Iraq's Fragile Stability "is Threatened by a Shifting ME Order"
Iraq's fragile stability is threatened by a shifting Middle Eastern order
For the first time in recent memory, Iraq has found itself on the margins of a major Middle Eastern conflict rather than at its epicentre.
Open conflict between Iran and Israel arrived during a rare window of relative stability and developmental progress.
Yet, this moment of fragile calm is unlikely to endure. Iraq is on the brink of being drawn into what appears to be a transformative upheaval in the regional order.
Click here to download the full report. Tags: Chatham House, Iran, Israel, Renad Mansour, United States
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Iraq Business
4 days ago
- Iraq Business
Jiyad: Turkey Ends ITPA - Blackmail or Preservation of Iraqi Sovereign Rights
By Ahmed Mousa Jiyad . Any opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News. Turkey Ends ITPA- Submission to Blackmail or Preservation of Iraqi Sovereign Rights and National Interests The Turkish government officially ended, on 21 July 2025, the Iraqi Turkish Oil Pipeline Agreement-ITOPA, effective on 27 July 2026.[1] A couple of days later, the Turkish Minister of Energy proposed amending and expanding- ITOPA.[2] Obviously, the Turkish formal position is inconsistent with ITOPA' "2010 Amendment". So far, no formal position was announced by the Iraqi government on the Turkish move. [3] The Turkish act was the topic of a debating event, in Arabic, that was convened by "Al-Mushtarac Platform" on 1 August 2025.* Below is a brief of my presentation, with minor updating. My intervention at the debating event covers the following themes: 1. A brief background on ITOPA, focusing on its latest amendment in 2010, which expires in 2026. An analysis of the Turkish position in light of the agreement's legal frameworks on the one hand, and the very complex set of economic, geopolitical, and geostrategic considerations on the other. 3. The impact of the Turkish decision on Iraq: A critical analysis of what Iraq should have done since 2023, what Iraq have done, and the alternatives currently available for Iraq. First: A brief background on ITOPA and its latest amendment ITOPA was signed on August 27, 1973. The pipeline on the Turkish side consists of two parallel lines: a 40-inch line, which is the first expansion of the system that was completed in 1984, and a 46-inch line, which is the second expansion, completed in 1987. This brought total design pumping capacity to 1.6 Mbpd. ITOPA latest amendment was signed in 2010 and became effective in July 2011. In November 2013, KRG completed the laying of an oil pipeline from Khormala to the metering station at Fishkhabur for the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, then connected it to the 40-inch pipeline on the Turkish side. In the same month, KRG and Turkey signed 50-year agreements regarding KRG oil export. On 21 May 2014, the first shipment of KRG oil was loaded for export from the port of Ceyhan. That loading prompted the Ministry of Oil-MoO to invoking arbitration clause of ITOPA amendment before the Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce-ICC on 23 May 2014, and ICC award was delivered on 23 March 2023. A formal document entitled, "Amendment to the Crude Oil Pipeline Agreement signed on August 27, 1973, and the following related agreements, protocols, minutes of meetings, and annexes between the Government of the Republic of Iraq and the Government of the Republic of Turkey," signed on September 19, 2010. The amendment entered into force in July 2011 and expires in July 2026.[4] The "Amendment" document consists of 16 pages and includes 11 articles: 1- Definitions. 2- General Provisions. 3- Pumping Capacity and Minimum Obligated Pumping Capacity. 4- Transit Tariffs and Payments. 5- Recovered and Wasted Crude Oil. 6- Ownership of Crude Oil Filling Pipelines and Tank Flors. 7- Iraq Office in Ceyhan Port. 8- Other Issues. 9- Force Majeure. 10- Dispute Settlement. 11- Duration of the Amendment and Date of Entry Into Force. According to Article 11, the duration/term of "Amendment" is 15 years effective from July 2011, with time-framed four options: 1- amendment, 2- new agreement, 3- automatic extension for five years and 4- end of the amendment term. Second: Analysing Turkish' action and position The following analysis is premised on the legal frameworks of ITOPA amendment on the one hand, and the very complex economic, geopolitical, and geostrategic considerations on the other. From a legal perspective related to international bilateral agreements, Turkey's move does not violate Article 11 of the Amendment, Turkey chose the fourth option. But why? Theoretically and analytically, Turkey could have waited another five years for ITOPA amendment to expire, and during that period, it could use the pipeline, which has become ready to be operational. However, Turkey may have found that the current overall circumstances-domestic and regional economic, geopolitical, and geostrategic- are conducive to making the decision to terminate the agreement. So, what are they? The Turkish energy balance indicates the country is oil and gas import dependent. Petroleum consumption-production gap was 800 kbd, and 56% of its gas imports was from Russia and Iran (in 2022). [5] This is a geopolitical vulnerability if the situation continues in 2025, considering Trump's threatening to energy imports from these two countries. However, Turkey worked for years to becoming an important transit country and oil and gas pipelines hub from central Asia to Europe, in addition to pipelines from Iraq (including KRG). Also, Turkey succeeded to making important discoveries offshore (in the Mediterranean and Black Sea) and onshore, especially Gabar oilfield in eastern mountainous area of the country, which was connected to the ITP. [6] The Iraqi oil through the pipeline have been either very low or was outage for years. This makes Turkey accustomed to the absence of the Iraqi oil. But, on the other hand, Turkey benefits twice; by gaining the minimum-throughput transit fee, i.e., pump-or-pay (PoP) and by charging a much higher transit fee on KRG oil that is pumped through the 40 Inch pipeline of (ITP). The political reconciliation and agreement with the Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan/PKK, have reduced the tremendous security burdens on the Turkish government, and thus discounts or minimise the Kurdish related political and security risk. The political and geopolitical consequences of the military situation in the Middle East and the USA/Isreal attack on Iran have weakened Russia and Iran geopolitical standing and, consequently, enhanced Turkish regional strategic importance and positioning. The Turkish President Erdogan is known for his pragmatism and real politic , and such political attitude is probably enhanced by the US President Trump views, policies and actions. Turkey might find some encouragement by the recently expressed US views regarding the end of "Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 1916" Middle East boarders. Also, there seems to be an echoing sentiment in Turkey hinting to end 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. In addition to the agreements signed between Turkey and KRG, the latter had offered, in 2016, the sale of many oilfield and exploration blocks to Turkey.[7] Finally, ICC award might have been triggering the timing of the Turkish action. The award comprises many decisions, some in Iraq's favour while others in Turkish favour and others of operative nature relating to interest rates that both countries are directed to apply and calculate. Decisions 2, 3 and 5 compel Turkey to pay ca. $1.998billion to Iraq. Decisions 6, 7, 8, 9, 11,12 and 13 award Turkey a total of ca. $5.266billion, mostly related to PoP provisions. Thus, Turkey should pay Iraq a net of $1.471billion. Decisions 16, 17, 18 and 19 are related to the calculation of accrued interest rates that the countries should follow and apply, without stating the timeframe, how and who to finalise this matter. While the award was a financial victory for Iraq, many in Turkey interpret it as only related to unauthorised KRG oil pumping to and loading in Ceyhan terminal; this could be avoided by different means in the future. Third topic: How Could Iraq React to Turkish Decision Upon the ICC award, I proposed for the MoO to: 1. Implement the award, especially what relates to interest rate issue. 2. Carefully examine the award and learn from its deliberations and consequences. 3. Evaluate Turkish potential future options and how to confront them to preserve Iraq's interests.[8] I have not received feedback or seen any action from the government, the ministry or any information regarding these recommendations. [9] In my view and as mentioned above, the possibility of the pipeline agreement expiring in July 2026 is included in the amendment document, and therefore Iraq should have been planning since 2014 to confront such eventuality in 2026 or, in the best-case scenario, in 2031. From my perspective, regarding the strategic importance and geopolitical risks of all Iraqi export outlets, the best alternative is to modernize and expand export capacities at the southern outlets, while simultaneously modernizing and expanding the "strategic pipeline" for transporting northern oil, including KRG oil, to the south. The matter becomes even more urgent after the signing of the Kirkuk field development agreement with BP and the Hamrin field development agreement with the US' HKN. I am fully aware of the MoO's efforts on these two directions, but the actual facts and statistical data do not indicate at all that sufficient work has been done to complete these two strategic export essential projects. This failure has been the responsibility of the MoO since 2014. Moreover, the North Oil Company-NOC announced, for a while, that the restoration of the Kirkuk-Feshkhabur pipeline has been completed and that three tests have been conducted, indicating that the pipeline is ready for pumping oil. If this is the case, why hasn't it been operational before July 21, 2025? And why hasn't Turkey taken this into consideration? What's even more surprising is that in recent months MoO has been busy contracting numerous mini projects it classifies as "strategic", in a manner that lacks proper planning and implementation priorities. The worst and most damaging action Turkey could take and do after July 2026 includes any or all of the following alternatives/possibilities: Activating the secret agreements with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), including those reported by Allocating a portion of the capacity of the Turkish section of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline to exporting KRG oil or laying a new pipeline exclusively for KRG oil, parallel to the existing two pipelines. Proposing and negotiating a new agreement with the Iraqi government aimed at achieving a range of Turkish interests at the expense of Iraqi national interests. What can the Iraqi government do regarding these three possibilities above? Iraq has two alternatives: submitting to the blackmail or preserving sovereign rights and national interests. I believe the Iraqi government should adopt the second option, and take the following actions: Regarding the two Turkish possibilities (1) and (2) above, it is preferable to resort to activating the tools of international law related to relations between states, the Vienna Convention, the bilateral agreements between Iraq and Turkey, especially the 1946 bilateral friendship treaty between the two countries, and numerous international law instruments. There should be a concerted move towards the relevant international bodies for this purpose. The responsibility for such move is entrusted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with ongoing, serious follow-up by the Council of Ministers. I see no point in talking about or negotiating any new agreement, as discussed below, if the Turkish side insists on the two possibilities (1) and (2) mentioned above. Turkey's latest proposals and comments The Turkish Energy Minister reportedly said, on 29 July 2025, that his country is proposing: (1) A framework for ongoing negotiations to expand the bilateral agreement in the energy sector. (2) A "mechanism to ensure full utilization" of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline. (3) Expanding the amendment to the pipeline agreement to include cooperation in the fields of gas, electricity, and petrochemicals, in addition to oil. (4) The possibility of extending the pipeline to southern Iraq, as the path to full capacity necessarily begins from the south. (5) Linking all this to the "Development Highway" project from Basra to the Turkish border and then to Europe. My preliminary remarks on the reported proposals. First: Turkey should have submitted these proposals in July 2024, in accordance with the provisions of Article 11 of ITOPA Amendment of 2010 referred to earlier, instead of giving note, in July 2025, ending the validity of the ITOPA. Article 11 stipulates that either party has the right to propose amendment or a new agreement two years prior to the end of Amendment term/duration. Therefore, by choosing one option while violating other options of Article 11, this actually reflects inconsistency, by intention or omission, of the Turkish authorities. Second: Such proposals, whether general or multi-purpose, should be presented within the "Iraqi-Turkish Joint Committee for Economic and Technical Cooperation", which has been in operation for more than 50 years. This Turkish proposal could be a base for a "Frame Agreement," resulting from it, if needs be, a series of "specific agreements" for the topics mentioned in the Turkish minister proposal. It is worth mentioning that this Joint Committee has been one of the most active bilateral committees Iraq has with other countries. Third: Regarding the crude oil pipeline, I suggest there should be a specific agreement for oil pipeline consisting of two parts: the first is relating to the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline (i.e., the agreement that Turkey have suspended recently-ITOPA), and the second is relating to the proposed new Basra-Ceyhan pipeline, in the event of an agreement have been reached on the implementation, timing and funding of this pipeline and its integration with the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline.[10] Fourth: The integration of the Kurdistan Region's oil pipeline with the Kirkuk-Ceyhan/Basra-Ceyhan pipeline, with pumping, transporting, and loading of oil falling under SOMO mandate exclusively. Final remarks Until recently, the Oil Minister's statements indicated Turkish side's readiness to operate the pipeline. Furthermore, in her recent meeting with parliamentarians, the Minister of Finance did not mention anything related to the Turkish side as a reason for the delay in submitting the budget schedules thus far. Furthermore, the Director General of SOMO recently confirmed the current readiness to export oil through the pipeline, if KRG deliver the oil. Have the Iraqi authorities, the government, and the Ministry of Oil fallen into what can be described as a "trap of deceptive statements" by Turkey and their naive trust in these statements?? While the Turkish decision had actually prompted numerous reactions inside and outside Iraq, including my initiative to convene this event, the matter was not mentioned in the Cabinet meeting on July 29, and not in the regular meeting of the Council' follow-up on oil projects on July 31[11], and not in the seventh session of the Opinion Board held on Wednesday, July 30, at the Ministry of Oil.[12] Nothing relating to the Turkish decision was published on the websites of the Ministry of Oil, SOMO, and the North Oil Company (all of which are executing parties specifically mentioned in the Amendment document of 2010.( Do these Iraqi authorities have no official position on the Turkish move?? I believe that official bodies must stop adopting the policy and practice of "ignoring and turning a deaf ear." A closing call or cry is due now: To strengthen Iraq's negotiating position, ensure economic security, and protect the national interest, I emphasize the need for the Iraqi government to give immediate and absolute priority to modernizing and expanding oil export capacities at the southern ports and expediting the implementation of the Basra-Haditha pipeline within the concept of a "strategic pipeline" to transport northern oil, including regional oil, to the south. A dim light at the end of a tunnel still there; recent statements by the Iraqi side, namely by the Minister of Oil[13] and the DG of SOMO[14] indicating eminent resumption of ITP operation, conditional though, upon KRG and its contracted IOCs making enough oil for pumping!! * The virtual event uses Zoom facility, and its full recording is accessible through the following link: The Platform uses AI to transfer "sounds into text". Hence, the text of the recording is accessible through the following link: The Arabic text can be translated into English and other languages by clicking the Translate icon therein. The presentation comprises map, charts, tables and images; they are not included in this brief article. The PowerPoint slides are available upon request in MS or Pdf. Norway 10 August 2025 Endnotes [1] [2] [3] Except a brief statement by unnamed official from the Ministry of Oil to (INA), which was removed later, but till accessible through this link. [4] I do possess scanned copies of the Agreement and related formal Iraqi documents, and they are the base of analyses. [5] Based on data from, [6] My articles, "Once Again, Turkey Violates the Pipeline Agreement" and in Arabic, [7] The secret documents were published by but they are not available now. Luckily, I saved them in my database. [8] My articles, ICC Awards, FSC Decisions and The Three-Years State Budget, May 2023 [9] However, an IOR article dated 30 September 2023, "Iraq presses claim to enforce arbitration award against Turkey", provides information on an Iraqi filed case before a US court. [10] Actually, such a pipeline was proposed in 2012, but the idea did not materialize since then, and I have referred to it in my previous writings many times. [11] [12] [13] Tareek Al-Shaab, 7 August 2025 and Click here to read the full article in pdf format. Mr Jiyad is an independent development consultant, scholar and Associate with the former Centre for Global Energy Studies (CGES), London. He was formerly a senior economist with the Iraq National Oil Company and Iraq's Ministry of Oil, Chief Expert for the Council of Ministers, Director at the Ministry of Trade, and International Specialist with UN organizations in Uganda, Sudan and Jordan. He is now based in Norway (Email: mou-jiya(at) Skype ID: Ahmed Mousa Jiyad). Read more of Mr Jiyad's biography here.
Iraqi News
4 days ago
- Iraqi News
Iraq stands firm on Popular Mobilization Bill despite US pushback
Baghdad – A bill in Iraq that would further formalise the role — and perhaps, the autonomy — of a powerful coalition of pro-Iran former paramilitaries has sparked a heated debate, fanned in part by US pressure. Few details of the bill that could decide the future of the Hashd al-Shaabi, also referred as Popular Mobilization Forces or PMF, alliance have been made public. Formed in 2014 when Iraqis were urged to take up arms against the jihadists of the Islamic State group, the Hashd is a powerful force with major military and political clout. The bill aims at regulating and restructuring the alliance of a myriad of armed groups, which together have more than 200,000 fighters and employees. Not mincing words, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said the proposed legislation 'would institutionalise Iranian influence and armed terrorist groups undermining Iraq's sovereignty'. An Iraqi government official, speaking to AFP on condition of anonymity, said opponents of the bill say it 'seems to establish something similar to the Revolutionary Guards' in Iran — a powerful military force imbued with the Islamic republic's ideology. The aim, according to political scientist Renad Mansour, is to integrate the Hashd 'even more into the state'. 'Some argue that this is an important first step, because it's better to have them in this system than outside the system, where they could be spoilers,' said Mansour, a senior research fellow at Chatham House think tank. But others, he added, 'argue that this is a further way for the Hashd to consolidate its power', giving the alliance 'access to greater funds, greater intelligence, and other kind of equipment and technology'. The debate around the bill comes at a time of heightened regional tensions and upheavals, as the Gaza war reverberates across the Middle East. Iranian allies and proxies have been weakened in wars with Israel, which has Washington's backing. In Lebanon, Tehran-backed group Hezbollah faces a government push to disarm it by the end of the year. In recent years, the Iraqi armed factions have seen their clout grow, with some gaining seats in parliament and in government, even as several group leaders — including the Hashd's top commander — have been subjected to US sanctions. In 2022 the coalition was granted a public works enterprise, Al-Muhandis, with capital worth tens of millions of dollars. Responding to Washington's concerns, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani has defended the proposed bill as 'part of the government's broader security reform agenda'. The Hashd 'is an official Iraqi military institution operating under the authority of the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces', Sudani said. A 2016 law already affords the Hashd the status of a public body. But some factions face accusations of collecting government salaries for their fighters on the one hand, but acting entirely independently of the state on the other. Some of the factions within the Hashd are aligned with Baghdad, while others pledge their allegiance first and foremost to the Tehran-led 'Axis of Resistance'. The latter have in the past launched rockets and explosive-laden drones at US troops stationed in Iraq as part of an anti-jihadist coalition. Mansour said the Hashd was unlikely to morph into something that resembles Iran's Guards. It 'isn't a coherent institution', he said. 'It has many different groups, many different factions, many different leaders, and they're still fighting with each other.' Speaking on condition of anonymity, a source close to the armed factions told AFP that Shiite Muslim political parties seek a 'special law' that would guarantee the Hashd remains 'an independent military institution, on the same level as the interior or defence ministry'. Sunni Muslim and Kurdish politicians oppose any such move, and even among the Shiites there is no consensus, said the government official. Deputy parliament speaker Mohsen al-Mandalawi said the proposed legislation 'contributes to enhancing the combat capabilities' of the Hashd and to 'creating new formations concerned with developing this security institution', according to the official Iraq News Agency. If approved, it would pave the way for the creation of a special military academy and secure the Hashd's 'financial independence', according to a parliament report published by state media. According to the report, the Iraqi state council noted the 'bloating' of administrative structures, and opposed the creation of such an academy for the Hashd instead of using existing defence ministry facilities. But with legislative elections coming up in November, the former paramilitaries may seek to seize on the chance to gain institutional recognition. The Hashd 'needs something to reinvigorate its base', said Mansour. 'The more the Hashd is institutionalised, the more access it has to Iraq's wealthy state coffers,' he added. 'This could become another mechanism for patronage.'
Shafaq News
07-08-2025
- Shafaq News
Trump urges Middle Eastern countries to normalize with Israel
Shafaq News – Washington On Thursday, US President Donald Trump called on all Middle Eastern countries to join the Abraham Accords with Israel, considering the move essential for achieving peace in the region. Posting on the Truthsocial platform, Trump said, "Now that the nuclear arsenal being 'created' by Iran has been totally OBLITERATED, it is very important to me that all Middle Eastern Countries join the Abraham Accords. This will insure PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Thank you for your attention to this matter!' The Abraham Accords, brokered by the Trump administration in 2020, normalized diplomatic relations between Israel and several Arab countries, including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco.
