Lost Soul Aside goes gold after 11 years in development, releasing on PS5 and PC this August
The project began in 2016 when Chinese developer Yang Bing shared a demo video that quickly gained attention online.
The footage caught Sony's eye, leading to Lost Soul Aside becoming part of the China Hero Project, a PlayStation initiative that supports indie Chinese developers with resources such as quality control, code reviews, audio, and marketing.
What started as a solo endeavour has since grown into a 40-person studio effort. The game's style reflects Bing's admiration for the Final Fantasy series, combining manga-inspired characters with realistic textures.
In an interview with Famitsu, Bing explained that the mix of surreal and realistic design elements influenced the creation of the game's protagonist.
For its combat system, Lost Soul Aside takes cues from titles like Bayonetta, Ninja Gaiden, and Devil May Cry, blending fast-paced action with elaborate visual effects.
The development team is now focusing on final optimisation and testing ahead of launch, having shifted from the original planned PlayStation 4 release to fully utilise PS5 hardware.
Two editions will be available: the Standard Edition at $59.99 and the Digital Deluxe Edition at $69.99. Pre-purchases are open ahead of the game's debut later this month.
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