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RIC redux: How India should navigate old groupings in a new world order

RIC redux: How India should navigate old groupings in a new world order

First Post20-07-2025
Growing interest in RIC among Indians is not about rejecting the US or embracing China—it's about building leverage through diversified partnerships, given today's fragmented global order further disrupted by Trump-era unpredictability read more
In recent times, there has been a noticeable resurgence of interest among Indians in the Russia-India-China (RIC) grouping. This renewed attention stems in large part from a growing sense of unease—if not disillusionment—with the United States, particularly during the Trump presidency, where abrupt policy shifts and erratic rhetoric left New Delhi confused, concerned, and confounded.
Once regarded as a staunch ally of New Delhi, Donald Trump's sudden, unpredictable tilt toward Islamabad—his public praise for Pakistan's military and even his offer to mediate on Kashmir, a diplomatic red line for India—was seen as either dangerously naïve or strategically duplicitous. For a country that had embraced Trump as a potential ally and viewed the US as a strategic partner in countering growing Chinese hegemony, this U-turn was jarring.
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This perceived betrayal has triggered growing introspection within New Delhi's strategic circles. Has India placed too many eggs in the American basket? Is the time ripe for recalibrating and revisiting older platforms like RIC—not out of ideological affinity, but as a pragmatic counterbalance in a turbulent world?
RIC: Rhetoric vs Reality
The RIC grouping, first conceptualised in the 1990s, was designed as a forum for three major Eurasian powers to coordinate on global and regional affairs. Though often overshadowed by broader groupings such as Brics and the SCO, RIC still offers potential as a platform for strategic dialogue—especially as global power dynamics shift toward multipolarity.
Russia remains a steadfast partner for India, despite its increasing dependence on China in the wake of Western sanctions over the ongoing Ukraine war. The Indo-Russian partnership has stood the test of time, rooted in mutual trust and decades of cooperation.
China, by contrast, presents a complex duality: it is both a vital economic partner and a strategic adversary. Border tensions—including the standoffs in Doklam and Galwan—and broader concerns about China's activities in the Indian Ocean and South Asia underscore the trust deficit. China's growing alliance with Pakistan, vividly manifested during Operation Sindoor, further deepens India's apprehensions.
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While RIC presents an opportunity to engage China in structured dialogue, India must approach such forums with realism. New Delhi cannot afford to fall for the 'Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai' narrative—even when American perfidy becomes too obvious to ignore.
Playing Both Sides, Committing to None
Given today's fragmented global order—further disrupted by Trump-era unpredictability—India must resist aligning fully with any single bloc. This isn't about returning to Nehruvian non-alignment, but about pursuing interest-based alignment rooted in realism.
India must engage all major powers—but on its own terms. From the West, India can leverage defence technology, economic investment, and support on global platforms. And from Russia and China, it can secure energy cooperation, regional stability dialogues, and support for a multipolar global order.
This two-track diplomacy should not be viewed as indecision but as pragmatic statecraft. In this scheme of things, no one is a pariah. What matters is India's supreme national interest—a fact that the Ministry of External Affairs reminded Nato's secretary-general of this week when he threatened New Delhi with 'secondary sanctions' over its ties with Moscow.
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The goal is not to choose sides but to make choices that serve India's long-term interests and aspirations.
Significance of Strategic Autonomy
Since Independence, strategic autonomy has been the cornerstone of India's foreign policy. Since 2014, this policy has been reoriented from 'non-alignment' to 'all-alignment', with the country's strategic autonomy intact. Whether it is forging closer ties with the US, buying arms and oil from Russia, or even standing by Israel without abandoning the Palestinian cause—India has consistently asserted its right to act independently.
That tradition must continue. Groupings like the Quad or RIC should be treated as platforms for engagement, not as binding alliances. India must adopt a model of issue-based alignment—collaborating where interests converge, disengaging where they don't.
New Delhi's rising global profile brings both opportunities and challenges. India must recognise that while partnerships are helpful, its rise will largely depend on its own internal strength—economic resilience, military modernisation, and political stability.
The truth is that neither Washington nor Beijing truly wants New Delhi to emerge as a rival power. Both offer engagement—but often attach strategic strings. Recognising this reality is essential.
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In today's volatile global order, which is akin to a 3D chessboard of overlapping alliances and competing interests, India must therefore act like a fox rather than a hedgehog. The fox, as the old saying goes, knows many things, while the hedgehog knows one big thing. India cannot afford to get locked into any singular worldview or alliance structure. It must embrace complexity and prepare for multiple contingencies.
In this scenario, India's best bet is to stay pragmatic and relentlessly focused on its own interests. The growing interest of Indians in RIC must be viewed through this lens. It is not about rejecting the US or embracing China—it's about building leverage through diversified partnerships.
A Lonely but Glorious Rise
This stand comes with a price. India often finds itself alone in a bloc-oriented world order. Both sides see it as suspect. Recently, following the Brics summit in Brazil, some geopolitical analysts went so far as to call India an outlier—or worse, a Trojan horse in the grouping. Conversely, the US-led West finds India's engagement with countries like Russia and Iran, as well as its presence in Brics and the SCO, problematic.
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What both sides don't realise is that it is the presence of a country like India that helps keep the volatility of the world in check—whether political or economic. It helps maintain some degree of balance in a bloc-based global order.
India's journey toward great-power status may be lonely—but it can also be glorious, provided it is navigated with strategic wisdom and restraint. The world respects strength and consistency—not dependence or ideological rigidity. New Delhi must continue to walk its own path: open to all, beholden to none.
In the global power game, there are no permanent friends or enemies—only permanent interests. This, however, does not mean that India's foreign policy should become unethically Nixonian in nature. For India, a civilisational state steeped in dharmic consciousness, foreign policy must be more than transactional—dictated largely through the wider lens of dharma. It is this timeless principle that must guide India's foreign policy. And in this worldview, there's always space—and scope—for both Quad and RIC.
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The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost's views.
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