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PM Modi to visit China: Why the trip matters amid Trump's steep tariffs on India
Prime Minister Narendra Modi (R) along with China's President Xi Jinping look on during their summit in Mahabalipuram in Tamil Nadu on October 12, 2019. File Photo/PIB / AFP
Prime Minister Narendra Modi is expected to visit China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) amid a thaw in ties between New Delhi and Beijing. The conclave will be held in Tianjin from August 31 to September 1, with Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin also in attendance.
A bilateral meeting between Modi and Xi could also be in the cards. There are also reports that the Indian leader could first visit Japan around August 29 before heading to China.
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Here's why PM Modi's China trip matters.
PM Modi to visit China
PM Modi's likely visit to China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit later this month will be his first to the country in seven years.
He last travelled to China in June 2018 to attend the SCO summit. PM Modi met Xi on the sidelines of the 16th BRICS Summit at Kazan on October 23, 2024.
Xi last travelled to India in October 2019, months before the Chinese incursions in eastern Ladakh.
Ahead of PM Modi's visit, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi will arrive in India to hold discussions with National Security Adviser (NSA) Ajit Doval on the border issue between the two countries on August 18, reported ThePrint.
Why PM Modi's China visit is significant
This is PM Modi's first trip to China since the military clashes at Galwan in eastern Ladakh along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in 2020, which killed 20 Indian soldiers and several Chinese troops. China officially claimed four fatalities on its side.
Both sides have since held many rounds of discussions at political, military and diplomatic levels to resolve the border dispute.
Days after PM Modi and Xi met in November 2024 in the Russian city of Kazan, the disengagement process was completed between India and China.
Ties between the two countries have since been on the mend. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar attended the SCO meetings in China earlier this year.
During talks with Wang Yi last month at the SCO meet, Jaishankar brought up key issues such as trade restrictions, de-escalation along the LAC and underlined the need for an 'uncompromising' stand against 'terrorism, separatism and extremism'. This seems to have paved the way for Modi's China trip later this month, Dr Shaheli Das, an independent foreign policy analyst, wrote for The Interpreter.
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The visit comes amid increased pressure on India by United States President Donald Trump for buying Russian oil. The US has imposed 25 per cent tariffs on India and announced an additional 25 per cent tax on Indian imports for New Delhi's trade with Russia.
America's growing closeness with Pakistan has also raised alarm bells in India.
'In this context, even a temporary recalibration in ties with China will allow India to hedge against the United States,' as per The Interpreter article.
Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Narendra Modi enter a hall for the family photo before a plenary session of the Brics 2024 Summit in Kazan, Russia, 23 October 2024. File Photo/Reuters
However, differences between India and China remain. Beijing assisted Pakistan during the latter's conflict with India in May following Operation Sindoor.
PM Modi could use the SCO stage to call on the world to take a tough stance on cross-border terrorism. His address is likely to come in the presence of Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif.
Modi's decision to visit China for the SCO summit also showcases the importance New Delhi is attaching to the forum.
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According to Das, India's engagement with SCO displays the 'Modi government's strategy of multi-alignment with the Quad, SCO, Brics, G7 and underlines its intent to practice strategic autonomy while remaining outside bloc politics. Furthermore, it provides India a policy space vis-à-vis China, Russia, Iran and some Central Asian countries to continue dialogue at the highest political level.'
How India-China ties have improved recently
The government will take a call on PM Modi's visit to China, with an official announcement to be made once the plans are finalised, sources told Indian Express.
Tensions between India and China have been on the decline since Modi's meeting with Xi last November. Just ahead of their meet, New Delhi and Beijing had decided to restart patrols in the Depsang area of Eastern Ladakh.
Since then, the engagement has increased. China has restarted the Kailash Mansarovar yatra and India resumed visas for Chinese tourists.
China is also seeking to restart direct air travel from India for both Indian and Chinese airlines.
Despite the recent thaw, the border remains an issue between India and China. Some 50,000-60,000 troops are still deployed along the LAC, on both Indian and Chinese sides. Talks for de-escalation and de-induction of military forces are on.
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Whether PM Modi's visit to China will open a new turn in New Delhi's ties to Beijing has to be seen.
With inputs from agencies
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