If Ukraine-Russia Negotiations Fail, Victory Remains an Option

Yahoo

21-04-2025

ON FRIDAY, SECRETARY OF STATE MARCO RUBIO announced that 'in a matter of days,' the administration would decide whether negotiating an end to the Russia-Ukraine War is 'doable.' It's unclear what the administration would do if it determined that negotiations had failed—in that case, Rubio said, 'We'll do what we can on the margins.' But Rubio's clear frustration contrasts markedly with the testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee earlier this month of Gen. Christopher Cavoli, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the soldier most knowledgeable about the current situation in Europe and Ukraine. That testimony mostly went unnoticed by the media.
Cavoli's message was clear and precise: Ukraine is fighting with incredible resolve, Russia is not adapting quickly enough even after three years of fighting, and both sides are running dangerously low on the means to continue their fight without outside support. His testimony punctured the false narrative being spread by President Trump and members of his national security team—that Russia is winning, Ukraine is doomed, and future U.S. support would be wasted. That view, repeated by President Trump on multiple occasions, is more than misinformation. It is a view that distorts the battlefield reality and the critical strategic interests of the United States and our allies.
Cavoli didn't mince words. His assessment was that 'Despite extensive battlefield losses in Ukraine, the Russian military is reconstituting and growing at a faster rate than most analysts had anticipated,' with significant numbers of artillery shells, drones, and long-range fires being produced and sourced from abroad. Their military is battered, but not yet broken—and their will to press troops—including North Korean troops and Chinese 'volunteers'—into a meat grinder remains intact.
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The Supreme Allied Commander didn't say explicitly that Ukraine is running out of ammunition, but he did stress that 'the Ukrainians depend on us . . . uniquely . . . for their high-end anti-aircraft systems.' And reading between the lines, demand for artillery ammunition continues to exceed supply. He praised the Czech Republic for delivering 70,000 rounds to Ukraine this month but also noted that the Russians are expected to produce 250,000 shells per month. (The Russian's shells aren't as accurate, so they take more shells to hit each target; still, no military commander wants to be the one with less ammunition.) He stressed that delays in American aid 'have a rapid and deleterious on [the Ukrainians'] ability to fight.'
But despite all that, Cavoli's overall estimate wasn't bleak. He observed that the Russian economy features a dangerous combination of high inflation, high interest rates, and dramatic dependence on war production at the expense of everything else. According to a recent report from the Institute for the Study of War, Russia's financial capacity to incentivize new recruits, pay those currently in the force, and provide bonuses to those wounded or the families of those killed is under incredible strain. This looming collapse of pay and benefits increasingly threatens morale and cohesion, two things that have never been the strengths of the Russian army. (The ISW report also gives a bleaker outlook on Russan industrial production than Cavoli provided.)
On the other side, 'the Ukrainians . . . have assumed very strong defensive positions—positions well dug-in. And [they] appear to have solved some of their manpower problems that were so acute last autumn. They've evolved and developed very, very quickly.'
On the ground, Russian forces have made marginal advances in recent weeks—particularly in areas along the Donetsk front. But those gains have failed to achieve their aims and come at a high cost: Since the war began, Russia has suffered nearly 800,000 dead or wounded, about four times the size of its initial invasion force, and more than the 600,000 it now has deployed in Ukraine. For that cost, progress has been measured in meters, not miles. The Russian tactics continue to rely heavily on human wave assaults, with poorly trained conscripts often used as cannon fodder.
Russia's use of glide bombs, loitering munitions, and massive artillery barrages continue with the standoff tactics designed to inflict maximum damage (especially on civilians) with minimal risk. Civilian infrastructure, energy plants, and hospitals remain deliberate targets. This has never been a war of maneuver for the Russians—it is a war of terror. Since the beginning, Putin's strategic objective has been to gain territory and break Ukraine's will. That has not changed, but it now appears only the will of the United States is being broken.
Perhaps Cavoli's most important message was this:
There's nothing inevitable in war, and the Ukrainians are in very strong defensive positions right now, and are improving weekly, their ability to generate force and to reinforce those positions. It is hard sitting here right now to envision a major Ukrainian offensive that clears everybody you know out of every square inch of Ukraine. But likewise, it's very hard to envision Ukraine collapsing and losing that conflict. I do not think there is inevitability to a Ukrainian loss.
That's the essence of this moment: Russia is still dysfunctional and increasingly broken and Ukraine are still fighting for their people, their territorial integrity, their sovereignty. But they can only continue with that fight if the United States shows the strategic patience and political will to provide what's needed.
During the campaign, Trump claimed that he could 'end the war in 24 hours.' It was obvious then and it's even more obvious now that there's only one way to guarantee a war ends in 24 hours: surrender. Trump signaled a willingness to hand Ukraine over to Moscow in exchange for quiet on the European front—a trade he realistically can't make, because the Europeans and especially the Ukrainians have a say.
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Even more troubling is the recent suggestion by Retired Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg, the administration's Envoy to Ukraine, who floated the idea of dividing Ukraine into 'zones of responsibility.' This is not just naïve—it is offensive to the Ukrainian people, who have fought and died for every inch of their territory. It ignores Ukraine's sovereign right to define its borders and future. And it reinforces a 'frozen conflict' model that Putin has used for the last twenty years and benefits only Moscow. A frozen conflict—where the front line becomes an accepted de facto border—hands Putin a victory without a formal treaty, giving him time to rearm, regroup, and resume his assault at a time when he is ready. We've seen this before in Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, the Donbas, and Crimea. Partition isn't peace. It's a time bomb.
Gen. Cavoli stated it plainly: 'Russia's war in Ukraine, now in its fourth year has revealed Russia to be a chronic threat . . . it will be a growing threat, one that is willing to use military force to achieve its geopolitical goals.' And the man responsible—Vladimir Putin—must remain an international outcast. The ICC's arrest warrant for the abduction and deportation of Ukrainian children is just one of many war crimes under review, and the attacks on civilians over the last few weeks—as Russia claimed to be negotiating a ceasefire—provides overwhelming evidence of Russian intent: to continue targeting civilians, maintain filtration camps, and increase systemic torture. President Trump's rhetoric, Steve Witkoff's sycophancy toward Putin, and Gen. Kellogg's proposed partition scheme play right into that plan.
The window for Ukraine to regain momentum is narrowing—but not closed. Maintenance of sanctions, critical deliveries of air defense systems, artillery, and precision munitions, and reaffirmation of Ukraine's territorial sovereignty could begin restoring battlefield balance within weeks. With better protection from Russian airstrikes and renewed long-range fires, and proper treatment of Putin's aggression, Ukraine could stabilize its lines and set conditions for limited offensive actions by late summer or early fall.
Ukraine can persevere. With steady Western support, they can hold the line—and push it forward. They don't need our soldiers. They need our resolve. We are at the inflection point. History will remember what we chose to do next.
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