Ishiba clings to leadership after election setback
'As the first party in parliament, we have to fulfill our responsibility with the public so as to prevent politics from stagnating or drifting away,' Ishiba told a news conference he held as LDP leader Monday afternoon.
Citing ongoing negotiations with the United States over the 25% 'reciprocal' tariffs imposed by the administration of President Donald Trump and the complex economic and security outlook, Ishiba told reporters he has no intention of stepping down.
However, in the wake of another setback after last October's debacle in the Lower House election, his political capital has plunged.
In the Upper House election, the LDP failed to reverse the momentum of mounting headwinds anticipated by the poor showing in June's Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly poll.
Throughout the campaign, the LDP tried to play the part of the 'responsible party,' portraying itself as the only force able to steer the country out of the troubled waters it finds itself in. Depicting the opposition as a cluster of irresponsible forces who can't be trusted with the helm of the country, the LDP attempted to appeal to the electorate with its alleged experience and sound judgment.
The party's recipe for the future, though, failed to resonate with a public vexed by the soaring cost of living and tired of over a decade of LDP leadership.
The insistence shown in protecting the country's coffers and defending the consumption tax 'to the end' — in the words of LDP Secretary-General Hiroshi Moriyama — backfired at the polls, as did the promise of ¥20,000 cash handouts.
As shown in the resounding victories achieved by the Democratic Party for the People and Sanseito , especially in urban districts, the LDP faded in comparison to the expansionist menus presented by the opposition.
The election debate largely stayed inward-oriented, with voters showing little interest in topics such as security and the ongoing tariff negotiations. Ishiba's attacks on the alleged 'irresponsibility' of a fragmented opposition largely fell on deaf ears.
On the defining issue of the campaign — policies related to the foreign community — the LDP was forced to adapt to an agenda defined by opposition parties.
All in all, the party couldn't escape the fate that often awaits incumbents in times of burgeoning dissatisfaction with the status quo. Ishiba's own track record ended up exacerbating that dissatisfaction.
In his nine months in office, Ishiba — who seemed to have plenty of plans for the country when he reached the party leadership — proved unable to leave his own distinctive mark on the role.
Perhaps surprisingly, the party showed its trademark pragmatism to successfully navigate an insidious session of parliament — clinching ad-hoc deals with the opposition in exchange for policy concessions.
However, that laborious process left the party anemic, unable to reboot and rehabilitate its standing after last year's Lower House defeat. Handicapped from the start of his mandate and lacking a strong power base within the party, Ishiba could do little to change the course of the election.
For a moment, the popular Shinjiro Koizumi's appointment as agricultural minister in late May seemed to have turned the tables and given Ishiba some breathing room. That too, however, proved short-lived.
After voters signaled their frustration toward the current administration at the polls, the ball is now in the LDP's court. The next few weeks will be crucial to determine the future of the administration — and potentially of the composition of the coalition.
The thin margin of the coalition's defeat — the coalition is only three seats short of the 125 needed for a majority — leaves potential room for maneuvering in the Upper Chamber.
On top of that, the Aug. 1 deadline on tariff negotiations might grant the prime minister some breathing room, allowing him to stay on in the name of continuity and the need to avoid a political vacuum at a sensitive time for the nation.
The weakened state of party factions means that, even if internal maneuvers to oust Ishiba were to occur, the old playbook may no longer apply.
That being said, in one way or the other, Ishiba will be forced to take 'responsibility' for the party's underperformance in the poll. Although last year's Lower House defeat took place only weeks into his mandate, this time the prime minister has fewer excuses, particularly given the impasse on tariffs.
Reports say the party will soon call a plenary meeting with members of both the Lower and Upper House. Lawmakers long critical of Ishiba will have a chance to vent their frustrations and potentially coalesce.
While he denied any enlargement of the coalition at this stage, he voiced his intention to create a framework for policy cooperation with the opposition.
'We will hold sincere discussions with opposition parties on policy issues of particular urgency,' Ishiba said.
He also added he hasn't made up his mind on a potential reshuffle of his government or the party leadership.
So far, all the potential interlocutors — namely the DPP and Nippon Ishin no Kai — have ruled out the possibility. DPP leader Yuichiro Tamaki said his party will watch the coming developments within the LDP before making the next move.
Should Ishiba step down, the party will enter a new phase of instability, and it's unclear whether a new leader could gain the trust of fellow lawmakers. Last September's presidential election showed there's no shortage of aspiring leaders, starting with Koizumi.
It took Ishiba — famously the lone wolf, popular with the public but with few friends in the party — five attempts to attain the long-yearned party leadership. He won't go down that easily.
'The road ahead will be thorny,' Ishiba admitted. 'But we will deepen discussions with other parties and run the country with a sincere heart.'
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