SP's social engineering vs BJP's core base—the caste battle in UP

The Print

3 days ago

The return of the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) to political power in the 2014 national election sparked contested debate regarding the salience of caste in Indian democracy (Trivedi and Singh, 2021). Some scholars argued that this return signified the declining role of caste in electoral politics (Sridharan, 2014; Desai, 2014; Gupta, 2019), whereas others disagreed (Gurjar, 2019; Jaffrelot and Rizvi, 2019).
It further examines their claims about jati-wise nomination strategies of parties through original data on candidates' caste profiles. The caste background of candidates remains a crucial component of the so-called 'caste equation' shaping the image and appeal of political parties. Decoding this equation helps reveal the strategies of political mobilisation that parties employ. Each party faces representational limitations, and examining the caste profiles of candidates offers a window into these structural and strategic constraints. Based on these analyses, this article highlights how caste continues to influence electoral strategy, candidate selection, and political narrative in contemporary India.
The outcome of the 2024 National General Election brought caste or jati back to the centre of electoral analysis in India—an aspect that had receded after the BJP's rise to power in 2014. Based on a critical analysis of opinion articles and the caste background of candidates, with the state of Uttar Pradesh as a case study, this article explores how political commentators used caste as an 'equation' in their assessments.
It has been argued that the BJP's return marked the re-nationalisation of Indian politics (Schakal, Sharma, and Swenden, 2019), contributing to the emergence of the fourth party system (Chhibber and Verma, 2014; Vaishnav and Hintson, 2019) and transforming Indian democracy into a majoritarian ethnic democracy (Jaffrelot and Verniers, 2020; Jaffrelot, 2023). This re-nationalisation is said to have shifted Indian polity from identity-based to issue-based politics (Yadav and Palshikar, 2009).
Sircar (2020) and Attri and Jain (2019) find evidence of increasing issue-based voting.
The argument concerning the decline of caste politics relies on two key empirical claims (Kumar, 2024). First, the weakening electoral performance of caste-based political parties—such as the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), Samajwadi Party (SP), Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD), Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), and Indian National Lok Dal (INLD)—signalled that voters were casting their votes beyond caste loyalties.
Second, since the BJP attracted support across caste groups, caste was presumed to be no longer relevant for explaining vote choice. Historically, the BJP has been viewed as a party of the Brahmin-Bania castes, which belong to the upper strata of Indian society. Due to its perceived favouritism towards upper-caste elites, the party initially struggled to gain support among the poor, who predominantly come from lower castes (Thachil, 2014). However, in recent elections, the party has mobilised voters from across all castes and classes of Indian society.
Several scholars have argued that the party achieved this through narratives of Hindu nationalism (Kaul, 2017; Pai and Kumar, 2018; Heath, 2020), development (Verma, 2014; Sarcar, 2020), and populism (Gudavarthy, 2018; Vittorini, 2022; Tillin, 2024).
Nevertheless, the outcome of the 2024 national election reignited debate not only on the prospects of Indian democracy (Vaishnav, 2024) but also on the significance of caste in electoral outcomes (Jaffrelot, 2024). In particular, the result in Uttar Pradesh was surprising, as the BJP not only performed modestly but also lost the Faizabad constituency, where the town of Ayodhya—the epicentre of the Ram janma bhumi (birthplace of Ram) movement spearheaded by the Hindu nationalists—is located.
Just before the election, the Modi government organised a grand inauguration ceremony for the Ram Temple in January 2024. Many commentators had predicted that this move would be electorally beneficial for the BJP (Palshikar, 2024; Tiwari, 2024).
However, the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which comprised Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD), Apana Dal (S), Nishad Party, and Suheldeo Rajbhar Bhartiya Samaj Party (SBSP), secured only 36 seats, while the SP-led Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance (INDIA), which comprised Indian National Congress (INC), won 43 seats. This has rekindled discussion on the importance of caste in candidate nomination and electoral outcomes. One factor widely discussed in the media as contributing to the opposition's success was the caste background of the candidates (Tiwari, 2024; Salaria, 2024; De, 2024; Mishra, 2024).
The Return of Caste in Election Analysis
The media analysis of Uttar Pradesh's electoral outcome heavily focused on caste equations (jati sameekaran). The word 'equation' here is used to explain the winning possibility of any candidate.
The winning possibility is largely predicted on the caste and community composition of voters, and their allegiance to the candidates of their own caste/community. Political parties also take into account the assembly constituency-wise social profile of voters while nominating candidates, and expect that the candidate of a particular caste/religion would not only bring in caste and community voters of his/her constituency but also the neighbouring constituencies/regions (Kumar, 2022). For this reason, the increased use of 'caste equation' illustrates renewed interest in the role of caste in election analysis.
I briefly provide a description of how political commentators emphasised the role of caste and candidate nomination to explain UP's election outcome in the 2024 National General Election. Beg et al., (2024) observed that 'the biggest takeaway in this election is the sway of caste-based politics over communal politics … Akhilesh Yadav managed to undo the BJP's attempt at polarisation by fielding candidates from dominant castes.'
Salaria (2024) argued that the SP's success in the UP election lies in its meticulously designed candidate selection. She points out 'the party's candidate selection reflected a detailed caste calculus tailored to suit the demographics of each constituency.' Kishor and Ranjan (2024) also argue that 'caste selection of candidates explains the differential performance of SP in UP and RJD.'
Yadav and Pandey (2024) identified ticket distribution, caste dynamics, and a ground-level disconnect as key reasons for the BJP's electoral setback. They noted that the diversification of SP's candidates worked in favour of the SP-led INDIA alliance. They also noted that the BJP's over-reliance on survey agencies and neglect of ground-level worker input caused dissatisfaction among party members (Yadav and Pandey, 2024).
Tiwari (2024) also provides three main reasons for the BJP's poor performance in UP. First, there was an under-representation of non-upper caste leaders in Yogi's ministry and an over-representation of upper caste leaders in candidate selection. Second, the SP altered its caste composition of candidates to attract Kurmis, Kushwahas, and Scheduled Castes (SCs). And third, statements by some BJP leaders about changing the constitution helped the INDIA bloc gain greater support from non-Jatav Dalits and non-Yadavs (Tiwari, 2024).
The BJP's strategy of mobilising non-Jatav SCs and non-Yadav OBCs has been crucial in previous elections, but losing their support seems to have led to the decline of the party in the 2024 election (Kumar, 2024). Furthermore, De (2024) also highlights three reasons for the turnaround in UP's political scenario: ticket distribution, PDA outreach, and Rajput community anger.
The SP's ticket distribution was based on a well-crafted social engineering plan, reducing the number of tickets for its core voting communities (Yadavs and Muslims) and nominating 27 non-Yadav OBC candidates (De, 2024). Under its PDA outreach, SP shed the tag of being a MY (Muslim-Yadav) party, virtually swept the seats in the Purvanchal region, where non-Yadav OBCs and Dalits form a major chunk of the electorate. The Congress also won 4 seats in OBC-dominated areas.
The BJP, which gave the maximum tickets to upper castes, lost 23 seats in OBC-dominated constituencies and suffered losses in Brahmin- and Muslim-dominated seats (De, 2024). De (2024) notes the anger among Rajputs over the BJP's ticket distribution, but a post-poll survey by the Lokniti Team showed that 89 percent of Rajputs still voted for the BJP (Beg et al., 2024).
Singh (2024) argues that 'the INDIA bloc increased its tally and vote share by breaching the OBC, EBC, and Dalit caste formula prepared by the BJP in the 2014 Lok Sabha election.' He notes that 'poll results also show that the INDIA bloc bagged a large number of seats not only in its stronghold—the Yadav land (Etah, Etawah, Firozabad, Mainpuri and Kannauj), but also in the Bundelkhand region, Central and East UP dominated by OBCs—Kurmi, Maurya, Shakya, Kushwaha, Rajbhar and Nishad communities as well as Dalit communities including Jatav, Pasi, Kori, Valmiki and Dhobis' (Singh, 2024).
Similarly, Mishra (2024) attributes SP's performance to its PDA strategy, guiding the distribution of tickets. Pai (2024) points out that 'Akhilesh single-handedly created an anti-BJP front of smaller OBC and Dalit parties, and the Babasaheb Vahini to attract Dalit votes. Positioning himself as the leader of the pichhda [backward], he changed the election discourse to a battle between Hindutva and social justice.' She opines that the Congress manifesto's promise to amend the constitution to raise the 50 percent ceiling on reservation for SC, ST, and OBC groups was well received by voters.
Lastly, Kashyap (2024) observes that 'the SP threw itself into the hectic recreation of Kanshi Ram's winning strategy, organizing numerous meetings of underrepresented caste groups, building a sense of pride and self-respect among them as a direct weapon against the BJP's attempt at subsuming them under a Hindu umbrella, ensuring that the election rhetoric stayed focused on social justice demands, and ensuring that ticket distribution represented Dalits and EBCs.' He further points out that 'for backward castes and their representative parties, elections are first a space to fight for dignity and self-respect, and then for employment' (Kashyap, 2024).
Finally, Mishra (2024) observes that 'caste returns to centre stage in the 2024 Lok Sabha election. As much as people talk about eliminating caste, there are no signs that it is going away anytime soon, or even becoming less important, either socially or politically.'
Also read: RJD has an EBC dream in Bihar. It'll take more than tickets & tokenism
Caste Equations in Candidate Selection
Political analysts have almost unanimously agreed that the reduction of Yadav and Muslim candidates and the increase of non-Yadav OBC candidates by the SP alliance were prime factors causing damage to the electoral prospects of the BJP. To explore this further, I present the castewise nomination strategy of the BJP and SP alliances to understand the importance of this factor. I investigate the caste background of candidates which I have collected information through the telephonic interviews of party leaders and local journalists.
Figure 1 provides a comparative analysis of the candidate nomination strategy of the SP and BJP-led alliances in the 2024 National General Election in Uttar Pradesh. This state has 80 parliamentary constituencies, out of which 17 constituencies are reserved for the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs). Only members of SCs/STs can contest in the reserved constituencies. In the remaining 63 constituencies, members of all communities, including SCs/STs, can contest the election.
I have categorised the caste background of candidates into Upper Caste, Yadav, Other OBCs, Most Backward Castes (MBCs), Jatav/Chamar, Other SCs/STs, and Muslim. All Muslim candidates, irrespective of their caste background, have been included in the Muslim category.
The rationale for this categorisation is the BJP's long-term strategy of dividing OBCs and SCs proposed through the Hukum Singh Committee Report in Uttar Pradesh (Verma, 2001). The Modi government has appointed a similar commission, popularly called the Rohini commission, at the national level for exploring similar divisions. Hence, it is interesting to see whether the formula proposed in the report of the Hukum Singh committee somehow reflects in the candidate nomination strategies of the BJP.
Figure 1 reveals that the BJP alliance nominated upper caste candidates twice as often as the SP alliance. It nominated 36 upper caste candidates in the 63 non-reserved constituencies. In non-reserved constituencies, the BJP alliance nominated more than 50 per cent of its candidates from the upper castes. On the other hand, the SP alliance nominated upper caste candidates in the one-third non-reserved constituencies. It nominated remaining candidates from backward castes, SCs, and Muslims.
The BJP alliance nominated relatively fewer candidates from Yadav, other OBCs, MBCs, Jatav/Chamar, and Muslim compared to the SP alliance. Conversely, the BJP alliance nominated more candidates from Other SCs/ STs compared to the SP alliance. The
SP alliance, although nominating relatively fewer Yadav and Muslim candidates, but a higher proportion of Other OBC and MBC candidates. All 5 candidates from the Yadav caste belong to the family of Mulayam Singh Yadav.
Similarly, the BJP alliance remained limited to nominating candidates from SC/ST backgrounds only in the 17 reserved constituencies, whereas the SP alliance nominated 20 candidates from SCs/STs. It nominated 3 SC candidates in non-reserved constituencies—Saharanpur, Mathura, and Faizabad. Among them, the alliance won the Faizabad-Ayodhya constituency. In the reserved constituencies, the BJP alliance nominated 90 percent candidates from non-Jatav/Chamar castes, despite Jatav/ Chamar constituting 54.23 percent of UP's total SC population.
In comparison to 2 candidates of the BJP alliance, the SP alliance nominated 8 candidates from Jatav/Chamar castes. To match the nomination strategy of the SP alliance, the BJP alliance would have needed to significantly reduce the number of upper caste candidates, which the party could not afford to do.
There is a growing debate over the significance of caste at the jati level (Jaffrelot, 2012, 2024). Therefore, I provide a jati-level overview of the nomination strategy of the political parties.
Table 1 illustrates the jati-level candidate nomination strategy of the BJP and SP alliances. It shows that the BJP alliance nominated the highest number of candidates from the two upper castes—Brahmins and Rajputs. Among backward castes, it nominated the highest number of candidates from Kurmis, followed by Jats and Nishads. Among SCs/STs, it nominated candidates from the Pasi caste. It nominated only 2 candidates from Jatav/Chamar castes, which comprise more than 50 percent SC population of Uttar Pradesh.
Table 1 further demonstrates that the SP alliance nominated its highest number of candidates from the Kurmi caste, which is a backward caste. Following this, the alliance nominated more candidates from Brahmins and Jatav/Chamar. It nominated six candidates each from the Kushwaha and Muslim communities. The SP alliance's nominations are polarised towards Kurmi, Brahmin, Chamar, Pasi, Kushwaha, Muslim, Rajput, Nishad, and Yadav; however, it includes castes from all categories. In contrast, the BJP alliance's nominations remained heavily polarised towards upper castes. It indeed nominated a larger number of castes, but such nominations might be more symbolic than substantive.
Finally, there is growing discussion about the nomination of candidates in terms of caste against caste. Table 2 provides a brief analysis of the nomination strategy of the BJP and SP alliances in terms of caste against caste. The table reveals that, against the 37 upper caste candidates of the BJP alliance, the SP alliance nominated 10 candidates from the upper castes, 12 from Other OBCs, and 6 from MBC backgrounds.
Against the 15 Other OBC candidates of the BJP alliance, the SP alliance nominated 4-4 candidates from each of the Other OBC and MBC backgrounds, and 5 from upper caste backgrounds. Against the MBC candidates of the BJP alliance, the SP alliance nominated 3 candidates from MBC backgrounds and 4 from upper caste backgrounds. Against the 2 Jatav/Chamar candidates of the BJP alliance, the SP alliance nominated 1 of their candidates from the same background. Against 15 Other SC/ST candidates in the BJP alliance, the SP alliance nominated 9 candidates from similar castes and 6 candidates from Jatav/ Chamar caste.
The mobilisation of non-Yadav OBCs particularly MBCs and non-Jatav/Chamar SC/STs through increased nomination of candidates from these categories have been one of the key strategies of the BJP over the last few elections. However, the analysis of comparative nomination strategies of both alliances presented above reveals that the SP alliance appears to have countered this by replicating the same strategy by nominating a higher number of candidates from these social groups and moving away from its traditional reliance on Yadav and Muslim candidates. The BJP seems to have avoided matching the strategy of the SP alliance due to the fear of losing the support of its core upper caste social base.
Conclusion
The results of the 2024 national election in Uttar Pradesh have introduced caste as a critical variable in electoral analysis. Political commentators have highlighted the role of caste in candidate selection and nomination, focusing on the disproportionate representation of certain castes or the reduction in nominations of castes such as Yadav and Muslim to alter the party's image. The party's caste image is a crucial aspect of the broader caste equation. However, jati-level analysis of candidates is needed to reveal patterns of polarisation.
Additionally, the caste equation involves examining which castes are nominated against one another, and it helps us to understand political mobilisation. My analysis indicates that non-Jatav/Chamar candidates are frequently nominated against each other. While these analyses illuminate the growing significance of caste in candidate nomination, further investigation is needed to fully understand the complexities involved in the candidate nomination policy of parties.
Arvind Kumar is a visiting lecturer in Politics & International Relations at the University of Hertfordshire, UK. He tweets @arvind_kumar__. Views are personal.
This article was originally published in the Indian Politics & Policy journal.