Tusk unveils major cabinet reshuffle amid coalition crisis
The reshuffle follows the presidential election defeat of Civic Platform candidate and Tusk ally Rafał Trzaskowski, as well as slumping poll numbers that have emboldened junior coalition partners.
The centre-right Poland 2050 party pushed for the creation of a deputy prime minister post, while the Polish People's Party (PSL) even suggested replacing Tusk with its leader and defence minister, Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz. These demands were ultimately dismissed.
Although Tusk insisted that the overhaul would not alter the coalition's 'major goals' since taking power in 2023, the changes mark a clear shift in direction.
Justice Minister Adam Bodnar, the architect of Poland's EU-approved rule-of-law plan, is set to leave the government. Although he was praised for unlocking EU cohesion and recovery funds that had been frozen under the PiS-led administration, Bodnar has faced mounting criticism over the slow pace of judicial reform. He will be replaced by Waldemar Żurek, a vocal critic of the judicial changes introduced during the PiS era, who is expected to continue the reform agenda.
Tusk also announced that the number of ministries would be reduced from 26 to 21, stating that the goal was to build 'not the biggest government, but the best one.'
Two new 'super ministries' were also announced: an energy ministry, which will be led by Miłosz Motyka (PSL); and an economy ministry, which has been added to the portfolio of Finance Minister Andrzej Domański.
Despite the shakeup, public confidence remains low. A poll by SW Research for Onet found that 40% of Poles believe the reshuffle will do little to improve the government's image.
(cs, de)
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
Euractiv
24 minutes ago
- Euractiv
Maroš Šefčovič: From Soviet-trained diplomat to the EU's forever commissioner
Ursula von der Leyen and the pro-Russian Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico are at opposite ends of Europe's political spectrum. But they do agree on one thing – backing Maroš Šefčovič, the EU trade chief and the bloc's longest-serving commissioner. 'We should congratulate him,' Fico wrote on Facebook after Šefčovič sealed a trade deal with the United States. Von der Leyen was equally effusive, thanking the Slovak for his 'tireless work and skilful steer,' after 10 trips to Washington. With 15% tariffs set to be imposed on the EU on Friday, Šefčovič remains at the centre of negotiations to flesh out the deal with Donald Trump's negotiators Howard Lutnick and Jamieson Greer. 'This is the toughest challenge I have faced,' Šefčovič told Euractiv in emailed comments. 'I feel a huge responsibility for millions of jobs and trillions in trade. I am convinced a deal is better than a trade war." To understand what drives him, and his improbable journey to Brussels from an elite Soviet diplomatic school, Euractiv spoke to more than 15 people who know him. Despite having spent more than two decades in the EU bubble, surprisingly little is known about his personal life. Šefčovič, who just turned 59, is known as a good-humoured father-of-three and loyal husband, who enjoys coffee, likes his pets, loves volleyball, and works out in the Commission's gym, alongside von der Leyen's bodyguards. He also sometimes does imitations of MEPs for his colleagues. One of the few glimpses into his life beyond politics came in 2019, when a fire broke out in his Brussels apartment, and his son, also named Maroš, narrowly escaped. Behind the curtain Šefčovič grew up in a suburb of Bratislava, then part of Czechoslovakia, with a father who was an electrical engineer and a mother who worked as an administrator for the postal service. Their family home was just three kilometres from the Iron Curtain, which his father predicted would stand forever. "Back in my student days, my biggest dream was simply to cross the Iron Curtain and visit Austria," Šefčovič said in the emailed comments. "I never imagined we would join the EU or that I would serve so long in its key institutions." Between 1985 and 1990, Šefčovič studied diplomacy at MGIMO, a prestigious university in Moscow run by the Soviet foreign ministry and the alma mater of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. "Studying at MGIMO during Gorbachev's time – when perestroika and glasnost now sound archaic – gave us young students hope for a more open future," Šefčovič said. He is a fluent Russian speaker. That skill would later serve him well in EU policies, including in tense negotiations over gas deals between Ukraine and Russia before Moscow launched an all-out invasion on its neighbour in 2022. "He used this knowledge of the Russian mentality for the EU's interests,' said a senior European diplomat. Some in Slovakia, though, still view MGIMO alumni with suspicion. Like Fico, Šefčovič was a member of the communist party in his youth. But if he was a communist in the 80s, by the 90s, he was being lectured by capitalist luminary Milton Friedman and taught by Condoleezza Rice at Stanford University. 'He was always pro-European, despite his Moscow pedigree,' said a second diplomat who has long known Šefčovič. His diplomatic career took him across continents, with diplomatic postings in Zimbabwe, Canada, and Brussels, and he served as Slovakia's ambassador to Israel at the age of 32. By 2004, he was back in Brussels as his country's ambassador to the EU. Five years later, he joined the European Commission, and hasn't left since. His EU career has stretched across generations, having served as a commissioner alongside both Siim Kallas, and his daughter Kaja Kallas, who is now the bloc's top diplomat. Mr Fix It Immaculately dressed, and eschewing the media spotlight, Šefčovič has cultivated a "Mr Fix It" persona in Brussels. Three European Commission presidents have relied on him to negotiate the thorniest of dossiers, from reforming the internal workings of the institution to hammering out a gas transit deal between Ukraine and Russia, and Swiss relations. 'He always knows his shit, from A to Z,' said Katarína Roth Neveďalová, a Slovak MEP from Fico's populist Smer party. British conservative politician Michael Gove dubbed him the 'sausage king,' for his mastery of the Northern Ireland protocol during the Brexit talks. Calm under pressure, his risk aversion is perhaps a key to his longevity. A Commission insider who saw him operating up close said: 'He's kind of an eel, swimming through, not getting into any fights.' 'He's not a homo politicus, he's always been a very good and very decent bureaucrat,' said the diplomat quoted above, who has long known him. But Šefčovič hasn't always stayed in technocratic mode Back in 2019, he made the explicitly political move to campaign to be president of Slovakia, with the support of Fico's party, ultimately losing to liberal Zuzana Čaputová. A different Šefčovič emerged on the campaign trail: he pivoted to a more socially conservative line that would appeal to Smer's voters, saying he was against adoption by homosexual couples, and inviting the cameras in to show his wife Helena cooking a schnitzel for him. 'I hated that, because he's not like that,' said the diplomat who's long known Šefčovič. 'He's of a very liberal background; he's got nothing to do with conservatism,' the person said. 'That was his low point in Slovak politics,' said Milan Nič, a senior fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, who said Šefčovič made a 'Faustian bargain' with Fico, in which Šefčovič campaigned in exchange for another nomination to the Commission in 2019. Šefčovič, for his part, disputes that. 'I did not enter the presidential race to bargain for another position,' he said in an email. Maroš in the middle Šefčovič has so far managed to balance his loyalties to Brussels and Bratislava, to von der Leyen and Fico. Though not a member of Smer himself, Šefčovič is politically tied to Fico, who has nominated him multiple times for the top job in Brussels. 'I think the main reason why he was nominated by Fico so many times is that he's never opposed him in anything,' said a former Slovak diplomat. But Fico's stance on Ukraine has partly isolated his commissioner in Brussels. Days after Fico won the 2023 Slovak election, having campaigned to stop sending weapons to Kyiv, MEPs grilled Šefčovič on his views on the war, as he prepared to take on the Green Deal portfolio. 'He was a bit annoyed because of how much he has done with Ukraine, that they would doubt him,' said an EU official. He described Fico as a 'friend' in the wake of an assassination attempt in May 2024, but those who know them characterise their relationship as mainly professional. "With Prime Minister Robert Fico, we communicate, talk openly and respect each other's roles," he replied by email. In Brussels, where Fico's Smer is now suspended from the wider Socialist family, Šefčovič remains firmly in von der Leyen's pro-European camp. 'He got this portfolio because he's very close and loyal to von der Leyen. He's basically her man, her fixer,' said Milan Nič, the think-tanker. In April 2027, Šefčovič will become the longest-serving commissioner in history. "I believe in serving in public office as long as I can make a difference," said Šefčovič by email. As he hammers out a final joint declaration of the new EU-US trade deal with his American counterparts, Šefčovič is also trying to sell the agreement as a pragmatic success, amid criticism from EU capitals and experts who say the EU should have played it tougher. "It would be easy to seek popularity by taking a hard line," he said. "But that risks damaging transatlantic relations for a generation." Thomas Møller-Nielsen and Natália Silénska contributed reporting. (mm, jp)
Euractiv
24 minutes ago
- Euractiv
What the EU-US deal means for Brussels' ties to China
Since clinching the 'biggest trade deal ever' last month, the EU and US have repeatedly clashed over what was actually agreed – but on economic security, they seem firmly aligned, with China in their sights. Despite offering conflicting accounts of the deal, both sides explicitly pledged to 'enhance supply chain resilience', 'address non-market policies', and 'cooperate' on investment screening and export controls. All of which appears a thinly veiled reference to reducing dependence on China for strategic products and protecting Western industries from increasingly fierce Chinese competition. Economic security was also 'one of the easier issues' in recent EU-US talks, a senior European Commission official said. 'All the economic security tools and instruments that we have make for a good conversation,' the official said, adding that further discussions are planned. The use of near-identical language suggests the EU – officially committed to 'de-risking but not decoupling' from China – is moving closer to America's tougher stance, analysts say. 'I think it's just the final sign that the EU is throwing in its lot with the US on China,' said Varg Folkman, an analyst at the European Policy Centre, a Brussels-based think-tank. 'I definitely think it's going to be viewed like that by the Chinese – they would be fools not to do it.' Beijing, which has condemned previous US trade deals with the UK and Vietnam, reacted slightly more mildly to the EU–US agreement. 'We firmly oppose any party's move to strike a deal at the cost of China's interests,' said China's foreign affairs spokesperson Guo Jiakun last Monday – one day after the EU-US deal was announced. Few details Despite broad commitments, Brussels has offered little clarity on how the EU and the US plan to jointly address Beijing's 'overcapacities' or its grip over the world's supply of critical minerals, essential for cars, smartphones, and other advanced technologies. 'It seems to me that not all of the information about the EU-US deal has been released – especially when it comes to the economic security part,' said Alicia García Herrero, senior fellow at the Bruegel think tank. 'We're missing a big part of that picture.' The senior Commission official said that a forthcoming EU-US joint statement on the deal – which is '90-95% ready' – will not offer specific details on economic security cooperation, but will instead contain 'fairly general language' that Brussels will 'develop [as] we go." García Herrero said the vagueness is likely intentional, as China is not only the world's second-largest economy but also the EU's second-largest trading partner. Japan, which struck a similar deal with Washington last month, has also refrained from elaborating on how it plans to cooperate with the US over its China policy, she noted. 'The Japanese didn't put on paper their disagreements and what they're going to do, because it's too risky,' García Herrero said. 'For Europe, it would also raise questions: 'Are we encircling China?' So there's no point.' Tit for (trade) spat The deal also comes amid worsening EU-China ties, long strained by human rights concerns and Taiwan's status. Beijing's introduction of sweeping export controls on critical minerals earlier this year – which came in response to Trump's imposition of a 145% blanket levy on Beijing – has rattled EU policymakers and forced temporary production shutdowns in Europe. China's growing ties with Russia have exacerbated tensions as European leaders scramble to sustain support for Ukraine amid mounting Russian attacks and fading US backing. Yet Trump, who has praised Russian President Vladimir Putin and promised to end the Ukraine war 'within 24 hours,' has recently shifted tone – threatening 'secondary tariffs' on India and China for purchasing Russian oil. Some analysts suggest Brussels may have won that shift as a concession during trade negotiations. 'On the issue of Europe's economic security, the US has, in my view, been willing to offer something: it is putting pressure on India and China to cut ties with Russia,' said García Herrero. "The US wants to encircle China and cut it out of supply chains. Europe is saying, 'Fine, I'm with you' – but they want the US to get tougher on Russia." 'A flimsy foundation' Still, others question whether the EU-US deal offers much foundation for economic or political cooperation. 'Given the overall shakiness of the deal,' the commitment to boost economic security cooperation 'looks like a flimsy foundation for serious transatlantic cooperation,' said Nils Redeker, deputy director at the Jacques Delors Centre. Redeker argued the EU's China policy has been weakened by 'internal divisions' that also severely hindered the bloc's negotiations with Washington. He pointed to the sharp divisions among EU capitals over the Commission's decision last year to impose tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. The levies were strongly backed by France but fiercely opposed by Germany, whose export-oriented car sector is heavily tied to the Chinese market. 'One key lesson from the deal with the US is that the EU still hasn't found its strategic footing in a rapidly changing trade landscape,' Redeker said. 'And for now, the same goes for its approach to China.' (de, mm)
Euractiv
24 minutes ago
- Euractiv
No power, no glory: The expensive weakness of the EU in Israel-Palestine
Gershon Baskin is the Middle East Director of the UK-based International Communities Organization. He is also the co-head of the Alliance for Two States. He lives in Jerusalem. For decades, I have heard from European politicians and leaders that Europe wants to be 'a player and not just a payer'. In a normal world being a player requires not only financial resources but also the ability to flex real muscles. Today, the world is not normal – if in the past the United States was a player that engaged others in the decision making of consequential issues to global security, in the world in which Donald Trump is the President of the United States, it seems that most of the other centers of any real power have already lowered their expectations to influence global affairs where the US President is the player. Trump doesn't like sharing the stage with others. However, Trump is the only person in the world who has leverage over Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu. Nothing that Europe can do politically will have any positive influence over the Israeli Prime Minister. Nonetheless, there is great importance to the French-Saudi initiative to advance the two-state solution, and with it enlist other countries to finally recognise the State of Palestine. This is important not only because those countries that have supported the two-state solution for many years – while only recognising one of the States – they are finally putting their money where their mouth is. The duplicity of supporting the two-state solution but only recognising one does not cause anyone in the region of Israel-Palestine, or in the world, to take Europe seriously. Most of those countries that have not yet recognised the State of Palestine have hesitated because they have been fearful of the response of the US. This has to end if those countries want to be players. Even if recognition of Palestinian statehood will not end the occupation or improve the lives of Palestinians, it has to be done – because it is the right thing to do. Europe has a history of making statements and issuing declarations on Israel and Palestine. But it has largely failed to act on its words. What actual power does Europe have? It is mostly in the economic field, and a little in the production of weapons and components of military machines. Despite being the largest funder of the Palestinian Authority, Europe has done very little to exert its financial leverage by making assistance conditional on changes and reforms that the EU believes are necessary. This is related to the issue of hateful material in school textbooks in Gaza, for which the EU is the largest donor. The EU has also previously called for serious reforms on issues concerning Palestinian democracy, including elections and human rights. While the bloc has been the largest funder of the Palestinian Central Elections Commission, it has failed to ensure that Palestinian elections are actually held. These are just a few examples of missed opportunities for the EU to have used its funding to nudge Palestinian decision-making. On issues concerning Israel, European duplicity and the lack of conditionality on trade, finance of R&D (Horizon program), and entry to the EU, has been an ongoing sign of European powerlessness. Europe considers Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories as being illegal. Why then do the 700,000 Israelis residing in such settlements enjoy visa-free access to Europe? If the settlements are illegal (in occupied territories, they are), the residents of those settlements are not living in the State of Israel. Even foreigners who have visa-free access to Israel and the United States are now required to fill out an online form to enter those countries. Why not do the same in Europe for Israelis? And if an Israeli's place of residence is in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, they should be denied visa-free access to Europe. Similarly, if goods produced in illegal settlements are illegal products not produced in the State of Israel, why does Europe ask only that they are marked as being produced in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and not prevent their entrance into Europe as illegal contraband? Whatever Europe does to ensure that its actions match its policy directives, particularly in support of Israeli-Palestinian peace based on the two-state solution, Europe will be labelled by Israel as antisemites or of taking actions which are antisemitic. This is the way that the State of Israel deals with all legitimate criticism of what Israel does. If Europe is confident that the criticism raised against Israeli policies is legitimate and not antisemitic, then don't be afraid to be labelled something that you are not. Israel uses the legacy of the Holocaust to cast the shadow of accusations of antisemitism in order to push down any and all legitimate criticism, and until now Europe has generally backed down. In the reality of the war crimes being committed by Israel in Gaza, it is time to stand up and open up the diplomatic toolbox of all of the carrots and sticks inside and to take out the biggest sticks in the toolbox with not only empty threats, but with actual intent to use them.
