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Russia Today
03-06-2025
- Business
- Russia Today
Here's how the EU system rewards high officials for failure
Every circus needs a clown. And this one has a truly awesome demo reel. Despite the Greens snagging 85 seats in the current German parliament, it turns out they're about as useful to Friedrich Merz's shiny new right-left establishment coalition with the Christian Democrats as a vegan menu at Oktoberfest. So they're relegated to chilling on the Bundestag backbenches. Annalena Baerbock, the former German Foreign Affairs Minister in ex-Chancellor Olaf Scholz's government, could have coasted into parliament again via the Greens' party list, even after losing her direct seat to Scholz himself. But she apparently had bigger plans. She's just been tapped as the next President of the United Nations General Assembly. Before officially packing up at the Foreign Ministry, her own department nominated her for the UN gig – an administrative role, largely ceremonial. Why her? Well, it's Germany's turn to fill the seat for a year starting in September, and a career diplomat was reportedly first in line. You know, someone who hadn't become globally famous for flunking basic geometry. And well, that just can't stand. Not when the face of German diplomacy is no longer being kept by German voters in the manner to which she has become accustomed. Besides, just check out this CV. In a moment that will live in infamy alongside Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, MLK's 'I Have a Dream,' Pericles' Funeral Oration, and Churchill's 'We shall fight on the beaches,' Baerbock took the spotlight at the 2023 Munich Security Conference. Asked whether Ukraine would be safe long-term if Vladimir Putin stayed in power in Russia, she replied: 'If Putin doesn't change by 360 degrees, no.' Apparently, she thinks a dizzy Putin would make all the difference. Perhaps it's not the first time that Baerbock, a former gymnast, confused a 360 with a 180, and landed on her head at some point. Either way, German school-kids usually master this concept by age 10. In another Baerbockism, during a January 2023 speech at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, she said: 'We are fighting a war against Russia and not against each other.' Cue her foreign ministry hastily clarifying that no, of course Germany hadn't just declared war on Russia. It was just Baerbock talking again. With all this experience as Germany's walking, talking diplomatic banana peel, she was clearly destined for bigger things on the world stage. So who could possibly object to shipping her off to the UN? Well, this guy, for one: 'It is outrageous to replace the best and most internationally experienced German diplomat with an outdated model,' grumbled Christoph Heusgen, former chair of the Munich Security Conference, referring to career diplomat, Helga Schmid, reportedly slidelined in favor of Baerbock. An outdated model? Bold words, Mr. Former Conference Chair! Excuse you, but trusty single-cylinder moped-grade intellectualism never truly goes out of style. 'Ms. Baerbock can learn a lot from [Schmid],' said former German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel. What's he suggesting? That Schmid moonlights as a geometry tutor? So that makes two critics, including one who previously held Baerbock's job. But surely these bitter old guys are alone in their skepticism towards this pioneer of feminist foreign policy. No doubt it's just a coincidence that 'Mr. Eighteen Percent Popularity' Scholz beat her in her own riding. And that Statista pegged her approval rating at -0.7 on a scale from -5 to 5. And who really cares about that time she sounded kind of like she was unilaterally declaring war on Russia on behalf of Germany, or when she seemed unsure which country she was representing. Like at a September 2022 forum when she said: 'If I give the promise to people in Ukraine – 'We stand with you, as long as you need us' – then I want to deliver. No matter what my German voters think.' At the time, Germany was deindustrializing and its citizens were being crushed by energy costs. Both consequences of the very Ukraine policy Baerbock was committed to, with or without voter consent, as she suggested. But look, Baerbock isn't the only politician to turn a domestic faceplant into a corner office with a view at Global Governance Inc. Take European Commission President 'Queen' Ursula von der Leyen. No, please, take her, as former Chancellor Angela Merkel would say. Before becoming the unelected President of the European Commission, von der Leyen served as Germany's Defence Minister in Merkel's government from 2013 to 2019. Known more for glamour shots in front of jets than for actually equipping them, her ministry apparently favored pricey consultants over functionality. One report noted: 'There is neither enough personnel nor material, and often one confronts shortage upon shortage. The troops are far from being fully equipped.' Well, unless you count the broomsticks reportedly used during training exercises, and possibly sourced from Ursula's personal garage. Former European Parliament President Martin Schulz offered this glowing review of the current de facto Queen of the EU: 'One thing is true, she ran in 2019 – but not for the European Parliament, but she ran away from her ministry in Germany.' He also tweeted in 2019: 'Von der Leyen is our weakest minister. That's apparently enough to become Commission president.' Apparently, flunking your domestic portfolio is the new fast track to international prestige. Just ask Mark Rutte. The Dutch Prime Minister became so politically radioactive that his coalition partners were getting scorched by mere proximity. He resigned twice: first over a child welfare scandal, then after failing to maintain unity on asylum policy. His solution? Bail and become NATO's new Secretary General – essentially, the West's chief weapons lobbyist. Or consider Estonia's Prime Minister Kaja Kallas. Her Reform Party slipped to third place under her leadership, dropping below 20 percent approval. As her coalition sank, she jumped ship and landed in Brussels as the EU's chief diplomat. Voters back home were apparently less impressed, especially after her government's tax hikes and perceived focus on Ukraine over Estonia. Even more awkward: while Kallas was calling for Europe to cut all ties with Russia, her husband's company, Stark Logistics, was still doing business there. But apparently, that kind of conflict of interest now screams 'diplomatic credentials.' So no, Baerbock's story isn't a bug in the system. It's effectively the blueprint. The fall from grace at home just gives more momentum for the launch to cushy international posts. The moral of the story is clear: stumble locally, ascend globally. Even if your personal GPS is so busted that you can't tell a U-turn from a 360.
Irish Times
12-05-2025
- Politics
- Irish Times
Broken Republik: The Inside Story of Germany's Descent into Crisis
Broken Republik: The Inside Story of Germany's Descent into Crisis Author : Chris Reiter and Will Wilkes ISBN-13 : 978-1526679147 Publisher : Bloomsbury Guideline Price : £25 The Germany that Friedrich Merz has inherited as chancellor is in shocking shape. Now in its third year of recession, Germany's postwar engineering-export business model - and underlying prosperity - have been hammered by war on its doorstep, soaring energy prices, brutal bureaucracy, reform-shy politicians and chastening Chinese competition. At the end of Broken Republik, Bloomberg journalists Chris Reiter and Will Wilkes say they 'remain hopeful that Germany can arrest its slide toward the abyss'. For the 278 previous pages, they have gone to considerable lengths to explain why this is unlikely. After a scorchingly negative introduction, which may sap the casual reader of the will to continue, the book races through the postwar period before settling into its themes of modern decline and collective denial. READ MORE Their insider-outsider gaze provides timely, brutal diagnoses of the hollowed-out promises of modern Germany, in particular dwindling social equality and threadbare welfare nets. Some chapters shine with original reporting, analysis and clever data collation, in particular Germany's naive self-deception in its trade ties to China and Russia. Other sections are more desk-bound and Wikipedesque. Curiously absent throughout: German voices or insights into the origins of the status quo or prospects of change. The British-US team stumble occasionally over their own expat assertions and assumptions of their adopted homeland. Decrying Germany's lack of national heroes or touchstones, for instance, they go on to dismiss pride in their national writers Goethe and Schiller 'as a form of chauvinism that props up a fragile national identity'. Their repeated insistence that greater German nationalism - shunned since Nazi era abuse- is the answer for this country's ills seem strange advice in the era of Maga America and Brexit Britain. After 250 pages of stringent analysis that is strong on what but weak on why, their proposals to save Germany are a mixed bag. A welcome but unoriginal idea is to boost affordable housing with interest-free loans and simpler bureaucracy. Another of their ideas -- for a national asparagus holiday -- has, given the kilo price of this seasonal vegetable, would thrill Marie Antoinette. For all their knowledge and insights, three decades here mean some of Germany's worst national characteristics have seeped into Broken Republik. Looking on the bright side: its doleful doommongery and hectoring humourlessness will have you whingeing like a local in no time. Derek Scally is Berlin Correspondent
Russia Today
11-05-2025
- Politics
- Russia Today
Why is Germany such a mess?
It seems long ago already, but politically speaking, it was really only yesterday that the last, deeply unpopular German government collapsed on November 6 of last year. Based on a fractious coalition and led by the hapless Olaf Scholz, it was a flop from almost the beginning to the bitter end. But what finally imploded Scholz's cabinet was its finance minister's refusal to hollow out Germany's – back then – severe restrictions on public debt, specifically to throw even more money at Ukraine. Exactly half a year after this fiasco, the next and current German government produced another one, even before it had really started: On 6 May, its designated leader Friedrich Merz from the mainstream conservatives (CDU) failed to get parliament to elect him as chancellor. This may look like a formality because, after complicated and humiliating maneuvering, Merz managed to find enough votes on a second try. Yet rest assured, no one in Germany thinks this was a minor glitch. For one thing, unlike a coalition breakdown, this was an entirely unprecedented failure: no post-World War II German chancellor has ever failed to be confirmed in the first round. That's why, on the day of the disaster, some parliamentarians even spoke of a fundamental 'crisis of the state.' No wonder really, because would-be-chancellors only ask parliament for this vote when they believe they have a majority of deputies securely on their side. So did Merz, too. And that is why his initial dud was so much worse than just a sad historic first: The only way he could fail was by quiet but deliberate mutiny from below and, clearly, arrogant negligence on his side. His coalition is made up of his own conservatives and the Social Democrats (SPD). If every member of parliament from these two parties had supported him in the first round, a second one would not have been needed. Clearly, then, it was deputies from his own party or its coalition allies who refused to comply. We will never know who exactly because the vote was anonymous, but we do know that there were at least 18 rebels. A major conservative commentator was right: This blow below the belt from Merz's own ranks will hurt for a long time. This is an awful way to begin a chancellorship. And not only because from now on, right from the get-go, the 'partners' – yes, those are scare quotes – now divvying up power and positions in Berlin will always have to wonder which one of them – SPD or CDU (or even both)? – is harboring snakes in the grass. And when might they strike again? Welcome to the all-new coalition: as backstabbing as the last one but faster off the mark. More fundamentally, if you can't keep your troops together on confirming you as the boss, how do you expect to get your budgets and laws through? But things are even more foreboding in this case. For Merz could only even have a shot at high office because Germany is in such a comprehensive mess: demography, the economy, infrastructure, the party system, foreign policy, technology, and, last but not least, the public mood. You name it – nothing, really nothing, is okay. It is against this dark background that a major German economist serving on the government's own council of experts is already asking the inevitable question: How can this new coalition government fulfill Merz's key promise to finally address this national misery, if it is so obviously bereft of unity? And, we may add, of discipline and foresight, too, because it takes astonishing sloppiness to prepare a chancellor vote so badly. Another economist notes that the debacle has also sent a 'devastating signal' to the rest of the world. Indeed. And good luck for Merz when trying to tell Trump off for his team's meddling in German politics: Whether Trump will say it or not, it is certain that he has already slotted Merz as a 'loser.' And the American bruiser-in-chief has a point. Not only because of the embarrassing lack of professionalism that came to light in mismanaging this crucial vote, but also because Merz's CDU and their SPD coalition partners under Lars Klingbeil richly deserved their come-uppance. Between the last elections and cobbling together their coalition, they engineered a crassly foul maneuver: Clearly against the spirit if not the letter of the constitution, they used the old parliament – de facto already voted out by Germany's citizens – for perhaps the single greatest flipflop in German postwar history. Remember those strict limits for public debt over which the preceding coalition collapsed? Merz ran his electoral campaign promising that he would not abandon this so-called 'debt brake.' As a dyed-in-the-wool conservative, he was in an excellent position to make that claim and get voters to believe it. And yet, it was his first action – even before entering office – to break that promise. And not in a small, corner-cutting way. Merz did not cut corners but razed the edifice to the ground. Having run and won (barely) as a fiscal hawk, he rapidly made a screeching U-turn to – in CNN's words – 'massively expand borrowing and super-charge military spending.' To the tune of a cool trillion or so over the next decade. Many voters and members of his own party were not only bewildered but aghast. We cannot know for sure, but I and many other Germans are probably right guessing that this massive breach of faith motivated at least some of the rebels during the chancellor vote. What we do know for sure is that Merz's personal ratings have crashed even before he almost failed to become chancellor. Never popular to begin with, he has reached a nadir: On the eve of the parliamentary vote, 56% of Germans were against Merz becoming chancellor, only 38% welcomed that prospect. And Merz is not the only one who has emerged dented from this affair: For complicated procedural reasons, Merz needed the cooperation of the Die Linke party under its shooting star Heidi Reichinnek to get his second chance. For Die Linke, providing this help was probably a very bad move. Reichinnek is to Germany what Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez is to the US: a social-media savvy lifestyle leftist with hubristic rhetoric (anyone for abolishing capitalism, all of it, right now and with tattoos, please?) and deeply tactical behavior in the real world. By helping out the unpopular arch-capitalist Merz, she may have overdone it even for some of her most devoted TikTok fans. But it's not all bad news. At least not for everyone. The AfD – under pressure from Germany's domestic intelligence service and the possible threat of a complete ban – is likely to profit. It may have missed a superb chance of embarrassing Merz by actually voting for him. But there is another effect: The collaboration of the oh-so-terribly radical Reichinnek and her party, has already made some German observers ask a simple, plausible question: If both Die Linke and the AfD used to be treated as beyond the pale – or, in German parlance, 'firewalled' – and yet Merz had no problem relying on Die Linke to get into office (no less!), then, clearly, that whole 'firewall' thing is not all it's cracked up to be. And if that is so, then the firewall against the AfD may well also crumble one day. In fact, as a matter of consistency and fairness, it should, whether you like the AfD or not. What an odd way of becoming the new leader of Germany's political mainstream: Limping through the entry gate, badly bruised and humiliated as no chancellor before, while once again de facto strengthening the country's largest and most threatening insurgent party. Merz's predecessor Scholz started with much undeserved advance praise and ended abysmally. Merz has managed to start abysmally already.
New York Times
08-05-2025
- Politics
- New York Times
A Tricky Challenge for Germany's New Government: a Far-Right Opposition
Ever since the German Parliament building reopened in Berlin in 1999, its second-largest meeting room has been occupied by what had often been Germany's second-largest party, the Social Democrats. Even the room's name, the Otto Wels Hall, bears the party's imprint: Wels led the Social Democrats from 1919 until the Nazis drove him to exile. Now, following their disastrous performance in February's federal elections, the Social Democrats may lose the room to the far-right Alternative for Germany, or AfD, which came in second and insists that, by the rules of the Parliament, it should get the room instead. The fight over the Wels Hall is just one in a series of challenges facing the Social Democrats and their senior partners in the incoming governing coalition, the center-right Christian Democrats, as they prepare to confront the AfD. Most important, they are considering how to deal with a party that is both politically toxic and yet powerful enough to undermine the coalition's agenda. Heightening the tensions was a decision on Friday by Germany's domestic intelligence service declaring the AfD an extremist organization. And on Tuesday, Friedrich Merz, leader of the Christian Democrats, was initially two votes short of winning approval as Germany's new chancellor (though he gained enough support later). That stumble raised questions about his ability to confront the AfD as he and his allies consider whether to call on Germany's constitutional court to ban the right-wing party. The AfD has gained support in recent years with an anti-establishment campaign and rails against migrants and refugees. In recent months, it has been polling alongside Mr. Merz's center-right Christian Democrats. But actually banning the party would be an extensive legal process. The AfD filed a lawsuit on Monday against the intelligence service, and that will have to be resolved before any formal procedure by Parliament and the constitutional court can begin. Those maneuvers mean that for the next few years, the ruling coalition must work alongside, if not necessarily with, the AfD in Parliament. Unlike in the winner-takes-all U.S. Congress, the leading opposition party in Germany, by tradition, is usually accorded a number of committee chairmanships and leadership roles that help guide the Parliament. Until Friday's announcement by the intelligence service, the Christian Democrats had split between those who wanted to hand some roles to the AfD, and those who wanted to quarantine them — for example, by refusing to work with them on legislation. Jens Spahn, who leads the Christian Democrats in Parliament, argued that the quarantine option would fuel the AfD's image as a victim of a hypocritical establishment that only purports to defend democracy — a charge that the AfD reiterated on Friday, as did Secretary of State Marco Rubio. 'The AfD will continue to defend itself legally against these defamations that endanger democracy,' said Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla, co-chairs of the AfD, in a statement. But Friday's decision makes Mr. Spahn's approach unthinkable to many Christian Democrats, not to mention Social Democrats or the smaller left-wing parties such as the Greens. Several members of the Christian Democrats immediately called for a ban, and even Mr. Spahn, in a social media post, wrote, 'We will not recommend electing AfD members as committee chairs.' For now, the coalition and the governments of several states led by the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats are considering other options. The extremist designation may allow them to restrict public funding for the AfD; it also opens the possibility of removing AfD members from civil-service positions. But those options come with their own risks, including more legal action. And while the AfD has been boxed out of any formal role in Parliament, its size means it can still cause immense pain for the coalition — just witness the failed first vote for Mr. Merz as chancellor on Tuesday. Mr. Merz will be governing with a narrow 12-member majority. That means every vote will require near-unanimity across a left-right coalition defined more by political expediency than shared agendas. 'The discipline of the governing coalition must be very good,' said Johannes Hillje, a German political consultant. Opportunities for mischief abound. The AfD could, Mr. Hillje suggested, introduce legislation copied from the Christian Democrats' playbook, rendering it toxic. Or they could peel off members from either party with amendments to must-pass proposals. 'They want to make the other parties look stupid,' Mr. Hillje said. 'This is the kind of games they do all the time.' Some observers fear that as Parliament settles into a new, uncomfortable normal and as rifts inevitably open among the coalition, the temptation will arise for the Christian Democrats to find ways to work with the AfD — which has similar views on aspects of spending and immigration policy. Much will depend on whether the AfD continues to grow in the polls and whether it strengthens its control in state-level elections, several of which are scheduled in the coming year. Maximilian Steinbeis, founder and editor of Verfassungsblog, a website focused on constitutional law said there was a temptation for the Christian Democrats to profit from a right-wing majority. 'This temptation,' he added, 'is super powerful.'
The Guardian
07-05-2025
- Politics
- The Guardian
Friedrich Merz arrives as a humbled new German chancellor – but that may not be the worst way to start
There goes the cliche about German politics being stable but dull. Germany finally has a new leader, but only after a day of drama, suspense and historic twists. The conservative Friedrich Merz failed to secure a majority confirming him as chancellor in the first round of voting in the Bundestag. In eight decades of postwar Germany, this has never happened before. When Merz's cabinet was finally sworn in later on Tuesday afternoon, after a successful second round, both parties in the governing coalition – the conservative CDU/CSU and the Social Democrats (SPD) – were eager to play down the failure as a mere hiccup. But the high drama indicates a new degree of fragmentation and instability in the German party system. It is certain to affect the way this new administration will govern. Merz starts his term as a weakened, somewhat humbled leader. There is some poetic justice in that, certainly from the viewpoint of the opposition. Ironically, Merz had to rely on the support of the Greens and the far-left Die Linke on Tuesday to table a second round of voting. Merz had fiercely attacked both parties during the campaign. But because a two-thirds majority was needed to change the Bundestag's proceedings to allow a second vote on the same day, the conservatives had to beg the loony left (or 'leftwing weirdos' as Merz calls them) for help. Technically, they could also have relied on votes by the hard-right AfD, now the leading opposition party. But that move would have blown up the new coalition. Its governing consensus is based on maintaining the 'firewall' against the AfD, excluding cooperation with the party that was confirmed as 'rightwing extremist' by the German domestic security service just days ago. Merz had promised to take the Christian Democrats back to their roots after Angela Merkel's decidedly moderate reign. But coalition dynamics draw him even closer to the centre than his predecessor. This, in turn, exposes him to attacks from the AfD, whose leaders constantly assail Merz for his supposed 'treason' of conservative principles. Berlin is rife with speculation about who the rebels were. Disaffected conservatives, unhappy with the abolition of the strict deficit rules, the so-called debt brake? Distrustful Social Democrats holding Merz in contempt for pushing a migration bill through the Bundestag earlier this year with help from the AfD? Maybe both? Because of the secret ballot, Merz and his vice-chancellor, Lars Klingbeil, the co-leader of the SPD, cannot be sure what triggered the extraordinary vote of no confidence by the 18 dissidents who denied them a smooth confirmation. Yes, they succeeded in re-establishing discipline before the second vote. But the brush with disaster will be remembered whenever contentious legislation comes to a vote in the next four years. It is also all but certain that Germany's challenges will demand painful compromises from both coalition partners. The conservatives must accept a looser fiscal policy so the country can finally invest heavily in defence and replace crumbling infrastructure, while the centre-left will find it hard to take ownership of the harsher stance on irregular immigration that a majority of voters want. The challenges that this new German government faces are enormous. Germany's business model is under assault from China and the US at the same time, with Donald Trump's tariffs looming and a flood of Chinese EVs threatening to wipe out the German car industry. Not to mention America's desire to wash its hands of Ukraine and leave the security of the continent to the Europeans. However, not everything is gloomy. Merz, for all his strategic mishaps, has the right instincts about Germany's European destiny. The lifelong Atlanticist spent some of his happiest professional years working for the American investment company BlackRock. He has a genuine affection for the US, yet he is remarkably sober about the dire future of the transatlantic relationship. In his first television interview as chancellor, he told the Trump administration to 'leave German domestic politics alone'. After all the meddling by JD Vance, Elon Musk and Marco Rubio in favour of the German hard right, that was a welcome tone of polite defiance. Interestingly, Merz seems to view the US reversal on European security and free trade as a tragic mistake, but also as an opportunity. He wants to work closely with the UK, Poland, France and others to put Europe on a path to more independence and self-reliance. This calls for robust leadership in Berlin. The new German chancellor will need a stable governing majority to be a credible 'servant leader' in Europe. To be taken seriously abroad, Merz must change his leadership style at home. The early near-death experience of the new coalition might yet be helpful in reminding everybody what is at stake.
