
Eastern Europe and Central Asia: Challenges for the media
The beginning of 2025 saw media development in Eastern Europe and Central Asia in crisis. Intensified by the US funding cut, financial support was dwindling while the challenges of strengthening institutional capacity, fostering enabling environments, encouraging cross-sector collaboration, and promoting a vibrant information ecosystem remained the same. Organizations involved in the sector expressed concern that emerging challenges, such as media business development, safety and security training, and legal threats (including SLAPP cases), were overstretching the capacity of editors and managers to focus on long-term sustainability or attract additional funding. Hardly a moment to breathe: Media leaders are stretched thin by emerging challenges like business development, safety training, and legal threats Image: Thomas Koehler/photothek/picture alliance
These developments stood in contrast to the successes that the sector had previously been able to achieve. In 2024, media development celebrated a landmark success when the OECD Development Co-Operation Principles for Relevant and Effective Support to Media and the Information Environment , or Media Principles for short, were adopted. DW Akademie conducted a study to find out how media development organizations were faring vis à vis these Principles. The State of Media Development Report was published in April 2025.
On the back of this study, a forthcoming follow-up regional report takes a closer look at the specific situation in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, based on interviews with local experts and responses to a survey completed by media development organizations across the region. Structured around the OECD's six principles, the report rates how organizations are faring vis à vis the Media Principles, identifies key challenges and provides recommendations for both media organizations and donors.
How is media development faring in Eastern Europe and Central Asia amid political instability and economic hardship?
With persistent political instability and economic hardship, media development support is especially critical in Eastern Europe and Central Asia — including Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine and drifts towards authoritarianism in countries like Georgia. There are, however, also positive examples of post-Soviet countries in the region, such as Armenia and Estonia, which not only respect but actively promote media freedom. In times of war and instability, media support has never been more vital Image: Rodrigo Abd/AP Photo/picture alliance
A closer look at the OECD's six principles
The research shows that two out of six principles have been positively assessed, while others — especially financial and institutional support — require urgent attention. The "Do no harm" principle (principle 1) was found to be minimally fulfilled, varying across countries and organizations. While donors reportedly respected editorial independence, their delayed or inadequate crisis response, short-term engagement and incoherent policies undermined operational flexibility. Principle 1: Do no harm to public interest media (Minimally fulfilled)
(Minimally fulfilled) Principle 2: Increase financial and other assistance (Not fulfilled at all)
(Not fulfilled at all) Principle 3: Take a whole-of-system perspective (Partially fulfilled)
(Partially fulfilled) Principle 4: Local leadership and ownership (Overall fulfilled)
(Overall fulfilled) Principle 5: Improve coordination (Overall fulfilled)
(Overall fulfilled) Principle 6: Invest in knowledge, research and learning (Partially fulfilled) Experts across the region stressed the urgent need to boost capital inflow to support resilient and innovative media Image: Guenter Fischer/CHROMORANGE/picture alliance
Financial support (principle 2) was widely cited as the most problematic area. Many media organizations reported that efforts to ensure sustainability — such as business development, safety training, and compliance with legal frameworks — were diverting resources away from content production. Despite efforts to engage the private sector, tangible results remain limited. Also, the cancellation of Meta's fact-checking program in the EU — and the potential suspension of similar efforts in other regions — has increased the demand for fact-checking and investigative journalism funding.
On the other hand, local leadership and coordination (principles 4 and 5) were positively assessed. New coordination frameworks and partnerships are emerging as critical strategies to resist political instability and respond to ongoing crises. However, research, learning, and innovation (principle 6) continue to suffer from underfunding. The lack of investment has limited regional innovation, constrained the ability of organizations to adapt, and left them unprepared for emerging challenges.
Across the region, experts emphasized the urgent need for structural reform in the media sector — including improving capital inflow, adapting to social media driven markets, and strengthening participation in policy discussions to enhance recruitment, innovation, and operational models. In search of unique stories: Local leadership was positively assessed Image: D. Shahbazyan/DW
What to do: Focus on media viability, digital strategies and safety
While the full report by DW Akademie's think tank DW Freedom offers a host of important recommendations, these are the most important ones to stabilize and consolidate media development efforts in the region:
Ensure core funding for media viability: Sustainable core funding is essential to respond to prevalent crises and avoid reliance on politically influenced and/or purely commercial content.
Invest in long-term tech innovation: Short-term, fragmented tech funding fails to deliver durable solutions. Donors must coordinate efforts to support scalable digital strategies and reclaim advertising revenue.
Address gaps in local media ecosystems: In many areas, TV remains dominant while digital adoption lags behind. Funding must support outlets that reinforce local democracy and help counter growing polarization.
Strengthen legal and safety frameworks: Small and exiled media face legal restrictions and security threats. Long-term support for legal reform, journalist safety, and operational protection is essential.
Prioritize local leadership and inclusion: Donor preference for international actors often sidelines capable local organizations. Local voices must be integrated into strategy, funding, and implementation processes.
Giorgi Jangiani is the Country Lead at Thomson Reuters Foundation, Georgia and GFMD IMPACT regional coordinator for Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. He conducted this research as an independent consultant.
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