
Hollow HALO: US admits defeat in hypersonic missile program
The US Navy has killed its next-generation hypersonic missile, slamming the brakes on a once-promising development program amid soaring costs, shaky performance and China's growing arsenal.
This month, Naval News reported that the US Navy has terminated its Hypersonic Air-Launched Offensive (HALO) missile initiative, originally part of the Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare Increment 2 (OASuW Inc 2) program, citing insurmountable budgetary issues and underperformance.
Rear Admiral Stephen Tedford, the US Navy's program executive officer for unmanned aviation and strike weapons, confirmed the cancellation occurred in the autumn of 2024 after a fiscal analysis deemed the system financially and operationally unviable.
HALO was slated for 'early operational capability' (EOC) by FY29 and 'initial operational capability' by FY31, intending to counter high-value surface targets from standoff distances.
Instead, Lockheed Martin's Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), a component of OASuW Increment 1, will undergo significant hardware and software upgrades to bolster precision and effectiveness.
Tedford underscored the US Navy's commitment to long-range weapons, prioritizing existing systems to align with national defense objectives. Industry insiders, including Northrop Grumman executives, signaled HALO's challenges during the Sea Air Space 2025 expo, with feasibility and cost concerns dominating discussions.
The decision to abandon the HALO program reflects broader fiscal and strategic recalibrations within America's munitions industrial base and highlights the challenges in developing exotic, high-cost systems amid tightening defense budgets. It may also highlight the US military's incapacity for rapid, high-speed, precision strikes against heavily defended naval targets.
In a March 2025 Atlantic Council report, Michael White highlights that capability, stating that a subsonic missile such as Tomahawk or the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) would take one hour to reach a target 800 kilometers away, while a hypersonic cruise missile can hit the target in less than 10 minutes.
White also mentions that a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) can make the trip between Guam and the Taiwan Strait in under 30 minutes.
Asia Times has previously noted that the Harpoon anti-ship missile's short range of 128 kilometers for standard models, lack of speed or stealth to penetrate modern shipboard defenses and paucity of launch platforms other than carrier-based aircraft forces US Navy air carriers dangerously close to battle zones, putting these valuable assets at risk. This situation narrows the US Navy's tactical options for striking modern warships at long distances.
However, Asia Times has pointed out that stealthy anti-ship missiles such as LRASM offer distinct advantages over hypersonic weapons by combining low radar cross-sections and minimal infrared signatures with advanced semi-autonomous guidance systems.
These features ensure survivability and precision in heavily contested electromagnetic warfare (EW) environments, where reliance on external intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms might be compromised.
The LRASM's stealth attributes make it harder to detect and intercept. In contrast, hypersonic weapons can create detectable plasma wakes and light emissions.
The capability to share data and execute coordinated swarm attacks further enhances LRASM's effectiveness. Its stealth and autonomous targeting capabilities offer effective tactical solutions, offsetting some lost advantages from HALO's cancellation.
Yet, at the operational level, HALO's cancellation risks creating a capability gap to defeat anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategies. A January 2023 report by the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) mentions that hypersonic weapons, launched beyond the reach of A2/AD systems with their atmospheric flight profile, enable them to evade midcourse missile defenses designed to intercept targets in space.
According to the report, by flying lower and maneuvering unpredictably, hypersonic missiles complicate detection and interception by ship-based and short-range defenses, potentially neutralizing coastal air defenses, over-the-horizon (OTH) radars and strike systems early in a conflict.
However, despite those advantages, a weak US hypersonic weapons industrial base may preclude the widespread adoption of such weapons.
A report released this month by the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) mentions that the US Department of Defense (DOD) has not yet established programs of record, indicating a lack of approved mission requirements or long-term acquisition plans for hypersonic weapons. It also points out that the US testing infrastructure remains limited, with no current US facility able to simulate full-scale, time-dependent flight environments above Mach 8.
Additionally, it says flight test schedules are continually hampered by limited hypersonic flight corridors, insufficient test ranges and limited support assets, hindering efforts to transition hypersonic prototypes into deployable weapons systems.
In contrast, the LRASM may have a more mature production base. In an April 2023 article for Air & Space Forces Magazine, Chris Gordon mentions that Lockheed Martin is producing more than 500 LRASMs and JASSMs a year, with the defense contractor working to increase capacity to 1,000 missiles annually.
In the same article, Dom DeScisciolo mentions that the LRASM and JASSM share many components and are built on the same production lines. DeScisciolo notes the missiles are designated as either type depending on customer demand.
Strategically, canceling HALO undermines the US Navy's efforts to maintain technological parity or superiority with competitors like China and Russia, which are aggressively advancing hypersonic missile programs.
Russia has already used hypersonic weapons in combat against Ukraine, though their effectiveness and overall impact on the ongoing war of attrition between the two are debatable.
Similarly, China fielded the DF-17 HGV missile system in 2019 and tested an HGV that reportedly circled the globe before cruising to its target in August 2021. In contrast, despite intensive testing, the US has yet to field any hypersonic weapon.
In a March 2024 statement for the US House Armed Services Committee, Jeffrey McCormick mentions that China now has the world's leading hypersonic arsenal, underscoring China's advances in hypersonic weapon technology.
McCormick says two decades of intense and focused investment, development, testing and deployment have dramatically advanced China's development of conventional and nuclear-armed hypersonic missile technologies.
However, some argue hypersonic weapons are overhyped and no better than existing weapons. In a March 2024 article for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, David Wright and Cameron Tracy argue that existing weapons, such as ballistic missiles, already fly at hypersonic speed and that drag from low-altitude atmospheric flight could slow hypersonic weapons down more than ballistic missiles on a depressed trajectory.
Wright and Tracy mention that hypersonic weapons emit substantial heat signatures during launch and flight, which could be detected early by satellites and other ground-based sensors, enabling potential interception.
They also say hypersonic weapons have limited maneuverability, as immense force is required to change direction at such speeds and scramjet engine technology for that purpose is still immature.
In terms of accuracy, they point out that the same guidance systems in hypersonic weapons can be used in maneuvering missile warheads (MARVs) and that the latter fly high enough to avoid the in-flight heating problems associated with the former.
In line with those views, Wright and Tracy say that while the US can not yet build functional hypersonic weapons, it stands to question whether those weapons make military and fiscal sense, regardless of whether its near-peer adversaries build them.
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Asia Times
3 days ago
- Asia Times
The real meaning of Japan's 'men without chests'
' The task of the modern educator is not to cut down jungles but to irrigate deserts. The right defense against false sentiments is to inculcate just sentiments. By starving the sensibility of our pupils, we only make them easier prey to the propagandist when he comes. ' -C.S. Lewis, 'The Abolition of Man' A recent article published in Asia Times , written by the author Han Feizi (which I presume is a pseudonym), used a phrase that caught my attention. The author spoke of 'men without chests,' a phrase used by Francis Fukuyama in 'The End of History and the Last Man.' The article was the second of a multi-part series titled an 'Asia without America' and presents a (compelling) case that the American military, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the political and cultural occupation of Japan have been corrupting post-war Japan since the founding of the Liberal Democratic Party in 1955. The author hopes for the possibility of a 'Tang renaissance' in Japan in which a truer and more authentic Japan would emerge if only America's influence was withdrawn. Han Feizi writes, 'Japan has everything to gain from America's military departure and rebuilding a nation of men with chests.' If this essay can be understood in any way as a disagreement, it is a subtle one, since I do not seek to contradict Han Feizi's basic thesis of America's corrupting influence on the soul of Japanese culture. It is the usage of the phrase 'men without chests' where I take particular issue. When Fukuyama speaks of 'men without chests', he is referring to the middle component of Plato's tripartite soul, which is composed of the head ( logos , reason) chest ( thymos , spiritedness) and bowels ( eros , appetite). However, from reading Fukuyama alone, it would be easy to make the assumption that thymos means almost exclusively 'ambition' and 'desire for recognition.' Fukuyama writes, 'Plato's thymos is… nothing other than the psychological seat of Hegel's desire for recognition' and that ' thymos typically, but not inevitably, drives men to seek recognition.' The original meaning of thymos in the Phaedrus does indeed include the desire for recognition, but certainly not exclusively so. Fukuyama, perhaps in the interest of supporting his argument, heavily overemphasizes this aspect. When Socrates was sentenced to death for 'corrupting the youth of Athens,' he exhibited no signs of discontent or remorse at the prospect of dying in infamy and disrepute. If Socrates is to be regarded as a role model for Plato's ideal man, then what he meant by thymos cannot be how Fukuyama interprets it. Han Feizi, while disagreeing with Fukuyama in other areas, seems to accept Fukuyama's interpretation of thymos at face value. As a result, the philosophical foundations of Han Feizi's otherwise incisive analysis may suffer from a kind of linguistic photocopying that strays quite far from the original meaning. Just as a 1-degree difference in direction can determine whether an airplane lands in Rome or Tunisia, the slightest nuance in our definitions can lead us to radically different conclusions. How we define ' thymos ' and 'men without chests' directly affects how we are to understand the cultural situation in Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, which are currently experiencing, in Han Feizi's words, the 'nihilism and cultural anomie of end-state capitalism and liberal democracy.' Since this essay is largely in response to 'Part II: Japan's Tang renaissance', I also focus here primarily on Japan. Fukuyama took the phrase 'men without chests' from C.S. Lewis's 1943 essay 'The Abolition of Man. ' It is important to understand that when Lewis advocated for 'men with chests' he was never thinking about the relative breadth of one's pectoral muscles. The term 'men' here referred to general humanity and was not as gender-specific as it would be interpreted today. Insofar as Lewis did specifically refer to men, his vision for masculinity was arguably much more holistic. For Lewis, 'men without chests' were men (and women) who lacked integrated sentiment about reality—what Iain McGilchrist would call a balance between the left and right brain hemispheres, and others may call 'emotional intelligence.' 'The Abolition of Man'is about the abolition of humanity, not strictly the abolition of masculinity. Lewis provides the example of Coleridge, who once observed two tourists admiring a waterfall: one said it was 'pretty' and the other thought it was 'sublime.' For Coleridge, the tourist who called the waterfall sublime had a more proper response. Lewis does not use this example to be a snob about sophisticated literary vocabulary. He segues from this example to argue that the real purpose of education is to cultivate 'proper sentiments' that are appropriate to the contemplated object—a project that Lewis considered inseparable from the cultivation of virtue itself and a necessary component of civilization. Men (humanity) ought to be moved by a landscape, a narrative, or a line of poetry in a certain way; to remain unmoved would be the equivalent to a dead nerve, even a moral defect. While physicality is not totally irrelevant here, Lewis's clarion call for broad-chested men was not primarily so that they can bench-press 200 pounds but so that they could accommodate a large heart : that is, to feel and explore all of reality more deeply. It is not so that they can pursue 'Fukuyamian' thymos (like samurais committing hara-kiri) but true Platonic thymos, where the heart serves as the liaison between the head and the bowels. 'Men with chests,' therefore, should not recall the likes of Donald Trump, but rather someone more like Saint Augustine: 'our souls are like a house–too small for You [God] to enter, but we pray that You enlarge it.' Interestingly, when Lewis writes about what these 'just sentiments' should entail, he does not appeal to Platonic thymos or even his own Christian theology but the Tao (道) of Chinese philosophy. Although Lewis himself was not a scholar of Sinology or the Sinosphere, my own specialization can testify that his invocation of the Tao is quite appropriate. Chinese thought is deeply rooted in what might be called 'affect-centered ethics.' While foundational texts such as Lao Zi's 'Dao De Jing ' and Confucius's 'Analects ' differ in terms of method, they are nonetheless both in basic agreement that the way to the Tao begins with learning to feel 'appropriately.' I need only cite the very first passage from the 'Analects ' as evidence: 'The Master said: To study and at due times to practice what one has studied, is this not a pleasure ? When friends come from distant places, is this not a joy? To remain unsoured when his talents are unrecognized, is this not fitting for a gentleman [ junzi ]?' [emphasis added.] The Confucian method of education advocates rigorous memorization, something that is still widely practiced in China today, as well as many other Confucian-influenced Asian countries. But mere memorization itself was never the end goal. The end goal could be summed up in that single rhetorical question: 'Is this not a pleasure?' It was not pleasure per se that was the goal, but rather proper pleasure cultivated to align with the Tao. If you have only learned to recite a line of poetry from Li Bai or Du Fu but not learned to delight in it, Confucius would probably say his project had failed. If, on the other hand, you remain bitter because your talents go unrecognized, it is also a sign that your sentiments have not yet been properly cultivated. You have not become a real 'superior person' ( junzi ). This is true thymos in the original Platonic sense: the education of the heart. Not only does Confucius's delight in learning have nothing to do with the drive for recognition, but Confucius even explicitly states that the sign of a true junzi is precisely the absence of this desire . His vision for the completed junzi was the individual whose natural desires were completely within the bounds of ritual, and therefore needed no suppression or restraint: The Master said: When I was 15, I set my heart on learning. At 30, I took my stand. At 40, I was without confusion. At 50, I knew the command of Heaven. At 60, I heard it with a compliant ear. At 70, I follow the desires of my heart and do not overstep the bounds. Lewis, as it turns out, is quite in agreement with Confucius here: 'Those who know the Tao can hold that to call children delightful or old men venerable is not simply to record a psychological fact about our own parental or filial emotions at the moment, but to recognize a quality which demands a certain response from us whether we make it or not.' One can see from this that the whole discussion of men, with or without their chests, has been missing the point. I blame Fukuyama for this misunderstanding, not Han Feizi. Fukuyama co-opted the term 'men without chests' to mean 'men without thymos ' and by thymos he meant 'the primeval drive for recognition and glory which is present in ancient civilization but is now eclipsed by modern liberal democracy.' Fukuyama does not see 'men without chests' as necessarily problematic—since thymos (under his definition) is the primary cause for history's bloody wars. Han Feizi (if I understand him correctly) does since it has turned the land of 'samurai warriors and hardened salarymen' into 'a theme park filled with kawaii anime, Pokemon, Super Mario and schoolgirl manga.' It is not entirely true that postwar Japan can be reduced to these extremes. No culture is that simple. Neither the wistful regret of Haruki Murakami nor the fiery samurai passions of Yukio Mishimia should be seen as examples of what it means to have a chest or to not have one. For this reason, it is not clear what Han Feizi means for Japan to be liberated from its 'bonsai pot' and become 'men with chests' again. If the rape of Nanjing was an expression of Japan's thymos , we might prefer Fukuyama's world to it—the world happily denuded of thymos via liberal democracy. But was this hideous act really a true expression of samurai culture, or a betrayal of Japan's own Bushidō (武士道) code of conduct? If the latter, we may be much closer to locating the real heart of culture from which we could craft a vision for Japan's 'Tang renaissance.' The final kanji character ' dō ' (道) is in fact a direct loanword from the Chinese Tao. If there is anyone who carries the seeds of Japan's 'Tang renaissance,' I suggest Hayao Miyazaki as a candidate, the legendary creator of classic films such as 'Spirited Away ', 'My Neighbor Totoro ' and 'Princes Mononoke .' There is a distinct Confucian flavor in all of these films, one that prioritizes relationships, mutual respect and the balance of reason, intuition and emotion. The heroes and heroines of Miyazaki are not hyper-masculine glory seekers or listless, dispirited recluses. They are real men, and real women, with 'chests,' with thymos and eros balanced and directed by Logos, or the Tao. This was Lewis's interpretation of Confucius and Plato. Without these kinds of full-chested men so defined, we should not expect Japan or anyone else to experience any kind of real cultural renaissance in our lifetimes. Raymond Dokupil holds a Master's degree in Asian Studies from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.


Asia Times
6 days ago
- Asia Times
The defense-industrial base and alliances: US Steel and beyond
As last fall's presidential election returns reminded us, massive trade imbalances in products ranging from textiles to automobiles to electronics are making Americans conscious of growing weaknesses in the industrial base of America's heartland. Coupled with rising geopolitical tensions across the Pacific, Europe's first major land war since 1945 made leaders of industrial democracies throughout the world increasingly cognizant of vulnerabilities in America's defense-industrial base. At this time of great transition and uncertainty in global politics, it is important to focus intently on the defense manufacturing crisis and to consider how the United States got here and what might be done. In 1950, US manufacturing produced more than half the industrial product of the entire world. In 1960, America's share was still well over a third. Yet today the American share is less than 16% percent, with the US ranking third as a manufacturing power – behind even Germany, which has a GDP only a third its size. Importantly, the largest global manufacturer – by a considerable margin – is China, with which the US faces an increasingly confrontational geopolitical relationship and on which America relies heavily for manufactured imports. The US does remain dominant in some important manufacturing sectors, most importantly aviation – although China is making advances even there. And the situation is very different in the strategic maritime area, as I point out in my recent book, Eurasian Maritime Geopolitics . Not even 1% of the world's ships are built in the United States – even including production for the US Navy, which requested 2025 budget funds for only six new ships. About five commercial ships are built in the US annually. Over 50% of global shipbuilding is in China, the world's largest producer, with seven of the top ten shipbuilders by order volume being Chinese. The Chinese navy now boasts, by a substantial margin, the largest fleet in the world. Even more ominously, future US defense-production capacity is eroding when its expansion is greatly needed. The average US Navy vessel today is 19 years old. Of the vessels in China's navy, by contrast, 70% have been launched since 2010 – and China's production base is expanding much more rapidly than American. The situation is similar in shipping and in port development. Three of the top ten shipping companies in the world are Chinese. America's largest, the Matson Line, is ranked 28th. Similarly, seven of the ten largest ports in the world are Chinese, with China leading the world in computerized container shipping. America's largest ports, at Long Beach and New York City, rank 22d and 24th respectively. Some attribute America's weaknesses in the maritime area to regulatory challenges. The Jones Act, an arcane law requiring that shipping between American ports be in American bottoms, is justified as bolstering national security by strengthening the US shipbuilding and shipping industries – but critics say that overall it has had the opposite effect. Equally damaging to US shipping is the broader weaknesses in basic industry. Highest on the list is the US weakness in basic steel. There America's flagship firm, US Steel, ranks only 28th in global scale. Much was made, on both sides of the Pacific, of former President Joe Biden's 2024 veto of Nippon Steel's bid to acquire US Steel. Although no doubt short-sighted from an economic standpoint, Biden's stance – similar to that of Donald Trump before his election – was understandable in political terms. US Steel, after all, is the US industrial flagship firm, founded by Andrew Carnegie in 1903, and headquartered in Pennsylvania, the most consequential US swing state of 2024. In a Presidential election year, with the United Steel Workers of America vehemently opposed – if not many local affiliates – it was not surprising that such an iconic firm would be a lightning rod for protectionist impulses. Yet amid the heated debate over US Steel's future course, it is important not to lose sight of the truly crucial national-security issue: the future of America's defense industrial base. Donald Trump's historic May, 2025 reversal – to support Nippon Steel's acquisition, on condition of $14 billion in added investment; an all-American board of directors; and continuation of the US Steel name and Pittsburgh headquarters – was an important step forward in that regard. Reviving America's steel, shipbuilding, shipping, precision-machinery, and capital-goods manufacturing sectors, to name a few, will be a crucial imperative in coming years, given the challenge of China and other competitors. And steel-industry revival will be fundamental to basic-industry revival more generally – not least on the seas. Such Technology and capital, provided largely by the private sector, supported by plausible market dynamics, will be crucial imperatives. Tariffs alone cannot possibly revive American maritime manufacturing. Particularly in the maritime sectors, and potentially in steel and some machine-building sectors as well, democratic allies will almost inevitably be a primary source of both technology and capital, as well as production volume. Strategic advantage in these basic sectors, after all, accrues to those who operate at scale. And China today in the maritime sectors has scale. The US needs its allies to help achieve that, and to move toward integrated capacity at optimal scale. In an era of potentially protracted conflict, as the experience of the Ukraine war suggests, production scale and capacity are looming larger than heretofore. Apart from China, the largest and most productive shipbuilders in the world are all in Japan and South Korea, supplied by their own productive, efficient steel sectors. Their expertise and investment will almost certainly be crucial to the revival of the US maritime industrial base. A ship under construction at a graving dock in the Philly Shipyard in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA. Photo: Philly Ship Indeed, that process has already begun. In 2024 Japanese and South Korean firms agreed to repair US Navy vessels and in December a Korean firm acquired and began rebuilding the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, which produced some of the US Navy's most powerful capital ships during World War II. Moving to the future, both sides of the Pacific need to build on lessons of the US Steel case – especially the importance of trans-Pacific cooperation in the rebuilding of America's defense-industrial base. Governments themselves need to take a longer view, and to grasp the vital importance to national security of cooperation among allies that does not compromise sovereignty or deeply held values. With the transition to leadership in Washington, and major trans-Pacific summits impending, now is the time both to learn from the past and to let partners play a role in helping to make American manufacturing great again. Kent Calder is Director of the Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies at Johns Hopkins University SAIS, former Special Advisor to the US Ambassador to Japan and the recent author of Eurasian Maritime Geopolitics (Brookings, 2025).


South China Morning Post
26-05-2025
- South China Morning Post
US' 500 military personnel in Taiwan an ‘open test' of Beijing's red lines
Washington's disclosure that around 500 US military personnel are stationed in Taiwan signals more open and substantial defence support for the island – a pivot from a previously discreet partnership that is openly testing Beijing's red lines, according to analysts. The disclosure, made on May 15 by retired US Navy Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery during congressional testimony, was the first official acknowledgement of such a substantial American military presence on the self-governed island. Taiwanese experts say the number refers to training personnel. It also vastly exceeds the previously known 41 personnel that were confirmed in a US congressional report a year earlier. Montgomery told lawmakers that the US military involvement was essential to training Taiwan to become a credible 'counter-intervention force' capable of real combat or complicating Beijing's military options. 'If we're going to give them billions of dollars in assistance, sell them tens of billions of dollars' worth of US gear, it makes sense that we'd be over there training and working,' he said. Days after the hearing, mainland Chinese state broadcaster CCTV took the rare step of airing commentary on Montgomery's remarks about the American military presence on the island.