‘Nationalism in China has grown with Xi Jinping— many citizens think economic showdowns with the US are part of China's rejuvenation'

Economic Times

29-05-2025

Rory Truex is Associate Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. Speaking to Srijana Mitra Das, he discusses what's driving China — in the era of Donald Trump:
Q. What is the core of your research?
A. I study Chinese politics — I've researched public opinion in China, how citizens think about the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the regime. I've worked on US-China relations and how American foreign policy makers think about US-China ties. Finally, I've been working increasingly on authoritarianism in general and particularly authoritarian trends in the United States and elsewhere in the democratic world
Q. Which main features define the US-China relationship today?
A. The US-China relationship has undergone a significant transformation starting with Donald Trump's first administration. We saw the end of the broad idea of engagement with China then and a shift towards 'strategic competition', which sees these as rival countries, competing economically, in science, military power, international influence, etc. Some in the US policy arena even believe we are in a Cold War with China — we just haven't realised it yet.
Q. How do most Chinese view America under Donald Trump?
A. There is a general decline in attitudes towards the US — and a rise in nationalism, which corresponds with Xi Jinping's ascent. The party has used external competition to foster nationalism at home and frames geopolitical competition with the US as a foreign power trying to contain China's rise — this resonates with Chinese history and the idea of the 'Century of Humiliation'. There are some pockets of admiration for Trump — some Chinese view him as humourous and appreciate his off-the-cuff style. However, these aren't particularly large constituencies. More common is the idea that Trump is eroding American competitiveness and, in turn, helping China's rise.
Q. Can China actually afford to decouple economically from America?
A. My understanding is that full economic decoupling would be costly for both sides. I think this rhetoric from the CCP is a bargaining chip to show resolve before heading into talks. More broadly, the Chinese government has been preparing the population psychologically for war with the US and economic showdowns — Chinese citizens have been socialised into thinking any of those costs are part of the struggle for national rejuvenation.
Q. Does an authoritarian state like China have politics?
A. Yes — it's just difficult to observe. The machinations which occur at the elite level, between Xi Jinping and other leaders in the Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee, cannot be readily observed — so, the degree of disagreement at that level isn't really known beyond signals in state-owned newspapers, etc. There is also mass-level politics — occasionally, the population engages in collective action that shifts policy-making. The 'White Paper Revolution' occurred in 2022 on the back of the long 'Zero-Covid' period in China which became increasingly draconian. Citizens protested then and the government had to roll back some of those policies. The citizen voice is muted — but it has an impact.
Q. Are most state decisions mainly diktat?
A. Of late, the CCP has tried to emphasise 'consultative processes' — this is 'consultative authoritarianism', where a government isn't just ruling by diktat but tries to incorporate public preferences. We see this in China's People's Congress System — every year, deputies convey different suggestions to the government. Laws put forth through the National People's Congress are posted for comment. Citizens can contact municipal governments through Mayor's Mailboxes. There are ways for people to express grievances — the question is, whether the government responds. My assessment is under Xi Jinping, we have not seen a strengthening of such channels. They exist but overall, there's been a relative closing of politics under him. Civil society organisations have been gutted — increasingly, this process is just lip service.
Q. China has some of the world's most capitalistic billionaires — how do they view life under a communist state?
A. Importantly, the CCP shifted its strategy about business elites in the last few decades — under Mao and the early years of Deng Xiaoping, the party was for peasants and workers. Jiang Zemin introduced the concept of 'The Three Represents' which sought 'advanced productive forces' — that's code for 'capital' —– to be brought into the party. Since then, the CCP has been quite cosy with business interests. Since the 2000s, the CCP is quite an elite party — it is nominally communist but in key levels of leadership, you'd be hard-pressed to find working-class people.
Q. Has the drive to become a global superpower reduced dissent in China?
A. It's important to note there are many people in China who dissent. It's hard to see them and several face real consequences. However, people in Xinjiang or Tibet, for instance, would take issue with the CCP, which is basically a Han-dominated regime. Young feminists in China understand the CCP as a traditional patriarchal authoritarian regime, while parts of the periphery, like Hong Kong, are not fully on board. In democracies, disagreements are front and centre — they are organised into parties that raise funds and compete electorally. In China, the party claims to represent everyone but glosses over dissent. Also, the Chinese's government's repressive capacity has increased so much in the last decade that a large-scale mass protest — a Tiananmen 2.0 — is almost impossible today, given the Orwellian level of surveillance. This has implications for its governance and other authoritarian governments.