Modi's visit, Indian aid pledge reshape Maldives ties as China wavers
Narendra Modi 's recent visit to
the Maldives is being viewed as a symbolic yet strategic reset in bilateral ties, signalling New Delhi's renewed engagement with its island neighbour amid waning Chinese investment and mounting economic distress in Male.
Modi's two-day trip, which coincided with the Maldives' 60th Independence Day celebrations, marked his first visit since President Mohamed Muizzu took office in late 2023 following an election campaign built on a combative 'India Out' platform.
Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy, an associate fellow at the Delhi-based Observer Research Foundation's strategic studies programme, said Modi's visit was successful for two key reasons – to show that Indian influence remained unchallenged in the Maldives, and to aid the local government amid the country's economic struggles.
The pledge of assistance underscored
India 's willingness, commitment and interest to support the Maldives when others were hesitating, Shivamurthy told This Week in Asia.
India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi (centre) plants a tree sapling during his state visit in Male on July 25 as the Maldives' President Mohamed Muizzu looks on. Photo: AFP
During the visit, Modi announced a US$565 million credit line and launched free-trade talks with the Maldives. India also announced a reduction in repayments of an earlier credit line from US$51 million to US$29 million annually.
'Whatever the weather may be … our friendship will always remain bright and clear. India will continue to support the development of the Maldives' defence capabilities,' Modi said during a joint press conference, while Muizzu reflected on the successes of the shared developmental journey between the two countries.
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