Roots of Indian rage

Express Tribune

26-05-2025

Over the past four decades, India's state apparatus has slowly been sold off to private capital. Consequently, economic anxiety defines the daily experience of ordinary citizens - the collective frustration of which the BJP strategically redirects towards Muslims. A national-level hero's journey of resurgence must, it turns out, have a villain.
India's 1991 neoliberal economic reforms under Finance Minister Manmohan Singh entailed three primary initiatives: deregulation, privatisation, and trade liberalisation. The first involved slashing oversight on corporations: licensing requirements to set up industries were eliminated, production quotas were substantially eased, and firms were allowed to diversify and expand without needing government approvals. The second entailed divesting from state owned enterprises. Major entities - including BALCO, Hindustan Zinc, IPCL, VSNL (now Tata Communications Limited) and many more - were sold to private parties over the subsequent decade. The third involved discontinuing 'artificial' import restrictions and state-led export promotion initiatives in an effort to integrate into global 'free' markets. More broadly, corporate taxes were slashed, interest rates deregulated, and restrictions on foreign direct investment lifted. Collectively, these measures led to improvements in surface level economic indicators. GDP growth, a better managed fiscal account, and the strengthening of trade relations were all observed. On the other hand, however, inequalities surged.
With fewer checks on corporations, collective bargaining via trade unions and farmer associations weakened - and workers were left to fend for themselves in a dog-eat-dog modality. Government funds were systematically redirected away from education, healthcare, and food/fertiliser subsidy programmes, especially under the BJP. With state support gutted, stable employment became the sole lifeline for most: making for a hyper-competitive job market with no room for slip-ups. Employers exploited this by demanding unpaid overtime, while some employees voluntarily extended their hours in the hopes of sustaining a 'respectable' lifestyle. All this, combined with rising average commute times to and from work, eroded space for leisure. The result was a declining public interest in art, literature, and intellectual engagement. Book reading was slowly replaced with mindless 'doom scrolling' on apps like Instagram, and academic/cultural conferences became less popular over time - in their stead appearing fleeting pastimes such as 'e-sports' (PC/console gaming) and the consumption of pornography, for which India ranked #3 in the world in 2024 with 30.75 billion views. Low self-esteem, rampant misogyny, and declining levels of critical thinking ability were all consequences.
According to data from the World Inequality Index, India's top 1% increased its income share from 10.2% in 1991 to 22.6% in 2022, whereas its share of wealth shot up from 16.1% to a whopping 40.1% during the same period. Conversely, the bottom 50% saw income and wealth shares drop from 22.2% to 15%, and 8.8% to 6.5%, respectively. In effect, resources were painstakingly redistributed from lower and lower-middle classes to the upper echelons of society. This rapidly transforming economic landscape, combined with the rise of digital connectivity, led to the erosion of communal bonds. Extended families were replaced with nuclear ones. Social gatherings became less frequent, eventually being transposed to the virtual realm. Religious occasions such as Holi and Diwali were ironically less about the reinforcement of deep sacred values of equity, compassion, and spiritual renewal, and more about escapism from cutthroat capitalism via consumer excess: presents, dance parties, and mass indulgence in drugs and alcohol. Isolation, frustration, emptiness, and resentment defined the daily experience of most non-propertied citizens.
It is in this general backdrop that two major ideologies slowly came to take centre stage in India. The first, hyper-nationalism, was fueled by the desperate desire for some sort of respect and belonging. This was represented by Hindutva - a belief that the nation belonged primarily to Hindus and existed to serve them. BJP was always its primary torchbearer, and its original 'moment of glory' was the destruction of the Babri Mosque in 1992, the intention behind which was to replace it with a temple dedicated to Rama, a Hindu deity. The event, led by RSS and BJP - triggered a particular kind of catharsis in both participants and observers, catapulting Hindutva to the political mainstream for subsequent years and decades. Sure enough, by 1998, BJP was able to form its first coalition government under AB Vajpayee. Over the years, and particularly following the 9/11 attacks, BJP presented the 'Muslim' as the source of all - or most - troubles - a convenient scapegoat to detract from rapidly expanding economic vulnerabilities. In 2002, the horrific Gujarat Massacre took place under the watch of Narendra Modi, then Chief Minister of the state. Approximately 800 Muslims were slaughtered, demonstrating that the nascent Prime Minister was more than just talk: he was the 'strongman' that would revive past glories and show no mercy to his adversaries. All while continuing to push anti-poor policies, crippling the most vulnerable - Hindus included.
The second ideology, which rose to global presence post 2010 alongside social media ubiquity, was postmodernism: the prioritisation of subjective experience over 'empirical' (quantifiable, verifiable) reality. The BJP's general communication is heavily reliant on precisely this. The unregulated Indian media's disinformation campaign on 9th May is an accurate recent manifestation. It is also why Indian authorities have continued to evade the demand on them to offer evidence for Pakistan's alleged involvement in Pahalgam, and why they have insisted on dragging the 'Muslim terrorist' trope from the War on Terror to this day despite its obvious irrelevance. For authoritarians like Modi, who rely exclusively on stoking myopic, hateful tribalism as a strategy to detract from worsening material conditions, postmodernism has been a godsend. With it, ruling elites can rest assured their economic exploitation is never brought into the limelight. Since 2014, Modi has made Indian Hindus feel a visceral animosity for Muslims that far exceeds that of bygone years. What was contempt yesterday is bloodlust today. And 'limited conflicts' scratch that itch unlike anything else. Voters in Bihar, scheduled for elections this year (what a coincidence!), must have watched the recent ordeal closely.
In many ways, the India of 2025 represents a worst-case scenario and cautionary tale for countries in the Global South, including Pakistan, that have been experimenting with neoliberal ideology to shape economic policy. Democracies cannot survive runaway economic inequality.