
Why Russia isn't taking Trump's threats seriously
On July 15, when describing new measures that would impose 100% tariffs on any country buying Russian exports, Trump warned: 'They are very biting. They are very significant. And they are going to be very bad for the countries involved.'
Secondary sanctions do not just target Russia directly; they threaten to cut off access to US markets for any country maintaining trade relationships with Moscow. The economic consequences would impact global supply chains, particularly targeting major economies like China and India, which have become Russia's commercial lifelines.
Despite the dire threats, Moscow's stock exchange increased by 2.7% immediately following Trump's announcement. The value of the Russian ruble also strengthened. On a global scale, oil markets appear to have relaxed, suggesting traders see no imminent risks.
This market reaction coincided with a nonplussed Moscow. While official statements noted that time was needed for Russia to 'analyze what was said in Washington', other statements suggested that the threats would have no effect.
Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, for example, declared on social media that 'Russia didn't care' about Trump's threats. The positive market reaction and lack of panic from Russian officials tell us more than simple skepticism about Trump's willingness to follow through.
If investors doubted Trump's credibility, we would expect market indifference, not enthusiasm. Instead, the reaction suggests that financial markets expected a stronger response from the US.
As Artyom Nikolayev, an analyst from Invest Era, quipped: 'Trump performed below market expectations.'
Trump's threat isn't just non-credible – the positive market reaction in Russia suggests it is a gift for Moscow. The 50-day ultimatum is seen not as a deadline but as a reprieve, meaning nearly two months of guaranteed inaction from the US.
This will allow Russia more time to press its military advantages in Ukraine without facing new economic pressure. Fifty days is also a long time in American politics, where other crises will almost certainly arise to distract attention from the war.
More importantly, Trump's threat actively undermines more serious sanctions efforts that were gaining momentum in the US Congress. A bipartisan bill has been advancing a far more severe sanctions package, proposing secondary tariffs of up to 500% and, crucially, severely limiting the president's ability to waive them.
By launching his own initiative, Trump seized control of the policy agenda. Once the ultimatum was issued, US Senate majority leader John Thune announced that any vote on the tougher sanctions bill would be delayed until after the 50-day period. This effectively pauses a more credible threat facing the Kremlin. People stand near the site of a drone strike on a residential building in Lviv, Ukraine, on July 12. Photo: Mykola Tys / EPA via The Conversation
This episode highlights a problem for US attempts to use economic statecraft in international relations. Three factors have combined to undermine the credibility of Trump's threats.
First, there is Trump's own track record. Financial markets have become so accustomed to the administration announcing severe tariffs only to delay, water down or abandon them that the jibe 'Taco', short for 'Trump always chickens out', has gained traction in financial circles.
This reputation for failing to stick to threats means that adversaries and markets alike have learned to price in a high probability of backing down.
Second, the administration's credibility is weakened by a lack of domestic political accountability. Research on democratic credibility in international relations emphasizes how domestic constraints – what political scientists call 'audience costs' – can paradoxically strengthen a country's international commitments.
When leaders know they will face political punishment from voters or a legislature for backing down from a threat, their threats gain weight. Yet the general reluctance of Congress to constrain Trump undermines this logic. This signals to adversaries that threats can be made without consequence, eroding their effectiveness.
And third, effective economic coercion requires a robust diplomatic and bureaucratic apparatus to implement and enforce it. The systematic gutting of the State Department and the freezing of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) programs eliminate the diplomatic infrastructure necessary for sustained economic pressure.
Effective sanctions require careful coordination with allies, which the Trump administration has undermined. In addition, effective economic coercion requires planning and credible commitment to enforcement, all of which are impossible without a professional diplomatic corps.
Investors and foreign governments appear to be betting that this combination of presidential inconsistency, a lack of domestic accountability and a weakened diplomatic apparatus makes any threat more political theater than genuine economic coercion.
The rally in Russian markets was a clear signal that American economic threats are becoming less feared.
Patrick E Shea is senior lecturer in international relations and global governance, University of Glasgow
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Hashtags

Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles


AllAfrica
an hour ago
- AllAfrica
Trump's AI Action Plan aims for global domination
'Winning the Race: America's AI Action Plan' envisions a world controlled by all-knowing US technology. It begins by declaring that 'The United States is in a race to achieve global dominance in artificial intelligence (AI). Whoever has the largest AI ecosystem will set global AI standards and reap broad economic and military benefits. Just like we won the space race, it is imperative that the United States and its allies win this race.' Released by the White House on July 23, the plan 'identifies over 90 Federal policy actions across three pillars – Accelerating Innovation, Building American AI Infrastructure, and Leading in International Diplomacy and Security – that the Trump Administration will take in the coming weeks and months.' In retrospect, it appears that the release of China's DeepSeek AI model last January really was a 'Sputnik moment.' With 23 pages of text, the Action Plan offers a highly detailed assessment of what needs to be done to 'achieve the President's vision of global AI dominance.' It is a mission statement from an activist government, complete with an alphabet soup of departmental acronyms. For example: 'Led by DOD, DHS, and ODNI, in coordination with OSTP, NSC, OMB, and the Office of the National Cyber Director [ONCD] encourage the responsible sharing of AI vulnerability information as part of ongoing efforts to implement Executive Order 14306, 'Sustaining Select Efforts to Strengthen the Nation's Cybersecurity and Amending Executive Order 13694 and Executive Order 14144.' That's Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Office of Science and Technology Policy, National Security Council and Office of Management and Budget. Also, 'Through DOL, DOE, ED, NSF, and DOC, partner with state and local governments and workforce system stakeholders to support the creation of industry-driven training programs that address workforce needs tied to priority AI infrastructure occupations.' That's Department of Labor, Department of Energy, Education Department (Department of Education), National Science Foundation and Department of Commerce. Trump's opponents claim that he is gutting the federal bureaucracy and wiping out decades of accumulated expertise. It seems more accurate to say that he is wiping out opposition to his policies within the bureacracy and changing it to suit his own purposes. That is what we might expect from those responsible for the Action Plan: White House Office of Science and Technology Policy Director Michael Kratsios, AI and Crypto Czar David Sachs and Secretary of State and Acting National Security Advisor Marco Rubio. Krastios served as Chief Technology Officer of the United States and Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering in the first Trump administration. Before that, he was a financial professional and investor who eventually became Peter Thiel's chief of staff. Theil was a co-founder of both PayPal and Palantir, the prominent developer of defense and intelligence data analytics software. Sachs, who is also chairman of the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, is a venture capitalist and entrepreneur who started working for Thiel prior to the formation of PayPal, where he became COO. He is a member of the 'PayPal Mafia,' which also includes Elon Musk. According to Krastios, 'America's AI Action Plan charts a decisive course to cement US dominance in artificial intelligence.' According to Sachs: 'Artificial intelligence is a revolutionary technology with the potential to transform the global economy and alter the balance of power in the world… To win the AI race, the US must lead in innovation, infrastructure, and global partnerships. At the same time, we must center American workers and avoid Orwellian uses of AI.' 'Orwellian uses of AI' – we will come back to that. Rubio said, 'Winning the AI Race is non-negotiable.' As if China, the European Union and others negotiate their progress in science, technology and entrepreneurship with the US. The Action Plan has three main 'pillars': (1) Accelerate AI Innovation, (2) Build American AI Infrastructure, and (3) Lead in International AI Diplomacy and Security. To accelerate innovation, the authors recommend the elimination of red tape and the denial federal funding to states with regluations that 'may hinder the effectiveness of that funding.' 'President Trump,' they write, 'has already taken multiple steps toward this goal, including rescinding Biden Executive Order 14110 on AI that foreshadowed an onerous regulatory regime.' – i.e.. extending the roll-back of diversity, equity and inclusion initiatives, as well as attempts to limit the influence of big tech companies, from the federal government to states controlled by the Democrats. The goal is to 'Ensure that Frontier AI protects free speech and American values,' as they define them. The authors also want to support next-generation manufacturing, invest in AI-enabled science, build world-class scientific datasets, prioritize AI skills in education and workforce training programs, facilitate AI adoption across society as a whole, and accelerate AI adoption in government, particularly in the Department of Defense. To support next-generation manufacturing, the plan is to: Invest in developing and scaling foundational and translational manufacturing technologies via DOD, DOC, DOE, NSF, and other Federal agencies using the Small Business Innovation Research program, the Small Business Technology Transfer program, research grants, CHIPS R&D programs, Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act authorities, Title III of the Defense Production Act… and other authorities… Led by DOC through NTIA [National Telecommunications and Information Administration], convene industry and government stakeholders to identify supply chain challenges to American robotics and drone manufacturing. In order to speed up the rebuilding of US semiconductor manufacturing, the authors recommend 'removing all extraneous policy requirements for CHIPS-funded semiconductor manufacturing projects' – e.g., collective bargaining, hiring based on social position rather than experience and ability, and other Biden-era priorities – in favor of return on investment. All this will require streamlined permitting for data centers, semiconductor manufacturing facilities and energy infrastructure. The Action Plan declares that: AI is the first digital service in modern life that challenges America to build vastly greater energy generation than we have today. American energy capacity has stagnated since the 1970s while China has rapidly built out their grid. America's path to AI dominance depends on changing this troubling trend. This means dumping the climate change-focused concern with energy conservation and zero carbon. To this end, President Trump issued an Executive Order last February that established the National Energy Dominance Council (NEDC). The order states that: 'We must expand all forms of reliable and affordable energy production… including our crude oil, natural gas, lease condensates, natural gas liquids, refined petroleum products, uranium, coal, biofuels, geothermal heat, the kinetic movement of flowing water, and critical minerals.' The administration also wants to 'Expedite environmental permitting by streamlining or reducing regulations promulgated under the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, and other relevant related laws.' Despite claims to the contrary, its policies are likely to accelerate environmental degradation. In order to 'Lead in International AI Diplomacy and Security,' the Action Plan states that the US 'must drive adoption of American AI systems… throughout the world… by exporting its full AI technology stack – hardware, models, software, applications, and standards – to all countries willing to join America's AI alliance.' This means countering the AI governance and development policies of the UN, OECD, G7, G20, International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and other international organizations, which have too often 'advocated for burdensome regulations, vague 'codes of conduct' that promote cultural agendas that do not align with American values, or have been influenced by Chinese companies attempting to shape standards for facial recognition and surveillance.' Never mind that the best facial recognition technology is Japanese. All international organizations are suspect. Even the G7 cannot be trusted. While promoting the use of American AI throughout the world, the plan also recommends expanding controls on exports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment from EUV lithography and other advanced technologies to sub-systems in cooperation with 'partners and allies,' using the Foreign Direct Product Rule (controls on the sale of any product made anywhere in the world using American technology) and secondary tariffs to force them to cooperate, if that is necessary. This is a carry-over from the Biden administration that reflects ongoing frustration with European and Japanese unwillingness to sacrifice even more of their business in China, which is the world's largest market for semiconductor manufacturing equipment. Trump's current approach to semiconductor sanctions on China reflects both the ideals of the plan and objective reality. He recently lifted restrictions on the sale of both Nvidia's H20 AI processors and EDA (electronic design automation) chip design software to China. Pressured into doing this by Chinese restrictions on exports of rare earth metals and magnets, he satisfied Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, but also helped Chinese designers of AI processors. Huang, who does not want to be locked out of the world's largest market for semiconductors and who has arguably replaced Elon Musk as Trump's chief technology guru, said: 'The reason why it was so important to get H20 back into the China market is that… 50% of the world's AI researchers are in China, tens of thousands of AI startups in China. We want to make sure we have every opportunity to compete in that marketplace and win those developers, and when that happens… when half of the world's AI researchers develop on an American tech stack, as the technology diffuses around the world and proliferates around the world, we become the global standard.' In their AI Action Plan, Krastios, Sachs, Rubio – and, by extension, President Trump – see the promise of AI as virtually unlimited: Winning the AI race will usher in a new golden age of human flourishing, economic competitiveness, and national security for the American people. AI will enable Americans to discover new materials, synthesize new chemicals, manufacture new drugs, and develop new methods to harness energy – an industrial revolution. It will enable radically new forms of education, media, and communication – an information revolution. And it will enable altogether new intellectual achievements: unraveling ancient scrolls once thought unreadable, making breakthroughs in scientific and mathematical theory, and creating new kinds of digital and physical art – a renaissance. An industrial revolution, an information revolution, and a renaissance – all at once. This is the potential that AI presents.' Nvidia's Huang is on the same page, declaring that 'The age of AI has started. A new computing era that will impact every industry and every field of science,' after receiving an honorary doctorate in engineering from the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology last November As for the 'Orwellian uses of AI,' the authors note that 'Finally, we must prevent our advanced technologies from being misused or stolen by malicious actors as well as monitor for emerging and unforeseen risks from AI. Doing so will require constant vigilance.' Presumably, the primary malicious actor they have in mind is China, although hackers, scammers and thieves come to mind, as does what 'constant vigilance' might entail. In March, President Trump signed an executive order removing barriers to data-sharing across agencies of the federal government and Palantir has been hired to combine and organize that data. This opens the door to a degree of surveillance that could be used to create an American version of China's social credit system, which monitors and evaluates the trustworthiness of individuals and organizations in the eyes of the government. It might seem, therefore, that Trump is trying to meet the Chinese challenge by adopting Chinese methods; however, China leads the world in renewable energy and electric vehicles, while Trump is throwing environmental protection to the wind. Follow this writer on X: @ScottFo83517667


AllAfrica
2 hours ago
- AllAfrica
Deflation dimming China's market allure
Disinflation in China is not being driven by weak household appetite alone. The more decisive factor is a sustained mismatch between policy-driven industrial output and actual market absorption. The country's price weakness, where the Consumer Price Index (CPI) was in deflation territory from February to May and up a mere 0.1% in June, is the outcome of a long-running expansion of capacity across several sectors that were never disciplined by global demand signals. For two decades, the model emphasized investment over consumption. Policymakers championed capacity-building in industries they viewed as nationally strategic. These included electric vehicles, solar components, steel, semiconductors, and shipping — all seen as future export engines. What followed was a flood of credit, coordination between local authorities and state-linked firms, and price competition aimed more at dominance than efficiency. Today, China's economy is saturated with surplus. Manufacturers are under pressure to maintain volumes, even at the expense of margins. Incentives at the provincial level still reward production benchmarks. Banks, facing limited profitable lending options, continue to support large state-linked corporates. These factors generate output levels that no longer match demand — domestically or globally. This is no longer just a domestic phenomenon. Chinese firms are now offloading excess supply into global markets, forcing down prices across multiple categories. For example, Europe's auto sector, particularly its electric vehicle producers, has already flagged this trend as commercially unsustainable. American policymakers, too, have raised concerns over underpriced Chinese exports in solar technology and green infrastructure inputs. Investor confidence in China remains under pressure. Deflation is not a cyclical hiccup. It's the logical result of an economic model that continues to treat output growth as a policy goal in itself. When domestic demand underdelivers, the default response is to lean harder into supply. As that supply grows, prices weaken further. Markets have stopped giving China the benefit of the doubt. Previous slowdowns were treated as tactical pauses. This one appears to be different. Price weakness now comes with questions about whether the country's growth model can adapt to changed conditions. International investors, particularly long-term institutions, have scaled back exposure to China's broad equity indices. Capital allocation is now selective, with a preference for names that are either deeply export-competitive or exposed to high-end consumption trends. The pricing effect is now visible in upstream materials, manufacturing inputs, and final consumer goods. The pass-through may seem marginal, but the cumulative effect is to put pressure on profitability far beyond China's borders. This is not a temporary fluctuation in trade flows. It's a result of persistent policy preferences that reward volume regardless of return. For global investors, this shift alters the map. Exposure to China no longer delivers predictable diversification or scale-based upside. Instead, it perhaps presents a complex mix of risk: deflationary drag on pricing power, geopolitical friction in key sectors, and weakening margins among global firms that compete head-on with Chinese oversupply. Passive capital is at particular risk in this environment; broad exposure is not a reliable strategy when entire segments are moving against price discipline. Allocations need to be more forensic. Portfolios should distinguish between companies benefitting from China's demand for upstream inputs — including energy and advanced capital goods — and those being undercut by its outbound overcapacity. Multinationals relying on high-margin exports to China may face a softer environment, while firms exposed to its export aggression will encounter tighter spreads and squeezed pricing. Global capital flows are already responding. There is less appetite for blanket Asia exposure. Investors are tilting toward India, ASEAN, and reshoring beneficiaries in North America and Europe. Manufacturing investment is being pulled into jurisdictions that offer pricing transparency, enforceable competition rules, and protection from subsidy distortion. Within China itself, attention is turning to segments that are better aligned with domestic services, premium consumer preferences, or tech sub-sectors that are not yet overbuilt. But this is no longer a momentum story; it appears to be a precision play. Back in developed markets, the deflationary spillover has implications for policy. Central banks will face a more uneven global pricing environment. Sectors competing with Chinese exports may see depressed margins and weaker inflation prints. Others, shielded by trade barriers or domestic scale, will remain under pressure from wage and input cost dynamics. For macro investors, that divergence offers opportunity, but only with close attention to exposure mapping. The assumption that China remains a global engine of demand now looks increasingly flawed. It remains a large, fast-moving economy, but one whose internal dynamics are now as much a source of risk as reward. What's missing is a pivot away from the metrics that drove past performance. An economy of this scale cannot operate on the same assumptions that shaped its breakout phase. Market realities now require restraint, precision and pricing discipline. Without these, disinflation will continue to weigh on corporate earnings and asset valuations. Consumption, while vital, cannot absorb the overhang created by a decade of supply-led ambition. Even aggressive fiscal support is unlikely to rebalance the equation while incentives remain fixed on production volumes. The longer Beijing postpones meaningful correction, the more the investment case shifts elsewhere. Price trends are not the story; they are the evidence.


South China Morning Post
3 hours ago
- South China Morning Post
Thailand-Cambodia clash: Malaysia hosts peace talks after fifth day of border dispute
As the deadly border dispute – that has killed at least 35 people, mainly civilians – between Thailand and Cambodia entered its fifth day on Monday, both nations' leaders set out for Malaysia to discuss a potential truce. Pressure for a ceasefire has mounted from both China and the United States, which has threatened to halt any tariff deals until the fighting ends. A long-simmering territorial dispute boiled over into open conflict along the nations' shared frontier on Thursday. More than 200,000 people in both countries have been forced to leave their homes by the relentless gunfights, artillery barrages and Thai air strikes, while tens of thousands of Cambodian migrant labourers have fled Thailand, fearing reprisals as nationalist sentiment intensifies on both sides. Fresh clashes were reported on Monday, even as Thailand's acting prime minister, Phumtham Wechayachai, prepared to meet Cambodia's leader, Hun Manet, in Kuala Lumpur. Phumtham sought to temper hopes of a swift ceasefire, telling reporters as he departed for the Malaysian capital: 'We do not believe Cambodia is acting in good faith, based on their actions.' 'They need to demonstrate genuine intent, and we will assess that during the meeting,' he added. Cambodian migrant workers leave Thailand, crossing the border at Ban Laem Border checkpoint to return to their home country. Photo: Reuters The talks come amid diplomatic intervention from US President Donald Trump, who warned on Saturday that tariff negotiations would not continue 'with either country if they are fighting'. Both Thailand and Cambodia blame each other for starting the violence, which has spread rapidly from forested front lines near ancient temple ruins to wide-ranging cross-border attacks that have struck civilian areas. Cambodian forces have fired salvoes of Russian-made rockets into Thailand, killing civilians in their homes and at a petrol station, even striking hospitals. Thai artillery has shelled Cambodian villages, meanwhile, while Bangkok's F-16 fighter jets have pounded Cambodian military targets. On the eve of Monday's talks, Cambodian officials accused Thailand of continuing to target their forces, while Thailand's military on Sunday warned: 'Cambodia may be preparing for a major military operation prior to entering negotiations.' A previous bout of border clashes between the two countries lasted from 2008 to 2011. A Srei Snam district official (right) works to register dozens of displaced villagers in a newly established resettlement site in Wat Velevorn in Siem Reap Province, Cambodia, on Monday, July 28. Photo: AP Representatives from both the US and China are expected to attend Monday's talks. China, a key ally of both nations, has significant influence across the region, while Thailand is one of Washington's oldest treaty allies in Southeast Asia. Monday's meeting is expected to be hosted by Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, who is also the chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), the regional bloc to which both Thailand and Cambodia belong. Late on Sunday, Anwar said he was ready to host the talks and discuss the parameters and conditions, but mainly an immediate ceasefire, in remarks carried by state news agency Bernama. The roots of the conflict run deep, tracing back to disputed French colonial-era maps, which Thailand refuses to recognise as accurate. The rivalry is also fuelled by competing cultural claims, rising nationalism and a recent fallout between Thailand's powerful Shinawatra family and the clan of Cambodia's former leader, Hun Sen, whose son now serves as prime minister. Thailand has accused Hun Sen of stoking border tensions in retaliation for Bangkok's crackdown on Cambodian-linked gambling and scam operations, which generate billions annually under Phnom Penh's watch. Malaysia's Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim (centre) mediates talks with Cambodia's Prime Minister Hun Manet and Thailand's acting Prime Minister Phumtham Wechayachai. Photo: AFP Cambodia dismisses these allegations as a distraction from the Shinawatra family's domestic woes. Thailand's coalition government has struggled with waning support and criticism for its perceived closeness to Hun Sen and his family. Paetongtarn Shinawatra, the latest in the family to lead Thailand, is currently suspended as prime minister pending a court ruling over an alleged ethical breach following a leaked call with Hun Sen. Analysts are watching for the precise details and durability of any ceasefire. The broader strategic aims behind the conflict remain unclear. 'It is unlikely, given the stark differences in the military capabilities of Thailand and Cambodia, that Cambodia will want to fight a prolonged conventional war with Thailand,' political analyst Ken Lohatepanont told This Week in Asia. 'But indeed, we are not even sure of what Cambodia's aims in this conflict are.' Additional reporting by Agence France-Presse, Reuters