US, China and Japan racing for the super-battleship lead
Cruisers typically are the largest, most heavily armed non-carrier major surface combatants, substantially larger and heavier than destroyers or frigates. They can serve as a flagship for surface action groups (SAG) or as a command center for fleet air defense.
While only the US and Russia currently operate warships formally classed as cruisers, some ships officially classed as destroyers have similar sizes and capabilities.
This month, Naval News reported that US defense contractor Lockheed Martin showcased a model of Japan's advanced AEGIS System Equipped Vessel (ASEV) at the IDEX in Abu Dhabi.
Set to become the world's largest stealth-guided missile destroyer outside the US Zumwalt class, Japan's ASEV will significantly strengthen its ballistic missile defense capabilities.
At 190 meters and over 14,000 tons, ASEV surpasses China's Type 055 destroyer (classed as a cruiser by NATO) on many measures with AN/SPY-7 AESA radar, 128 vertical launch system (VLS) cells, Glide Phase Interceptors (GPI) for hypersonic threats and Tomahawk missiles.
As regional tensions rise, delivery is expected by 2028, underscoring Japan's strategic shift from land-based systems to counter China and North Korea's evolving threats.
As with Japan's ASEVs, the US Navy's DDG(X) advanced guided-missile destroyer program is progressing in the concept design phase, The War Zone reported in January 2025.
The DDG(X) is envisioned to replace the US Navy's aging Ticonderoga-class cruisers, which are increasingly uneconomical to maintain with their limited combat value, and the maxed-out Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, which lack space for future upgrades.
Rear Admiral Bill Daly recently emphasized a 'clean-sheet imperative,' highlighting a 40-megawatt reserve power capacity for directed-energy weapons and advanced sensors supported by Zumwalt-class-derived Integrated Power Systems (IPS).
However, escalating costs pose challenges; initial estimates of US$3.3 billion per ship may rise to $4.4 billion, delaying production until at least 2034. Despite plans for 28 vessels, production delays could undermine the US Navy's strategic readiness amid heightened tensions with China.
In contrast to Japan and the US, whose next-generation destroyers are still on the drawing board, China has initiated a second production batch of Type 055 cruisers, leveraging shipyards at Dalian and Jiangnan to add to its fleet of eight ships, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported in February 2025.
SCMP notes that the class, costing $827.4 million for each ship, features cutting-edge stealth designs, advanced radar systems and a formidable arsenal, including 112 VLS cells capable of deploying surface-to-air, anti-ship and land-attack missiles. The SCMP report also says the class integrates hypersonic and anti-submarine weaponry, enhancing its multi-role capabilities.
China's Type 055 cruiser is designed to escort aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships and serve as command hubs for diverse naval operations.
The buildup of large surface warships in the Pacific comes as regional navies are gearing up for high-end war-at-sea scenarios, acquiring assets with critical capabilities such as air, ballistic and cruise missile defense. Growing threat perceptions are driving increased requirements for VLS cells, as seen in Chinese, US and other regional force acquisitions.
However, accommodating large VLS arrays demands significant internal space and deck area. Deployment is further complicated by technical requirements for large, high-mounted radars that can detect sea-skimming threats early.
Illustrating these missile threats, the US Department of Defense's (DOD) 2024 China Military Power Report says that China's People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) has an estimated 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), 500 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM), 1,300 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM), 900 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) and 400 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM).
Additionally, Politico reported in February 2023 that North Korea may already have enough ICBMs to overwhelm US homeland missile defenses. During an evening parade in Pyongyang, North Korea showcased 10-12 Hwasong-17 ICBMs. Politico says that if North Korea fits four warheads on each ICBM, it could overwhelm the US Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, which has only 44 interceptors.
Johannes Fischbach mentions in a December 2024 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) article that China has significantly narrowed the firepower gap with the US Navy, achieving over 50% of US VLS missile cell capacity.
According to Fischbach, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), the world's largest navy, now fields approximately 4,300 VLS cells across 84 surface combatants, compared to the US Navy's 8,400 cells on 85 ships.
He notes this progress stems from China's accelerated shipbuilding, including for Type 055 cruisers and Type 052D destroyers. In contrast, he says the US faces declining VLS capacity due to retiring Ticonderoga-class cruisers and slower construction of Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.
This narrowing firepower gap could significantly impair US surface warfare capabilities if left unabated. In a March 2023 Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) article, Dmitry Filipoff mentions that massed fires are central to distributed warfighting, enabling concentrated combat effects through coordinated missile salvos from dispersed units.
Filipoff says this approach maximizes lethality against advanced shipboard missile defenses, which require saturation by high-volume attacks to ensure effectiveness. He emphasizes the crucial role of ship-based fires, offering unmatched magazine depth and flexibility for sustained operations, as vessels can carry and launch significant missile loads.
While effective massed fires may require large, cruiser-size warships for magazine depth, US and allied shipbuilding capabilities are lagging behind China's. In a February 2024 Proceedings article, Jeffrey Seavy mentions that China has 46.59% of the global shipbuilding market, South Korea has 29.24% and Japan has 17.25%, with the US having an insignificant 0.13% share.
Seavy says China's massive shipbuilding lead over the US and its allies would give it considerable advantages in a sustained naval conflict. These advantages include potentially decisive numerical superiority, increased capacity for massed ship-based fires and the ability to repair or replace damaged or destroyed warships comparatively quickly.
In the Pacific's escalating naval arms race, missile firepower and shipbuilding capacity—not just technology—could determine who wins and who loses future crucial sea battles.
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