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Toward a new resilient India–South Korea strategic partnership

Toward a new resilient India–South Korea strategic partnership

AllAfrica14-07-2025
As the Lee Jae-myung administration sends its first cohort of special envoys abroad, the selection of India as one of the four priority destinations signals an important recalibration in South Korea's foreign policy. This initiative, aimed at bolstering bilateral and multilateral ties, comes at a critical juncture for both Seoul and New Delhi. Former Prime Minister Kim Boo-kyum's visit to India, accompanied by Representatives Song Soon-ho and Lee Kai-ho, offers a timely opportunity to reset the India–Korea strategic partnership in alignment with evolving regional and global dynamics.
This diplomatic outreach arrives at a moment of internal and external pressure for South Korea. The new government in Seoul is confronting a complex matrix of economic stagnation, social stress, and intensifying external demands – especially from the US. These challenges are catalyzing a rethinking of traditional alliances and the search for new, reliable strategic partners. India, as a rising global power and long-standing friend, stands out as a natural and capable partner.
South Korea's economic landscape is undergoing considerable turbulence. Contraction in domestic demand, increasing youth unemployment, and an aging demographic are converging into a socio-economic vortex that the new government must urgently navigate. On the foreign policy front, Seoul is facing mounting pressure from Washington on multiple fronts: increased tariffs on South Korean exports, heightened financial contributions to stationing US troops on the peninsula, and demands to raise its defense expenditure to 5 percent of its GDP – a figure considered exorbitant and politically untenable.
These strains are putting the US-South Korea alliance under unprecedented stress. In such an environment, it is prudent and necessary for the Lee administration to seek diversification in its strategic partnerships. India, with its robust economy, neutral diplomatic posture, and expanding global clout, emerges as a highly attractive option.
India, for its part, must view this Korean outreach with both gravity and warmth. It should respond in kind, seeing in this overture not merely a symbolic gesture but a genuine invitation to co-create a new stable, multipolar security and economic architecture in Asia.
To build a durable and multidimensional partnership under the Lee administration, it is imperative that both countries draw lessons from past missteps and refrain from engaging in politically contentious or economically burdensome issues. Instead, they should prioritize collaborative efforts in domains that offer practical and demonstrable mutual strategic value, and that are most conducive to sustained bilateral engagement. Such an approach is essential to meeting the urgent economic and security imperatives confronting both nations amid growing regional and global uncertainty. The time has come to move beyond rhetorical overtures and high-level declarations. What is now required is focused, results-driven cooperation – for too much is at stake to allow this opportunity to pass unrealized.
Unlike earlier administrations, which focused heavily on trade and investment, a natural starting point for such cooperation should now be the technological domain. South Korea's global leadership in semiconductors, smart manufacturing, and artificial intelligence aligns well with India's rapidly expanding digital economy and abundant engineering talent. Strategic joint ventures in frontier areas such as quantum computing, robotics, and microelectronics hold the potential to produce transformative innovations with far-reaching benefits for both economies.
In parallel, the shared commitment of India and South Korea to global climate goals provides another strong foundation for expanded cooperation in sustainable development. As signatories to the Paris Agreement, both countries should deepen their engagement in renewable energy, hydrogen fuel technologies, electric mobility, and carbon capture solutions – sectors that not only address environmental imperatives but also present significant commercial opportunities.
Defense cooperation also still offers a promising avenue, provided it remains calibrated to avoid entanglement in ideologically sensitive Indo-Pacific narratives. Practical collaboration in joint production, technology transfer, and humanitarian-oriented military exercises can advance mutual security interests without provoking geopolitical friction. Korea's advanced defense industry can meaningfully contribute to India's Make in India initiative, creating synergies in indigenous manufacturing and technological self-reliance.
Further, Korea's burgeoning space capabilities complement India's established and cost-efficient space program. The potential for joint ventures in satellite development, lunar exploration, and space-based surveillance could elevate both countries' strategic autonomy and technological standing in an increasingly contested domain.
Post-pandemic realities have also underscored the importance of health security. Joint research in vaccines, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical innovation – along with the development of resilient supply chains – would serve the healthcare needs of both nations and enhance their global competitiveness in life sciences.
Urban development is another area where complementarities can be effectively leveraged. South Korea's expertise in building smart cities, integrated transportation systems, and e-governance platforms can contribute significantly to India's Smart Cities Mission. Such collaboration would not only foster sustainable urbanization but also enhance quality of life and public service delivery in Indian metropolitan regions.
To ensure the long-term sustainability of these partnerships, investments in human capital and institutional linkages are essential. Both governments should prioritize the establishment of India-South Korea centers of excellence, expand bilateral financial assistance programs for scholars and academics residing long-term in both countries – particularly those working in the areas of defense and security – and deepen academic collaboration across STEM and humanities disciplines.
Currently, Korean language programs are well developed in India. However, Hindi (Indian) language programs in Korea remain at a relatively underdeveloped stage. Promoting Indian studies and language education, alongside facilitating scholarly exchanges, can significantly deepen intercultural understanding between the two nations. It is time that both governments pay closer attention to this important yet lagging dimension of their cooperation.
Soft power also plays a critical role in deepening bilateral ties. Capitalizing on the growing popularity of Korean culture in India and the rising appeal of Indian traditions and arts in Korea, both countries can promote cultural festivals, co-productions in film and media, and enhanced tourism facilitation to humanize and broaden the strategic partnership.
Last but not least, India's prominent role in BRICS offers South Korea a valuable pathway to engage with emerging multilateral frameworks beyond traditional Western-led platforms such as the G7. Active collaboration in BRICS-led development initiatives, financial institutions, and global governance dialogues could broaden South Korea's strategic options while allowing it to contribute to – and benefit from – a more inclusive and multipolar international order. It is, therefore, an opportune moment for both countries to begin exploring this avenue with greater seriousness and strategic intent
While expanding cooperation across broad strategic domains, both sides must remain cognizant of geopolitical sensitivities. For instance, India should not push Seoul into public positions on the Indo-Pacific strategy, QUAD military arrangements, or South China Sea disputes. These areas remain diplomatically contentious in South Korea due to its geography, history, and complex relationship with China.
Similarly, India should refrain from interpreting every dimension of South Korea's foreign engagements through the lens of US-China rivalry. The Lee administration appears committed to a more autonomous, balanced foreign policy that prioritizes economic and pragmatic diplomacy over ideological confrontation.
Economic integration, meanwhile, requires renewed momentum. The CEPA renegotiations, stuck in limbo for over a decade, exemplify the costs of inflexibility. The time has come when both nations must abandon maximalist positions and work toward a realistic, mutually beneficial upgrade. Negotiations to upgrade the Comprehensive Agreement must now be approached with pragmatism and resolute political will. The time has come for negotiations to be taken out of the hands of bureaucrats and diplomats and entrusted directly to the political elite at the highest level to enable swift and decisive action.
Both sides must move beyond entrenched positions and demonstrate the flexibility needed to accommodate each other's economic priorities, political constraints, and strategic imperatives. Meaningful progress will depend on adopting a realistic and forward-looking framework that is responsive to the broader regional economic context and shifting global dynamics.
A pragmatic approach would be to identify a set of common minimum points that can be operationalized without further delay. As an initial step, targeted liberalization in key sectors such as electronics, agriculture, and services – combined with concerted efforts to eliminate non-tariff barriers and harmonize regulatory standards – can substantially increase trade flows and contribute to a more resilient, balanced, and mutually beneficial investment environment.
This is a defining moment in Asia's geopolitical evolution. As established powers face growing internal contradictions and new powers like India rise to prominence, the opportunity for middle powers like South Korea to reshape the regional order has never been greater. The special envoy mission led by Kim Boo-kyum should be viewed not merely as a ceremonial gesture, but as a genuine signal of Korea's intent to elevate its relationship with India to a new strategic plane.
India, with its growing strategic capital, must not miss this window of opportunity. The two nations – by deepening cooperation across high technology, climate action, defense production, cultural exchange, and multilateral diplomacy – can help co-create a more stable, inclusive, and prosperous Asian future.
Rather than being reactive players in a polarized world, India and South Korea can emerge as proactive architects of a new economic and security architecture in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. But to do so, both sides must demonstrate the political imagination, strategic maturity, and diplomatic agility required to transcend past inertia and embrace a forward-looking partnership.
The time to act is now – and the world is watching.
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