revisited, sometimes abruptly, and things can simply change on a whim.
For Trump and his team, the tariffs represent a bold measure to Make America Great Again (MAGA) – to protect domestic industries, level global playing fields and strategically contain China's growing economic influence.
However, the costs of these tariffs are far from straightforward. While some domestic industries may benefit from protectionist measures, many economists warn that tariffs tend to be a zero-sum game or, worse yet, a minus-sum game.
Many American corporations are expected to shoulder the burden of higher costs. Consumers in the US will likely face steeper prices as companies pass on those costs.
Meanwhile, China, the apparent primary target of these tariffs, has shown an ability to adapt by finding ways to bypass or mitigate the impact through diversified trade channels and other measures.
At this point, it's still too early to predict the outcome of Trump's trade wars. He may ultimately emerge victorious. But the ripple effects on key political relationships, including with Japan, will be far-reaching.
For Japan, this period is particularly challenging. The government, led by Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, faces growing domestic criticism for failing to secure a written agreement with the US, leaving the country vulnerable to conflicting interpretations and market instability.
The political stakes are high. Ishiba's administration is already weakened after a historic defeat in the recent Upper House election, and a protracted tariff dispute with Washington will only deepen calls for his resignation.
More importantly, Japan's growing suspicion of US diplomacy signals a potential fracture in an alliance that has been a pillar of regional security and economic prosperity for decades.
As the world watches the evolution of Trump-era trade policies, one truth stands out: treating traditional allies as afterthoughts risks causing long-term damage to alliances that may prove difficult to repair even after Trump's tenure ends.
Kenji Yoshida is a Seoul-based correspondent for JAPAN Forward.
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