Selection of Iraqi judges for the Arab Investment Court
The Arab League said in a statement received by the Iraqi News Agency (INA): that "The Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, Ahmed Aboul Gheit, received today, Monday the judges of the Arab Investment Court on the occasion of the issuance of the decision of the Economic and Social Council to appoint them as members of the court's body."
The official spokesman for the Secretary-General, Jamal Rushdi, confirmed according to the statement that "Aboul Gheit received the judges so that they can take the regular oath before starting their work in the court and holding the general assembly."
He added, "The purpose of establishing this court is to settle disputes arising from the implementation of the Unified Agreement for the Investment of Arab Capital in Arab Countries. This agreement, which entered into force in 1981, aims to enhance comprehensive Arab development and Arab economic integration, provide a suitable atmosphere for Arab-Arab investment, and facilitate the free movement of funds within Arab countries while protecting it with guarantees against non-commercial risks."
According to the statement, the court's body was formed in its new session, which begins its term in February for a period of 3 years, from 24 judges from 13 countries: Egypt, Mauritania, Yemen, Qatar, Iraq, Syria, Morocco, Jordan, Palestine, Bahrain, Sultanate of Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon.
The spokesman added that "Aboul Gheit was keen to listen to the judges, exchange talks with them, and inform them of the challenges facing the Arab region at various levels."
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
Shafaq News
9 hours ago
- Shafaq News
Iraq's 2024 oil exports to Asia surpass $70B
Shafaq News – Baghdad Iraq's oil exports to Asian countries surpassed $70 billion in 2024, the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) reported on Wednesday. The data published indicated that Asian buyers, including China, India, and South Korea, imported Iraqi oil worth $71.915 billion, marking an increase from $67.144 billion in 2023. Western Europe followed as the second-largest importer, with purchases totaling $15.573 billion, while Arab countries came third at $6.484 billion. North America accounted for $6.403 billion in imports, and Eastern Europe purchased $565 million. Non-Arab African countries imported $50 million worth of Iraqi oil.
Memri
a day ago
- Memri
Without The SDF Maintaining Stability In Syria, The United States Will Need Boots On The Ground To Defeat The Resurgence Of ISIS
After the fall of the Assad regime, two main military forces now remain in Syria with two opposing ideologies and irreconcilable visions: the so-called Syrian government, which is made up of Turkish-backed jihadi factions, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which is comprised of Kurdish, Arab, and Christian forces. While the SDF are pro-West and democratic, the Syrian government is pro-sharia and is ideologically aligned with ISIS. Despite its attempts to project moderation, its extremist ideology and reliance on extremist groups have only fueled sectarian violence and enabled the resurgence of ISIS across Syria. The areas controlled by the Syrian government have witnessed mass violence, systematic ethnic cleansing, demographic changes,[1] sexual slavery,[2] forced conversions, and relentless attacks on religious minorities including the Alawites, the Druze, and Christians.[3] More than a million people have been displaced, thousands of people killed, and hundreds of women abused and enslaved. By contrast, in the SDF-controlled region, officially called the Democratic Autonomous Administration of Northeast Syria (DAANES), diverse religious minorities and ethnic groups live together peacefully under a democratic confederalist system despite ongoing attacks by both ISIS and Turkey aimed at destabilizing their autonomy. Syrian Government Relies On ISIS Elements To Entrench Its Rule In Syria Since the fall of the Assad regime, ISIS has taken advantage of the vacuum and instability in Syria and has carried out increasingly complex attacks. The resurgence of ISIS poses a serious threat to the region, to the West, and to the U.S. in particular. For more than a decade, the U.S.-backed SDF has been the primary force containing ISIS in northeastern Syria. In the past eight months, pro-Qatar and pro-Turkey think tanks and lobbyists in Washington, D.C., and European capitals have tried to rebrand Ahmed Al-Sharaa (Jolani), a former ISIS and Al-Qaeda leader, as a moderate president and have promoted the narrative that the Syrian regime is a viable alternative to SDF, and that, with Turkish support, it could fight ISIS on behalf of the U.S. In reality, however, over the past eight months the Syrian regime under Jolani has shown little willingness to fight ISIS. On the contrary, there is substantial evidence that the Syrian regime has heavily relied on ISIS elements in its attacks against minorities. A notorious example is the so-called "Tribal Forces," which are largely composed of fighters formerly part of or affiliated with ISIS. After the territorial defeat of ISIS, the IRGC regrouped these forces and used them for years against the U.S. and U.S.-backed SDF. After the fall of the Assad regime, these armed groups were incorporated into the Syrian army and are now used by Ahmed Al-Sharaa as proxies against minorities and the U.S.-backed SDF to entrench his rule in Syria. Syrian soldier wearing ISIS patch before entering Druze city of Sweida. (see MEMRI TV clip) Syrian regime forces wearing ISIS flag patches capture an elderly Druze civilian in Suwayda, calling the Druze "pigs." (See video). Syrian regime soldier wearing the ISIS patch. (See video) Turkey's Goal In Syria Is The Ethnic Cleansing Of Kurds, Not Fighting ISIS Turkey has repeatedly claimed that it has the military capability to replace the U.S. in Syria and combat ISIS. However, not only are Turkey's deep ties to ISIS well-documented,[4] but its primary objectives in Syria are territorial expansionism and the destruction of the Kurdish SDF rather than defeating ISIS, which it has strategically used against the Kurds for over a decade. More than 40,000 ISIS terrorists from 110 countries entered Syria through Turkey, along with their weapons and supplies.[5] More recently, in December 2024, ISIS elements participated in the attacks against U.S.-backed Kurdish forces in Manbij city.[6] Turkey continues to serve as a key logistical and financial hub for ISIS. Therefore, the U.S. should not depend on Turkey to combat ISIS.[7] An ISIS fighter was filmed at a checkpoint operated by the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) near Manbij during a live broadcast by the Turkish television HaberTürk in December 2024.[8] Erdoğan has made it clear that Turkey's goal in Syria is to radically re-engineer the demographics of Northeast Syria. In an interview with the state-run TRT channel, Erdoğan openly justified the rationale behind his ethnic cleansing of Kurds, saying: "What is important is to prepare a controlled life in this enormous area, and the most suitable people for it are Arabs. These areas are not suitable for the lifestyle of Kurds, because these areas are virtually desert."[9] Turkey carried out two military operations into the Kurdish region in northern Syria from 2018 to 2019, killing, injuring, or maiming thousands of Kurds and uprooting over 500,000 more. Turkey continues to threaten to execute more attacks against the Kurds if they refuse to lay down their arms and surrender to Turkish-backed factions. Jolani's Child Soldiers The Syrian government is actively recruiting, training, and radicalizing hundreds or possibly thousands of children across Syria. Arming children and turning them into suicide bombers is not just terrorism; it is child abuse and a crime against humanity. Child soldiers trained by Turkish-backed factions of the Syrian army. (See video) ISIS Prisoners – A Ticking Time Bomb The SDF manages 28 detention facilities holding around 10,000 ISIS terrorists and 46,000 supporters and family members in camps like Al-Hol and Roj.[10] ISIS considers the fighters held in these facilities to be its greatest asset and has attempted to free them, as demonstrated by its attacks on Ghuwayran prison in Hasaka in 2022 that resulted in hundreds of deaths and hundreds of ISIS prisoners fleeing the prison to Turkey and areas controlled by Turkish-backed factions.[11] U.S. officials have warned about a massive jailbreak if Turkey attacks the SDF. "This is essentially a terrorist army in detention," says retired four-star general Joseph Votel, who led U.S. Central Command from 2016 to 2019 during the fight against ISIS.[12] If the U.S. allows Turkey and the Syrian government to attack the SDF and occupy Northeast Syria, thousands of ISIS members held in detention facilities and camps will be released, allowing ISIS to quickly regain territorial control in Syria. A 2014-Style ISIS Resurgence Since January 2025, ISIS attacks have drastically increased in Syria. Noticeably 94 percent of these attacks have targeted SDF-controlled areas. ISIS elements, whether operating independently or as part of Syria's so-called "Tribal Forces," operate freely in regime-controlled territory where they stage attacks against U.S. allies and then retreat to government-held areas. Recent reports show that ISIS has expanded globally and significantly restructured its organization, its branches IS Khorasan Province (ISKP) and IS Turkey Province have played key roles in several attack plots since 2023. European security forces have disrupted several ISIS plots and analysts and security officials have warned of an increasing risk of ISIS attacks against the West. [13] If the security situation in Syria deteriorates further, and if Turkey continues to intervene in Syria's internal affairs and arm extremist groups, we will soon witness a 2014-style ISIS resurgence that would plunge the entire region into bloodshed. Conclusion: Kurds Are The Last Line Of Defense Against ISIS The SDF, with more than 100,000 battle-hardened soldiers, have served as ground forces for the U.S., keeping the region safe and stable for years. The U.S.-led campaign against ISIS (2014-present) has resulted in 120 U.S. casualties,[14] while the SDF has lost more than 12,000 fighters since 2014. Between 2014 and 2023, alone, the war against ISIS in Syria and Iraq cost the U.S. taxpayers $68.269 billion,[15] despite minimal U.S. military presence on the ground. Any attacks on Kurds by Turkey and the Syrian regime would allow ISIS to regain control over large parts of Syria and launch another wave of terrorist attacks in the West. If this happens, the U.S. would be forced to send tens of thousands of troops to Syria to contain ISIS again. The human and financial costs of the war would be massive, thousands of U.S. soldiers could lose their lives and the war would cost the U.S. tens of billions of dollars. To prevent this, the U.S. should support the SDF and push for a decentralized, federalist Syria that ensures Kurdish and Druze regions remain outside the control of the HTS-led regime and ISIS. Establishing a security corridor linking the Druze region to the Kurdish region in Northeast Syria would isolate Syria's Sunni areas from Iraq's Sunni areas – both are the largest recruitment pools for ISIS in the world. This would further weaken the group's chances of resurgence. The Kurds have proven themselves to be one of the most loyal partners of the West in the Middle East and their sacrifice has safeguarded both regional and global security. Therefore, defending the Kurds means defending Washington, D.C., London, Berlin, and Paris. The fall of the Kurdish autonomous region in Northeast Syria would lead to great chaos in the region with catastrophic consequences for U.S. interests and national security. *Himdad Mustafa is special advisor to MEMRI's Kurdish Studies Project.
Shafaq News
a day ago
- Shafaq News
Quotas without a cause: Iraqi Women counted, rights discounted
Shafaq News Iraq's Parliament counts more women than ever before, yet their presence has not translated into stronger protections for women's rights. Quotas guarantee seats, but real gains remain elusive. Women's Seats Through the Quota Era Women entered parliament in large numbers after the 2003 quota law guaranteed them 25% of the seats. According to data by the Council of Representatives, over four election cycles, their presence in parliament has hovered around one hundred seats: -2006–2010: 99 women of 275 seats (78 quota, 21 beyond) -2010–2014: 96 of 325 (81 quota, 15 beyond) -2014–2018: 103 of 329 (83 quota, 20 beyond) -2018–2022: 106 of 329 (84 quota, 22 beyond) For the upcoming elections, the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) reports that only 37 of 130 party nominees are women, while all four independent candidates are men. Despite the quota, cultural and technological barriers have kept women politically marginalized. International assessments reinforce this paradox. A joint 2020 report by the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), and the Iraqi Institute found Iraq ranked 70th globally in women's parliamentary representation. It noted that although women held certain decision-making roles in government after 2003, they had not secured any top executive or presidential posts. By 2023, Iraq improved slightly to 65th worldwide and second among Arab states, according to CEO World's ranking of 150 countries with the highest share of women in parliament. What Women Deliver in Practice A report by the Middle East Research Institute (MERI) shows that women's legislative activity is proportionate to their share of seats but limited in substance: -Out of every 25 MPs proposing bills, 19 are men and 6 are women—a ratio aligned with the 25 percent quota. -Only one law directly concerned women's rights: Iraq's accession to the International Maternity Protection Convention. -Women are represented in most of parliament's 24 committees and chair four of them. Yet some key committees—such as Youth and Sports and Communications—have no women at all. -In interventions, objections, and interrogations, women's activity mirrors their numerical share: one woman for every four men. MERI concludes that while women's activity matches their representation, it has not delivered significant progress for women's rights. This gap is most visible in the fate of landmark legislation. The Missed Laws At the heart of the debate lies the long-delayed Domestic Violence Law. The draft was submitted to the government in 2012, amended in 2019, and approved by the cabinet in 2020. Yet it has never been scheduled for parliamentary debate. The bill defines domestic violence as any act or omission that results in violence or causes violence to any family member, leading to material or moral harm. The law faced objections from within the legislature, even from some women lawmakers, because it challenged patriarchal authority and prevailing customs. Arif al-Hamami of the Parliamentary Legal Committee told Shafaq News that the committee had completed its review and referred the draft to the presidium, but it was never prioritized. 'Our responsibility ends with reading and review,' he explained, noting that specialized committees had organized workshops and consulted civil society groups. In the end, 'other legislation was given priority, pushing the bill aside.' The Legal Committee in the Iraqi Parliament is predominantly male, with only 2 women among its 17 members—an imbalance that has constrained the advancement of reform. Another debated law is the Personal Status Law, which was approved by the Parliament earlier this year after being submitted as a proposed amendment by both the Legal Committee and the Women, Family, and Children Committee. While some women lawmakers supported the measure, many others opposed it, arguing that it violates women's rights. Azhar Zaid Al-Jubouri, Head of Al-Mada Foundation for Human Rights and a member of the Iraqi Women's Network, warned of dangerous provisions in the law. She told Shafaq News that the amendments weakened custody rights, permitted child marriage, deprived widows of inheritance, and stripped away marital protections, describing them as 'a dangerous regression that returned women to something resembling pre-Islamic times.' Voices from the Ground For activists, the presence of women MPs has not shifted Iraq's political reality. Al-Jubouri argued that some blocs deliberately nominate women with little knowledge of rights issues to prevent them from pressing for reform. 'The hope was that women would carry the voice of women,' she said. 'Instead, their voices are either absent or used against women themselves.' Suhaila al-Asam, a women's rights campaigner, told our agency that political rivalries, religious pressures, and entrenched traditions repeatedly block protective laws. Opponents, she added, often frame them as 'incompatible with Iraqi values.' She described female MPs as 'a media façade rather than genuine decision-makers,' pointing to the persistence of male dominance in the legislature. Structural Dysfunction The weakness of parliament itself has compounded the problem. A recent rift between Speaker Mahmoud al-Mashhadani and Deputy Mohsen al-Mandalawi has left the chamber in deadlock. Independent MP Jawad al-Yasari told Shafaq News there is 'no indication of convening anytime soon,' as blocs focus on the November elections. Since January 2022, parliament has convened only 132 sessions—just over half of the 256 mandated annually under its bylaws. This dysfunction is eroding public trust and leaving vital laws, including those affecting women, in permanent limbo. As the November elections approach, women remain symbolically visible yet structurally sidelined. Without changes in how parliament prioritizes legislation and empowers women beyond quota numbers, representation risks remaining an exercise in counting seats rather than protecting rights.
