China's engagement in the Arctic is part and parcel of being a global power
China's presence in the Arctic has been exaggerated by numerous analysts and commentators. This much-needed breath of fresh air generated a healthy – if short-lived and industry- and geographically concentrated – rise in scepticism of the conventional but false narrative on China's activities in the Arctic region.
The Harvard University report says that 'Chinese Arctic ambitions and activities are contentious' and analysts in the seven Arctic states 'often frame Chinese investments in an adversarial way, describing Chinese activity in alarmist language in terms of scale, scope and risk'.
The study points to a tendency to mix proposed investments with actual investments. It finds that the figures supporting these claims are inflated and include unsuccessful investment projects and proposals that have not been implemented. It cites Greenland as an example: despite Greenland
emerging as the centre of debate about Chinese investments in the Arctic, much of the anxiety concerns what might happen rather than what has transpired.
The report notes that most Chinese investments in the Arctic were concluded several years ago and that recent Chinese investments have been met with resistance among Arctic nations, with the notable exception of Russia.
Ever since China released a white paper in January 2018 that outlined its Arctic policy, the West has been seemingly obsessed with a supposed China threat to the Arctic. In the
US Defence Department 's 2024 Arctic strategy document, the Pentagon seemed to drink this Kool-Aid. China was placed atop the department's threat hierarchy for the region, likely elevated for ideological and budgetary rationalisations rather than as a result of objective strategic analysis.
US Vice-President J.D. Vance arrives at the US military's Pituffik Space Base in Greenland on March 28. Photo: AFP/Getty Images/TNS
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