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Humbled and humiliated, India should look beyond Modi

Humbled and humiliated, India should look beyond Modi

AllAfrica12-05-2025
The Pahalgam attack in Kashmir not only claimed 26 lives and sparked a losing military confrontation with Pakistan, but has also plunged Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi into an unprecedented crisis of credibility.
The botched military response, where Pakistan reportedly shot down Indian fighters and at least one drone, has exposed new weaknesses in India's strategic vision, military prowess and diplomatic autonomy.
The failures, from battlefield missteps to diplomatic capitulations, underscore the urgent need for reform and introspection to restore India's standing in South Asia and beyond. Ultimately, that may mean moving on from Modi's faltering leadership.
The Pahalgam attack laid bare the persistent vulnerabilities in India's internal security apparatus amid the intractable complexities of the Kashmir conflict. In a knee-jerk response, Modi authorized a military operation, dubbed 'Operation Sindhur,' targeting Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir with airstrikes.
The operation, however, faltered spectacularly by any credible measure. Pakistan claimed its Chinese-made fighter jets, armed with air-to-air missiles, downed India's French-made Rafale jet—a claim New Delhi has vehemently denied.
If true, and the claims have by now been widely reported in global media, the loss of a Rafale jet to a supposedly less-advanced Pakistani adversary marks a humiliating blow to India's claim to regional supremacy.
In a significant turn, apparently initiated after losing fighter jets to Pakistan's counterstrikes, India's Foreign Minister S Jaishankar and National Security Adviser Ajit Doval turned to Washington for mediation.
Under American pressure, both sides agreed to a ceasefire on May 10, followed by commander-level talks on May 12. While the de-escalation has temporarily cooled nuclear-tinged hostilities, it humiliatingly underscored India's reliance on external powers to manage its regional conflicts—a significant, if not damning, indictment of its strategic autonomy.
At the same time, the episode has spotlighted the enduring complexity and extraordinary danger of the unresolved Kashmir issue and the critical role of international cooperation in combating terrorism – all the while exposing India's diplomatic limitations to do so on its own.
For decades, India has viewed South Asia as its sphere of influence, pursuing a regional hegemony akin to the Monroe Doctrine for the Indian Ocean.
By cultivating influence over neighbors like Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives, India positioned itself as the preeminent power in the subcontinent. However, the Pahalgam fiasco and the subsequent need for American intervention have shattered this narrative of dominance.
Beyond Bhutan, where India's influence remains firmly intact, its South Asian sway is waning as external powers exert growing influence in the region.
In Nepal, a Western-backed government defiant of India's preferences has challenged New Delhi's authority. Meanwhile, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives are deepening ties with China and other global powers, further diluting India's regional leverage.
This shift signals a reconfiguration of South Asia's power dynamics, with India's once-strong hegemony in clear decline. The Pahalgam episode has exposed India's growing vulnerabilities and will arguably embolden its neighbors to seek or double down on alternative alignments.
Since assuming power, Modi has relentlessly promoted India as a 'Vishwa Guru' (world leader) and emerging superpower, touting strides in economic growth, military modernization and global clout.
However, sober Indian strategists and analysts have cautioned that India is still far removed from superpower status, classifying it instead as a middle power with significant limitations. Now, the Pahalgam crisis and Pakistan's new claim of China-provided air superiority have dealt a blow to even this modest assessment.
Curiously, the most piercing critiques of India's diminished stature emanate not from its traditional adversaries, Pakistan or China, but from its ostensible ally, the United States.
Modi's self-proclaimed 'great friend' has subtly undermined India's position through actions like the November 2021 'Freedom of Navigation' operation in the Indian Ocean, which signaled American assertiveness in India's sphere of influence. The US-brokered ceasefire over the weekend has cemented this dynamic.
Analysts are already speculating that the US may have extracted big concessions from Modi, possibly compelling India to accept unfavorable terms in a bilateral trade deal as the price of mediation. India, it should be noted, was hit exceptionally hard by Donald Trump's 'Liberation Day' reciprocal tariffs.
This transactional diplomacy highlights India's eroding autonomy and relegation to a subordinate role in Washington's orbit. Far from being a peer, India is increasingly cast as a pliable ally, its superpower ambitions subordinated to America's strategic priorities. This raises troubling questions about India's ability to chart an independent course in a multipolar world.
Modi's failure to grasp the cynical underpinnings of Western flattery has compounded India's strategic woes. Western powers often laud leaders they can manipulate, cloaking their praise in terms of their subjects' supposed strength and vision. Modi, misreading this tactic, has internalized the adulation as evidence of his own prowess.
Upon assuming office, he appointed S Jaishankar, a diplomat aligned with Western interests, as foreign secretary in 2015 and external affairs minister in 2019, cementing a pro-US tilt in India's foreign policy. This alignment, however, has arguably yielded diminishing returns, as India finds itself increasingly beholden to American agendas.
Domestically, meanwhile, the government-aligned 'Godi media' has played a pivotal role in inflating Modi's image, relentlessly portraying him as a strong and decisive leader. Dissenting voices—namely journalists, intellectuals, and activists—have been silenced through state coercion, creating an echo chamber that has insulated Modi from reality.
This manufactured persona, however, has crumbled under the weight of the Pahalgam failure and the subsequent American intervention in the crisis. India's true strength lies in its economic resilience, technological advancements and strategic acumen, not in the hollow accolades of Western capitals or the sycophantic narratives of domestic media.
Modi's inability to discern this has left India mired in a dangerous illusion. And the Pahalgam incident and subsequent military humiliation at the hands of arch rival Pakistan have arguably awakened a wider swath of Indians to the stark realities of their country's limitations and Modi's failings.
At the same time, the crisis presents India with a critical opportunity for introspection and change. India must prioritize economic revitalization, military modernization and a recalibrated foreign policy to reclaim its waning regional influence and power.
Building trust with neighbors is essential to restoring India's regional clout. Equally important is reducing dependence on Western powers, particularly the US, by pursuing a more balanced and assertive diplomacy that reflects India's unique geopolitical realities.
India's ruling National Democratic Alliance (NDA) now faces a pivotal post-Pahalgam decision: continue with Modi at the helm or to seek new leadership? Modi's penchant for crude strategizing, susceptibility to flattery and diplomatic missteps appear increasingly ill-suited for navigating the complexities of today's multipolar world. A new leader could steer India toward a more pragmatic and effective course.
The Pahalgam attack and its fallout have put India in a profound crisis, one that has exposed the limits of its regional hegemony and the frailties of Modi's leadership. India's superpower ambition, nurtured by years of grandiose rhetoric and macho posturing, has been shattered by Pahalgam's upshots.
As South Asia's power dynamics shift, India needs bold reforms to redefine its role on the global stage. The longer Modi clings to power, the greater the peril to India's standing. Pahalgam has laid bare, among other things, that it's time for a post-Modi course correction.
Bhim Bhurtel is on X at @BhimBhurtel
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