Vietnam admitted as Brics 'partner country', says Brazil
Vietnam has been formally admitted as a "partner country" of the Brics group of major emerging economies, Brazil's government said on Friday, as the bloc presses ahead with an expansion push.
Vietnam is the 10th nation to receive this status, which allows invited countries to participate in Brics summits and other discussion sessions.
Vietnam had expressed earlier this year it was ready to discuss a partnership with Brics, whose original members were Brazil, Russia, India and China. Founded in 2009, it soon expanded to add South Africa.
"The government of Brazil welcomes the decision of the Vietnamese government," said the South American country, which holds the bloc's presidency in 2025.
"Vietnam stands out as a relevant actor in Asia. Its efforts in favor of South-South cooperation and sustainable development reinforce its convergence with the interests of the group."
The group has recently also included Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates, making it a growing diplomatic counterweight to traditional Western powers.
Belarus, Bolivia, Kazakhstan, Cuba, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda and Uzbekistan are its other partner countries.
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Daily Maverick
10 hours ago
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The study, co-authored by Gastón Nievas, covers a lot of ground but one of the many things that stands out is how financial transfers are now moving in a North-South direction – largely because of remittances. This is a striking contrast to the colonial era that defined the 19th century. 'No country or world region has ever received foreign income inflows approaching the magnitude of Europe's in the 19th century,' the study says. This accumulation of foreign wealth to the European colonial powers – an extractive process – had many taps: France imposed a large debt in Haiti in 1825 to compensate former French slave owners for the loss of their property(!), Britain saddled China with a debt from the Opium War, and there were also massive transfers of tax revenues from colonies to the metropolis. 'Today, financial transfers mostly flow from North to South, particularly through private remittances, rather than from South to North, via colonial transfers. 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Africa notably between 1970 and 2025 had a cumulated trade surplus from primary commodities that equalled close to 200% of its GDP, but a trade deficit in manufactured goods equal to 169% of its GDP. It is surely no bad thing to develop your economy and raise the living standards for most of your population through processes such as industrialisation, and not just as a precaution if the remittance flows are suddenly staunched. But for now, remittances are flowing one way, and that in itself speaks to enduring global disparities in economic opportunity. DM
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TimesLIVE
16 hours ago
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Vietnam admitted as Brics 'partner country', says Brazil
Vietnam has been formally admitted as a "partner country" of the Brics group of major emerging economies, Brazil's government said on Friday, as the bloc presses ahead with an expansion push. Vietnam is the 10th nation to receive this status, which allows invited countries to participate in Brics summits and other discussion sessions. Vietnam had expressed earlier this year it was ready to discuss a partnership with Brics, whose original members were Brazil, Russia, India and China. Founded in 2009, it soon expanded to add South Africa. "The government of Brazil welcomes the decision of the Vietnamese government," said the South American country, which holds the bloc's presidency in 2025. "Vietnam stands out as a relevant actor in Asia. Its efforts in favor of South-South cooperation and sustainable development reinforce its convergence with the interests of the group." The group has recently also included Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates, making it a growing diplomatic counterweight to traditional Western powers. Belarus, Bolivia, Kazakhstan, Cuba, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda and Uzbekistan are its other partner countries.
