Duterte surges as Marcos flags ahead of crucial midterm polls
Once considered the crown prince of dynastic restoration, President Ferdinand 'Bongbong' Marcos Jr is now floundering, with his public approval rating plummeting from 42% in February to 25% in March, according to a Pulse Asia Research poll.
Meanwhile, Vice President Sara Duterte, daughter of the now-detained former strongman leader Rodrigo Duterte, is rising in the electorate's eye, up from 52% in February to 59% in March, the same poll showed.
The arrest and extradition of Rodrigo Duterte to The Hague earlier this year on charges of crimes against humanity during his bloody war on drugs was a seismic moment in Philippine politics.
While many in the international community lauded the move as a step toward accountability for thousands of unpunished extrajudicial killings, its domestic reception has been mixed.
For many Filipinos, particularly in Mindanao and Duterte strongholds across the Visayas, the spectacle of a former president being tried abroad rather than at home has stirred nationalist resentment.
So far, it appears this Western international intervention, aided and abetted by Marcos Jr's government, has bolstered, not weakened, Sara Duterte's political standing.
She has deftly positioned herself as the inheritor of her father's political mantle while avoiding his excesses. And the symbolism of her defending national sovereignty—by implication, if not explicitly—has endeared her to a Filipino public weary of foreign moralizing and elite Manila politics.
This puts the Marcos Jr administration in a bind. What was likely intended as a triumphant moment of legal reckoning has, in practice, sparked a backlash. In the eyes of many, the Hague trial is less about Rodrigo Duterte and more about a state that is increasingly perceived as unstable and externally manipulated.
The many reasons for Marcos Jr's fading popularity are empirical and deeply felt on the ground. First, a cost-of-living crisis continues to batter ordinary Filipinos, with Rice, sugar, and basic utility prices all surging.
Despite lofty promises of ushering in a 'golden age of agriculture,' Marcos—who controversially appointed himself as agriculture secretary—has wholly failed to tame inflation, curb smuggling cartels or ensure food security. His symbolic decision to consolidate executive and agricultural power, once seen as bold, now looks like a lost gamble.
Second, critics say the Marcos administration's governance has become a masterclass in inertia. They argue Cabinet factionalism, elite-level indecision and growing policy contradictions have crippled the state's response to mounting multiple crises.
The rollout of the Maharlika Investment Fund—touted as a vehicle for national development—has been derailed by concerns over corruption and political patronage. It has become emblematic of how the Marcos administration speaks of modernization while practicing corrupt old patterns.
Third, the Marcos family itself is showing signs of internal disarray. Senator Imee Marcos, the president's sister, has publicly distanced herself from Marcos Jr's key policies, including Maharlika and his overt foreign military alignment with the US over China.
Their family split has not gone unnoticed by provincial power brokers. More damaging, the narrative of Marcos exceptionalism—revived during the 2022 campaign—has begun to crumble under the weight of unmet expectations and unresolved historical grievances.
This loss of confidence is not confined to Metro Manila's chattering classes. Across the Ilocos Region—once a Marcos bastion—local leaders are beginning to hedge their bets, with some quietly aligning with emerging camps loyal to Vice President Sara Duterte.
Her 58% approval rating, twice as high as Marcos Jr's, is no fluke. While she shares the Duterte name, Sara has managed to distance herself from her father's cruder populism, carving out a more pragmatic executive image rooted in her Davao mayoral years.
Unlike Marcos, Sara Duterte has avoided symbolic overreach. Her performance as Education Secretary—though criticized early on—has stabilized, with targeted investments in rural schools and curriculum reforms drawing quiet praise.
Her strength lies not just in competence but in emotional resonance. While Marcos projects elitism and nostalgia, Duterte offers something closer to everyday resolve.
Her Davao background and Mindanao base give her authenticity in a political landscape where central Luzon and Metro Manila elites often appear tone-deaf to provincial problems and struggles, especially among the poor.
The 2028 presidential election looms large over this month's midterms. The Duterte camp is already positioning Sara as the natural successor to Marcos Jr, with a growing coalition of governors, mayors and legislators rallying to her side. By law, Marcos Jr is limited to one six-year term.
If her allies perform well in the midterms, Sara Duterte will not only control Congress but also command the political narrative heading into the next presidential race. In contrast, the Marcos Jr camp increasingly appears bereft of an overarching strategy.
Rumors of an Imee Marcos candidacy, which could be credibly crafted as different from her brother's now floundering government, are already beginning to surface, with some suggesting a Marcos versus Duterte presidential duel is nearly inevitable in 2028.
If not, there is still a large clan of Marcoses to choose from if Imee doesn't get the nod from her family.
This Marcos versus Duterte blood feud is more than personal: it is regional and ideological. The Marcos clan's strength is concentrated in the north, especially Ilocos and parts of Luzon. The Dutertes, on the other hand, command the south, with deep support in Mindanao and the Visayas.
The two dynasties embody competing narratives of national identity and governance – one rooted in aristocratic restoration, the other in populist pragmatism.
And herein lies the simmering political tension. Unlike previous political rivalries that eventually gave way to fragile coalitions, the Marcos-Duterte conflict shows no signs of accommodation.
Their core constituencies are regionally insulated, emotionally committed and mutually distrustful. The rivalry is not merely electoral—it is generational, and possibly even existential.
Foreign actors, namely the US and China, are no longer peripheral, despite assumptions to the contrary. In early April, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) chief, General Romeo Brawner, publicly warned of alleged Chinese political interference.
Though specifics are lacking, the warning signaled a growing belief within the Philippine security establishment that the country's internal divisions may be exploited by foreign powers—not least at this month's mid-term elections. Marcos Jr is viewed as strongly aligned with the US and West, while the Dutertes lean toward China.
As such, the May 12 midterm elections will serve not only as a referendum on Marcos's leadership but as a test of national resilience against both domestic fragmentation and foreign entanglement.
If Sara Duterte's allies capture a majority in Congress and the Senate, the Marcos presidency could become a lame duck with a full three years to go.
If the Marcos camp suffers heavy electoral losses, it will mark not just a political miscalculation but perhaps the collapse of a dynasty's dream of full rehabilitation. The stakes couldn't be higher at the upcoming polls, where family, memory and vengeance will all factor in a crucial vote.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
South China Morning Post
9 hours ago
- South China Morning Post
Even his biggest fans in Japan are turning against Taiwan's William Lai
Western cheerleaders of Taiwanese leader William Lai Ching-te love his constant poking of Beijing in the eye. People from the Asia-Pacific, though, are less cheery about the incessant and often pointless provocations. Japanese media pundits have been among the biggest fans of the leadership of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), even before Lai entered office. It's not a good sign when even they are turning against him . That's not hard to understand. If there was to be a shooting war over Taiwan, it would affect Japan a lot more than faraway Europe and North America. Yomiuri Shimbun, Japan's largest daily, has denounced the latest recall vote – which failed to oust a single Beijing-friendly Kuomintang (KMT) lawmaker – as an undemocratic attempt to 'eliminate opposition parties' which make up the majority in the island's legislature. Sankei Shimbun, a conservative newspaper, compared Lai with the disgraced Chen Shui-bian, the island's first DPP president who was mired in corruption scandals. His time in office worsened polarisation at home and antagonism with Beijing. Sound familiar? Thanks to high tariffs and borderline blackmail on forced investments in the United States, even Japan and South Korea, actual allies of Washington with long-standing formal treaties, are waking up to how unreliable and even threatening Washington has become. But Lai, who faces the same economic coercion from the US, prefers to double down on provoking Beijing. He now talks about the 'purity' of Taiwan, presumably as opposed to the impure mainland, the kind of racial language fitting for a proto-fascist.
South China Morning Post
9 hours ago
- South China Morning Post
Hong Kong court challenges Jimmy Lai's rights claims in national security trial
Two Hong Kong judges hearing Jimmy Lai Chee-ying's national security trial have expressed reservations about the defence characterising the former media boss's alleged endeavours to trigger Western sanctions and foster hatred towards authorities as a legitimate exercise of fundamental rights. The 77-year-old Apple Daily tabloid founder's legal team on Wednesday started presenting its closing arguments at West Kowloon Court after the prosecution made their final remarks in his case of conspiracies to print seditious publications and collude with foreign forces. Senior counsel Robert Pang Yiu-hung opened his speech by hitting out at what he saw as prosecutors' attempt to 'denigrate' human rights and dismiss it as 'an alien concept'. 'You can't force someone to think in one way or another,' the lawyer said. 'Nor is it wrong to hope that the government would change its policies, whether through its own internal review or through suggestion or even pressure, whether from inside Hong Kong or out.' Madam Justice Esther Toh Lye-ping, one of three presiding High Court judges, said the charges were not as simple as that.
AllAfrica
12 hours ago
- AllAfrica
After Alaska: What Ukraine peace looks like to Trump
For all the pomp and staged drama of the summit between Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin in Alaska, the substantive part of the spectacle – that is, the negotiations between two great powers over the grinding war in Ukraine – did not at first appear to yield much. There was no deal and little detail on purported areas of progress. The post-Alaska analysis, however, suggested the US had shifted away from Ukraine's position. Trump, it was reported, essentially agreed to Putin's call for territorial concessions by Ukraine and for efforts toward a conclusive peace agreement over an immediate ceasefire – the latter opposed by Putin as Russia makes gains on the battlefield. Those apparent concessions were enough to prompt alarm in the capitals of Europe. A hastily arranged follow-up meeting between Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky – and assorted European Union (EU) allies – and Trump in the White House on August 18 yielded vague promises of security guarantees for Ukraine. This is all very frustrating for those looking for some concrete foundations of a peace deal. Yet, as a longtime scholar of Russian and Soviet history, I believe that the diplomatic whirl has revealed glimpses of what a future peace deal may look like. Or, more precisely, what it looks like for Putin and Trump. It may be a bitter pill for Ukraine to swallow, but what it all suggests is a meeting of minds between the leaders of the two great powers involved: Russia and the United States. After all, as Trump told Fox News following the Alaska summit: 'It's good when two big powers get along, especially when they're nuclear powers. We're No. 1 and they're No. 2 in the world.' Some of what we already knew remains unchanged. First, the European powers – notably Germany, France and the UK – remain fully supportive of Ukraine and are prepared to back Kyiv in resisting the Russian invasion and occupation. Second, Zelensky opposes concessions to Russia, at least publicly. Rather, Ukraine's leader seemingly believes that with Western – and most importantly, American – arms, Ukraine can effectively resist Russia and secure a better end to the conflict than is evident at this moment. Meeting Trump again in the Oval Office after being ambushed by Trump and Vice President JD Vance in February, Zelensky was as deferential and grateful to the US president as his more formal dress indicated. All eyes were on Presidents Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the Oval Office on Aug. 18, 2025. Photo: Anna Moneymaker / Getty Images via The Conversation In contrast to Zelensky and the European powers, the aims and positions of the United States under Trump appear to be fluid. And while Putin talks of the need to address the 'primary causes' of the Ukraine conflict and publicly pushes a maximalist position, it isn't entirely clear what he will actually settle for in regard to the security and land arrangements he says he needs. I would argue that there are two ways of interpreting the aims of both the United States and Russia: 'imperial' and 'hegemonic.' The former stems from an understanding of those countries' long experience as empires. Countries that have descended from empires have memories of former greatness that many wish to repeat in the present. And while there is nothing fatalistic about such imperial fantasies that translate the past into the present, they often echo in the repertoire of the influential and powerful. There are signs in the rhetoric of both Trump and Putin of such grandiose imperial impulses. Both have talked of returning their country to a 'great' past and have harbored desires of annexing or dominating other countries. And many Western analysts of Russia are convinced that Putin dreams of becoming another Peter the Great, who expanded his empire into the Baltic region, or Catherine the Great, who sent her armies south into 'New Russia' – that is, what is today Ukraine. But there is also another way, short of empire, that explains how great powers act in the world: as hegemons, either regionally or globally. Instead of the colonizing of other territories and peoples, hegemons act to dominate other countries economically and militarily – and perhaps ideologically and politically, as well. They do so without taking over the smaller country. The United States, through its dominant position in NATO, is a hegemon whose sway is paramount among the members of the alliance, which can hardly operate effectively without the agreement of Washington. Putin's interests, I would contend, are short of fully imperial – which would require complete control of Ukraine's domestic and foreign policy. But they are flagrantly hegemonic. In this reading, Putin may well be satisfied to get what the Soviets achieved in Finland during the Cold War: a compliant state that did not threaten Moscow, but remained independent in other ways. Putin has such an arrangement with Belarus and might be satisfied with a Ukraine that's not fully sovereign, militarily weak and outside of NATO. At the Alaska summit, Putin not only mentioned Ukraine as a 'brotherly nation,' but also emphasized that 'the situation in Ukraine has to do with fundamental threats to Russian security.' One can read Putin's words in many ways, but his public comments in Alaska framed the Ukraine conflict in Russian security terms, rather than in imperialist language. The problem for Putin is that Russia does not have the economic and military power, or the reputational soft power attraction, to become a stable, influential hegemon in its neighborhood. Because it cannot achieve what the US has accomplished through a mix of hard and soft power since the fall of the Soviet Union – that is, global hegemony – it has turned to physical force. That move has proved disastrous in terms of casualties, domestic economic distress, the mass migration of hundreds of thousands of Russians opposed to the war, and isolation from the global capitalist economy. What Putin desires is something that shows his people that the war was worth the sacrifices. And that may mean territorial expansion in the annexation of four contested provinces of Ukraine – Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson – as well as Crimea, taken in 2014. That goal certainly seems imperial. And while the distinctions between an imperial foreign policy and a hegemonic one may seem semantic or academic, they are crucial when looking at the prospects of peace. Imperialism is always about conquest and total subordination of one regime to another. If indeed Putin is an imperialist who wants full control of Ukraine – or, as is often claimed, its elimination as a sovereign state and the recreation of a polity akin to the Soviet Union – then negotiation and compromise with Russia become impossible. My sense is that to solidify his relations with Trump and his territorial gains in Ukraine, Putin will be satisfied with accepting the rest of Ukraine as a nation-state that remains outside of NATO and is neither a base for Western powers nor a perceived military threat to Russia. The problem here, of course, is that such a solution may be unacceptable to Zelensky and would have to be imposed on Kyiv. That would be anathema to the major European powers, though not necessarily for Trump. And here we find another obstacle to peace in Ukraine: Europe and the US do not have a united position on the final solution to the war. Even if both accept the view that Russia's aims are primarily about its own idea of security rather than conquest or elimination of Ukraine, would Europe accept Putin's demands for a major overhaul of the military balance in east-central Europe. Trump appears less concerned about the prospect of a truncated Ukraine subordinated to Russia. His major concerns seem to lie elsewhere, perhaps in the Nobel Peace Prize he covets. But the US may have to guarantee the security of Ukraine against future Russian attacks, something that Trump has hinted at, even as he abhors the idea of sending American troops into foreign conflicts. While leaders talk peace, Russian drone strikes continue in Ukraine. Photo: Serhii Masin / Anadolu via Getty Images / The Conversation Wars have consequences, both for the victorious and the defeated. And the longer this war goes on, the more likely the grinding advance of Russia further into Ukraine becomes, given the military might of Russia and Trump's ambivalent support of Ukraine. With those realities in mind, the solution to the Russia-Ukraine war appears to be closer to what Russia is willing to accept than Ukraine. Ukraine, as Trump so brutally put it, does not have cards to play in this tragic game where great powers decide the fate of other countries. We are back to Thucydides, the ancient Greek founder of political science, who wrote: 'Right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.' Not surprisingly, this is what international relations theorists call 'realism.' Ronald Suny is professor of history and political science, University of Michigan This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
