PM Modi leads NDA CMs' conclave, Union ministers join deliberations
NEW DELHI: A high-level conclave of NDA chief ministers and deputy chief ministers began on Sunday, with Prime Minister Narendra Modi and senior Cabinet colleagues in attendance.
Organised by the
BJP
, the day-long meeting is focused on
Operation Sindoor
, caste enumeration, good governance, and upcoming national milestones.
The meeting is under way at The Ashok Hotel in New Delhi.
BJP leader Vinay Sahasrabuddhe, who heads the party's good governance department, said the conclave will adopt resolutions congratulating the armed forces and
PM Modi
for the success of Operation Sindoor, and praising the Centre's decision to include caste enumeration in the next national census.
'State chief ministers will also present best practices from their governments, showcasing governance models and innovations,' Sahasrabuddhe added.
The meeting will also discuss preparations for key upcoming events, including the first anniversary of the Modi 3.0 government, a decade of International Yoga Day, and the 50th anniversary of the Emergency.
The conclave comes a day after Bihar CM Nitish Kumar skipped the 10th Governing Council meeting of
Niti Aayog
in Delhi, despite being a key NDA ally.
However, Bihar CM was present in Sunday's NDA conclave led by PM Modi.
The Niti Aayog meeting, chaired by the Prime Minister at Bharat Mandapam, focused on the theme 'Viksit Rajya for Viksit Bharat@2047' and brought together Union ministers, chief ministers, and lieutenant governors to outline state-level development goals.
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