Gold price today: Rates ease on profit booking; Trump Tariffs uncertainty remains a key support; key MCX levels to watch
In the previous session, Gold August futures contract rose 1.3 per cent to close at ₹ 99,328 per 10 grams, while silver September futures contract jumped nearly 2 per cent to settle at ₹ 1,15,046 per kg.
A largely stable dollar and weak spot demand may be reasons behind profit booking in precious metals, even as persisting uncertainty about the US's trade negotiations with its trading partners underpins the demand for safe-haven assets.
According to media reports, there is a high possibility that a potential trade deal between the European Union (EU) and the US could favour the latter. This may trigger retaliatory moves from the EU.
Meanwhile, the dollar index climbed by 0.10 per cent, weighing on gold's appeal.
The focus now is on the US Fed Chair Jerome Powell's speech on July 22 and the ECB interest rate decision on July 24.
Experts expect gold and silver prices to remain volatile, and some of them suggest buying silver at this juncture.
"We expect gold and silver prices to remain volatile this week amid volatility in the global financial markets, Fed Chairman's speech and ahead of ECB monetary policy meetings. We suggest buying silver on dips around ₹ 1,13,500 with a stop loss of ₹ 1,12,200 for the target of ₹ 1,16,000," said Manoj Kumar Jain of Prithvifinmart Commodity Research.
(This is a developing story. Please check back for fresh updates.)
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Disclaimer: This story is for educational purposes only. The views and recommendations expressed are those of individual analysts or broking firms, not Mint. We advise investors to consult with certified experts before making any investment decisions, as market conditions can change rapidly and circumstances may vary.
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