
Fragmented Europe faltering in the multipolar moment
Taken together, these developments present an extraordinary set of threats and opportunities for a series of European policies that must begin to look beyond Ukraine, without discarding the vital role that Ukraine has played in the security landscape.
Confronted by a bold American long-term vision, including President Barack Obama's 'Pivot to Asia' announced in November 2011, the US is increasingly viewing Europe as only a peripheral American concern.
Europe risks being left behind in the future, stuck between a burgeoning US and China, if it does not get its act together and concentrate on building state and regional capacity. For now, it is only starting to advance its readiness and resilience.
The EU's feeble approach to the Gaza conflict stands in sharp contrast with the staunch support extended to Ukraine. Even NATO's 2022 strategic concept, which clearly defines Russia as a threat and outlines Ukraine's general path toward NATO, remains at best elusive in the absence of formal US endorsement.
Competing individual responses by EU members or heads of EU institutions and sometimes divergent responses to external shocks are unlikely to favor a new European moment, much less a common project.
If Europe is now urged to 'arm itself' and invest in growing its defense capabilities, as advocated by the president of France and the chancellor of Germany in a recent opinion piece, it must also set a geopolitical ambition and roadmap that extends beyond its present boundaries.
The ambition must be bold enough to reinforce Europe's autonomy and capacity of action long after the Ukraine war ends.
Much of this year's NATO summit discussion has centered around the push to raise EU members' defense spending to 5% of GDP, or 3.5% of direct defense spending. The Hague pledge, signed by most Allies, holds only as long as there is no ceasefire in Ukraine.
Should the Russian threat diminish or political will to support Kyiv weaken, European publics may become reluctant to sustain such high levels of defense spending. It also assumes that the US direct financial contribution to NATO will stay at approximately 16% of the budget, which is not guaranteed.
According to the NATO Secretary General, Mark Rutte, the goal is for non-US NATO allies to deliver 70% of the alliance's total capabilities by 2032, up from 56% today. For European countries such as Spain, Belgium, Slovakia or Luxembourg, which lack Germany's fiscal flexibility or Poland's and the Baltic states' acute threat perceptions, this objective is already a significant challenge.
Long-term security cannot rest on the European defense industrial base and fiscal efforts alone. Without the necessary scale, and despite the recent rollout of its Readiness 2030 white paper to support the EU defense industry and deepen the single defense market, and the adoption of the $170 billion Security Action for Europe (SAFE) initiative, Europe is unlikely to make a meaningful impact in the near term.
A recent report indicates that Europe's defense industry will not be able to fully replace key US capabilities in the air and maritime domains within the next decade.
In the interim, the risk of capability or deterrence gaps must not be overlooked. Efforts to develop formats like the E3+1 initiative – France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Poland – represent temporary solutions aimed at regionalized defense coalitions until a unified European defense leadership emerges.
As the war in Ukraine has demonstrated, without cooperation, partnerships, co-production and joint development to maintain interoperability and efficiency, Europe alone is not equipped to meet its current defense production needs. This is likely due to fragmentation within its defense industry and this situation is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.
Beyond Russia, and beyond the goal of transitioning to a more balanced alliance, Europe's other major vulnerabilities include its political division and its broader geopolitical marginalization. Both are in part the result of EU member states' ongoing struggles to overcome narrow national interests.
Recent events could indeed catalyze deeper European economic and financial integration through a new single market strategy, a scenario that, while challenging, remains attainable.
To enhance its hard-power capacity and economic independence, the world's largest single market must address serious inconsistencies in capital markets, energy, and technology. Expanding the international role of the euro could also help reduce financing costs and help attract investments, thereby boosting Europe's resilience.
In a world increasingly defined by a contest between Beijing and the West, where economics is seen as subordinate to geopolitics, the optimal strategy may lie elsewhere.
While keeping Russia in check, Europe must also find ways to continue engaging with both China, as a potential off-ramp to its ongoing trade war with Washington, and the US, by adding a European signature to a Trump-compliant tariffs and trade deal as a concession to the America First agenda.
This should be done without allowing either power to gain undue influence over the continent's political systems and economies. Whether this strategy can be implemented fast enough to meet rising expectations remains one of the defining questions Europe will face in the coming years.
As global power becomes multipolar, being more adept at negotiation and compromise is not a trait reserved for rapidly rising powers. Economic prowess, diplomatic weight and global reach remain invaluable when urgency is driven by necessity.
Eric Alter, a former UN civil servant, is dean and professor of international law and diplomacy at the Diplomatic Academy in Abu Dhabi.
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