Japan seeks new panda loan from China ahead of zoo returning 4
BEIJING—A delegation of Japanese lawmakers met senior Chinese officials here hoping for a continuation of "panda diplomacy," requesting the continued loan of giant pandas to Japan.
'Many fans, especially children, are saddened by the pandas' departure,' said Hiroshi Moriyama, the secretary-general of the Liberal Democratic Party, on April 29.
The request for a new panda loan comes ahead of the scheduled return of four pandas currently residing at a Wakayama Prefecture zoo by the end of June.
Zhao Leji, the third-ranking member of the Chinese Communist Party, responded positively.
According to sources, he called pandas "ambassadors of friendship," stating that the relevant authorities in China would discuss the matter.
The two officials also agreed on the mutual benefit of promoting bilateral relations.
In response to the meeting, the spokesman for China's Foreign Ministry noted that cooperation between China and Japan on panda breeding and technical exchanges has yielded positive results.
Moriyama led the cross-party delegation, which visited China for the first time since August.
Currently, six pandas are in Japan under China's breeding and research program, including two at Tokyo's Ueno Zoo, which are also set to be returned by February next year.
The latest instance of panda diplomacy highlights Beijing's growing interest in strengthening economic ties with Japan and other Asian neighbors.
Chinese President Xi Jinping criticized U.S.-imposed tariffs on China, urging other nations to stand against a 'unilateral act of bullying' by the United States.
While Japan and China share common interests in opposing U.S. tariffs and supporting free trade, their relationship remains strained by political tensions.
These include territorial disputes and Beijing's ban on Japanese seafood imports following the release of treated radioactive water from the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant.
Since taking office in October, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba has held talks with Xi and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to improve bilateral relations.
Arrangements are being made for a trilateral summit between Japan, China and South Korea later this year, with Chinese Premier Li Qiang expected to visit Japan for the occasion.
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