Carbon tax no longer an option for Hong Kong but a necessity
[email protected] or filling in
this Google form . Submissions should not exceed 400 words, and must include your full name and address, plus a phone number for verification
Advertisement
Hong Kong has set ambitious climate targets, aiming to cut emissions in half by 2035, compared to 2005 levels, and achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. The
Climate Action Plan 2050 outlines strategies in clean electricity, energy-efficient buildings, green transport and waste reduction. However, a key element is missing: a
carbon tax . This policy is a powerful tool for pricing emissions and creating economic incentives for greener behaviour.
Countries like Singapore, Japan and Sweden offer valuable lessons. Singapore introduced a carbon tax in 2019, starting at S$5 (US$3.75) per tonne of carbon dioxide. It rose to S$25 last year, and is expected to rise to S$50-S$80 by 2030. After Japan implemented a carbon tax in 2012, the country reduced emissions by around 20 per cent between 2013 to 2022.
Sweden's carbon tax helped reduced emissions by 26 per cent from 1990 to 2017. During the period, its economy grew by 78 per cent, according to Clean Prosperity. This proves that carbon taxes can effectively reduce emissions without harming economic growth.
For Hong Kong, a carbon tax could target high-emission sectors such as electricity, transport and waste. A phased roll-out like Singapore's would allow businesses time to adapt. Sectors exposed to trade could be exempt. Revenue could be reinvested in climate initiatives, subsidies for marginalised groups or tax reductions, providing both environmental and economic benefits.
Advertisement
Social equity is a concern as carbon taxes can have an impact on lower-income households. However, redistributing a portion of tax revenue through rebates or 'carbon dividends' could offset these costs. The International Monetary Fund suggests allocating 16 per cent of the revenue to the poorest 40 per cent of households would be sustainable. Small businesses could receive targeted support, similar to Singapore's approach.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
RTHK
2 hours ago
- RTHK
Russian forces advance ahead of Alaska meeting
Russian forces advance ahead of Alaska meeting A Russian soldier raises his country's flag following the capture of a settlement in Ukraine's Donetsk region. File photo: Russian Defence Ministry via Reuters Russia's offensive in eastern Ukraine was gaining speed and seizing more ground on Wednesday ahead of a summit in Alaska between US President Donald Trump and Russia's Vladimir Putin. According to battlefield data from the US-based Institute for the Study of War, Russian forces have made their biggest 24-hour advance into Ukraine in more than a year. And, as battle raged, Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky and European leaders met to hold urgent online talks with Trump, hoping to convince him to respect Kyiv's interests during Friday's summit with Putin. Zelensky flew to Berlin and met Chancellor Friedrich Merz on Wednesday before both were to be joined online by French President Emmanuel Macron, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and other European leaders as well as the heads of the EU and Nato. The Ukrainian president said on social media on Tuesday that "we see that the Russian army is not preparing to end the war. On the contrary, they are making movements that indicate preparations for new offensive operations." With the world's eyes on the Alaska summit, Russia has made rapid advances this week in a narrow but important section of the front line in Ukraine's east. The Russian military fired at least 49 drones and two ballistic missiles at Ukraine during the night, the Ukrainian air force said on Wednesday. Trump on Monday played down the possibility of a breakthrough in Alaska but said he expected "constructive conversations" with Putin. (AFP)
AllAfrica
5 hours ago
- AllAfrica
Ukraine war making North Korea a more formidable fighting force
The war between Russia and Ukraine is taking place in Europe, but its security implications are increasingly being felt in Asia, too North Korea has benefited tremendously from its decision to supply enormous quantities of ammunition and soldiers to Russia in return for advanced nuclear and missile technology and diplomatic cover. North Korea's involvement in the conflict is transforming it into a much more capable and technologically advanced rogue state in East Asia. This evolving threat may soon prompt South Korea to reassess its security strategies in an increasingly challenging international environment. As Russia's invasion of Ukraine began to turn into a protracted conflict in late 2022, Moscow faced a problem: it was at risk of running low on ammunition and soldiers to send to the front lines. Its diplomatic overtures to North Korea began soon after. In July 2023, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu was warmly received by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in a visit to the North Korean capital, Pyongyang. In a matter of weeks, high-resolution satellite imagery showed what looked like the establishment of a new munitions supply route from North Korea to Russia. Around that time, Russia was using about 5,000 artillery shells per day. Around the time the first North Korean shells would have arrived at the front lines, several months later, the rate suddenly increased to an average of 15,000 per day. In September 2023, Kim travelled to Russia for a meeting with President Vladimir Putin, where he was given the red-carpet treatment at a space satellite launch facility. In mid-2024, Putin repaid the favour, making his first visit to Pyongyang in 24 years. He signed a new strategic partnership treaty with North Korea that included mutual defence clauses – each country pledged to provide immediate military assistance if either faced armed aggression. Soon after, a deployment of 11,000 North Korean troops was headed to the front lines to help Russia retake the Russian region of Kursk, part of which had been captured by Ukraine. Now, following another visit by Shoigu to Pyongyang in June of this year, Ukrainian officials say another 25,000–30,000 North Korean soldiers are heading to Russia in the months ahead. North Korea is also sending thousands of builders and deminers to help rebuild the Kursk region. Estimates from a German think tank suggest North Korea has earned anywhere from US$1.7 billion to $5.5 billion from selling war materiel to Russia since 2023. The think tank also estimates North Korea may be receiving up to half a billion US dollars annually from the troop deployments. Russia is also helping North Korea modernize its aging Soviet-era military. For example, Russia appears to have provided assistance to Pyongyang in building a critical new air-defense system, an airborne early warning system, tanks with improved electronic warfare systems, a naval destroyer with supersonic cruise missiles and air-to-air missiles. In addition, North Korean soldiers have received valuable modern combat experience using artificial intelligence and drones against a highly skilled Ukrainian military. And Russian soldiers have also tested North Korea's weapons in combat, such as ballistic missiles, which will assist in their future research and development. With Russian expertise, North Korea has also made recent progress on technologies associated with launching satellites and intercontinental ballistic missiles, which can deliver numerous miniaturised nuclear warheads. These developments mean South Korea and its allies will need to deal with a much more battle-hardened and technologically advanced North Korean military. Its antiquated systems, historically limited by isolation and a range of international sanctions, are now being rapidly transformed, making it a much more formidable foe. South Korea's new liberal president, Lee Jae Myung, is much less hawkish on North Korea and Russia than his predecessors. Instead, Lee is doing his best to ease tensions with the North. For instance, he recently ordered propaganda speakers to be removed from the North Korean border, which I visited this week. Though North Korea also dismantled its own propaganda speakers from the border, it has largely rebuffed other overtures from South Korea. The regime's rapidly expanding Russian ties give it little incentive to resume international talks aimed at reducing sanctions. Lee may soon find the evolving situation across the border requires a much more proactive security policy. South Korea may seek to bolster coordination with its main ally, the United States, and others in the region, such as Australia. For example, joint military exercises between South Korea and the US later this month will specifically focus on the threats posed by the North's advancing missile program, as well as drones, GPS jamming and cyber attacks. Current South Korean law prohibits it from sending arms to war zones, but Seoul has helped Ukraine indirectly and stepped up its sales of weapons elsewhere in Europe. And though Lee skipped the recent NATO summit that his predecessor had attended three years in a row, he may need to reverse course and continue deepening ties with the bloc if his soft diplomacy approach with the North doesn't bear fruit. Adam Simpson is senior lecturer of international studies, University of South Australia This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
AllAfrica
12 hours ago
- AllAfrica
Taiwan readying 'carrier killer' missile to thwart China invasion
Betting on stealth over speed, Taiwan is forging a long-range 'carrier killer' to push back China's carriers and toughen the First Island Chain—even as layered Chinese defenses and shaky allied politics cloud the gambit. This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that Taiwan is developing a long-range subsonic anti-ship cruise missile that defense analysts say could significantly strengthen deterrence against China's growing naval power, citing a defense ministry procurement list. Under the Defense Industry Development Act, the ministry will spend NT$40 million (US$1.3 million) over two years on 80 frequency-agile coaxial magnetrons, radar components for the new missile and existing models. Meanwhile, local media said more than NT$800 million (US$26 million) was allocated in 2021–2022 to adapt Hsiung Feng IIE land-attack technology with enhanced stealth. Taiwan's National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) is believed to have led the weapon's development since 2021. Analysts, citing the US AGM-158B and C as references, estimate the missile will have a range of 600–1,000 kilometers—enough to reach beyond Chinese carrier-based aircraft and cover large parts of the East and South China Seas. The new weapon aims to offset the Hsiung Feng III's 400-kilometer limit and the US-made Harpoon's 200-kilometer reach, both requiring risky penetration of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) layered defenses. The timing highlights urgency, with two PLA Navy (PLAN) carriers exercising in the Western Pacific amid a years-long escalation since Beijing cut ties in 2016. China claims Taiwan as its territory, while the US remains Taipei's leading arms supplier, shaping the self-governing island's procurement and war planning. Jonathan Harman mentions in an October 2024 Global Taiwan Institute (GTI) article that domestic production of missile platforms offers Taiwan mainly quicker deployment and reduced costs for weapons that match the performance of US systems. Harman notes that Taiwan aims to replace specific US missile systems with its indigenous variants, although some still require improvements to serve as a more credible deterrent. In line with that, Taiwan's subsonic Hsiung Feng II is slower, more vulnerable to shipboard defenses and has a short range of only 120 kilometers. Although the Harpoon has a longer range, it remains a subsonic missile. The supersonic Hsiung Feng III may have a better chance of punching through shipboard defenses but lacks sufficient reach for standoff fires against PLAN surface groups. Together, these limits may explain Taipei's shift toward a stealthier, longer-ranged option. Taiwan's emphasis on a stealthy, long-range anti-ship missile may also reflect a change of philosophy in defeating shipboard air defenses. The AGM-158, which Taiwan may take as a design reference for its new missile, has a low radar cross-section and minimal infrared signature to evade modern ship defenses. In contrast, supersonic missiles try to 'outrun' interceptors, but they emit intense heat during flight, increasing detectability and engagement opportunities. The divergence captures two schools of thought about beating increasingly sophisticated naval shields. Underscoring just how formidable China's carrier defenses are, Daniel Rice notes in a July 2024 China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) report that its carrier battle groups employ three concentric zones. These include: An Outer Defense Zone 185–400 kilometers from the carrier, where J-15 fighters and submarines conduct surveillance and precision anti-air/anti-ship strikes, executing 'offense to enhance defense' A Middle Defense Zone, 45–185 kilometers away, where large surface combatants—Type 052D 'sword-carrying guards' with advanced radars and vertical launch systems (VLS), and Type 054A frigates acting as 'bodyguards'—focus on anti-submarine warfare and area air defense An Inner Defense Zone, 100 meters–45 kilometers from the carrier, where shipborne point defenses ring the flattop, which serves as the command-and-control (C2) hub. Taiwan's existing anti-ship missiles leave gaps that a new system aims to close. The Hsiung Feng II, Harpoon and Hsiung Feng III cover short to medium ranges. A longer-ranged, harder-to-detect missile would extend its sea-denial envelope. Further, Craig Koerner mentions in an October 2021 Global Taiwan Institute (GTI) article that Taiwan's asymmetrical defense strategy would leverage its terrain to deploy numerous ground-based anti-ship and anti-air missile units. According to Koerner, these units, concealed by camouflage and decoys, can target invading forces while avoiding detection. Koerner says this 'porcupine strategy' offers a cost-effective defense, reduces vulnerability to China's strikes and surveillance, and sustains deterrence. The regional picture trends in the same direction. Taiwan is not alone in pursuing land-based, anti-ship capabilities; US allies are normalizing distributed, road-mobile launchers to complicate PLA planning. For instance, Japan plans to acquire 1,000 upgraded Type 12 cruise missiles and host the US Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS), while the Philippines indefinitely hosts the US Typhon and NMESIS systems—moves that toughen the First Island Chain's anti-ship missile wall and create cross-pressures on PLA surface operations. However, this larger US strategy of containing China faces significant caveats. Eric Gomez argues in a November 2023 Cato Institute report that Taiwan's asymmetric strategy is less flexible than traditional capabilities in peacetime or gray-zone scenarios, but remains essential for deterring and surviving a Chinese invasion. Suppose the PLA blockades Taiwan with naval and air forces to cut off shipping without storming the island's beaches in an amphibious invasion; then, Taiwan's shore missiles have no clear target unless it escalates to firing the first shot. While a blockade may seek to force capitulation without fighting, Gomez says that approach often fails to achieve its aims, while pointing out that an invasion carries the highest risk but is the most likely approach to succeed. Masashi Murano points out in a March 2024 article for the US Studies Centre (USSC) that Japan's long-range strike capability faces critical gaps in support assets, munitions stockpiles, joint operational doctrine and persistent intelligence tracking. He adds that legal constraints and escalation risks further limit its ability to credibly deter nuclear-armed adversaries such as China through conventional counterstrike operations. Domestic politics can also reroute strategy. Derek Grossman warns in a July 2025 Foreign Policy article that shifting Philippine politics could upend US defense plans: Vice President Sara Duterte—the 2028 presidential frontrunner after midterm gains—could roll back President Ferdinand Marcos Jr's US alliance expansion, invoking the constitution's call for an 'independent' foreign policy and thus implicitly criticizing the US Typhon deployment in northern Luzon that has sparked Beijing's ire. Grossman notes she might follow her father's precedent by revisiting moves to terminate the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) and by curbing the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement's (EDCA) now nine-site access, risking US access, training and surge capacity in the Philippines. Strategic bandwidth is another constraint. US involvement in overlapping conflicts—support to Ukraine, naval operations against the Houthis in Yemen, backing Israel versus Iran and responding to North Korea's nuclear saber-rattling—could sap political will and overstretch the defense industrial base, making US intervention against China's designs over Taiwan unfeasible if the timelines collide. Ultimately, Taiwan's deterrence hinges less on one 'carrier killer' than on whether Taipei can outlast a Chinese blockade while allied resolve from the Philippines to Japan—and US bandwidth—holds fast.
