What India's Hindutva ecosystem gets wrong in its fantasy of restoring Nepal's monarchy

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12-07-2025

The rising calls over the past few months for Nepal to restore its monarchy has caught the attention of many in India, especially within the Sangh ecosystem.
Hindutva hardliners such as Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Adityanath have enthusiastically promoted the idea that if Nepal were to revert to being a Hindu kingdom, a structure it abolished in 2008, it would be a beacon of stability – and have a natural cultural affinity for its giant neighbour.
This narrative, often spun with little grounding in Nepal's complex history or present realities, suggests that a restored monarchy would serve as a reliable ally for India against China and a stabilising force amidst Kathmandu's political chaos: since the restoration of democracy in 2008, there have been 15 distinct prime ministerial terms in a span of less than 17 years.
Yet this simplistic vision borders on fantasy and reflects the Bharatiya Janata Party's romanticisation of authoritarianism and majoritarian symbols, though these are at odds with India's own democratic and pluralistic values.
Historically, Nepal's monarchy was never the straightforward ally many in the BJP claim it to be. In 1950, King Tribhuvan Shah fled to India to escape the oligarchy of the Ranas, who had served as hereditary prime ministers, with the Shah rulers merely being figureheads. Jawaharlal Nehru's government helped facilitate Tribhuvan's return. It supported the establishment of constitutional monarchy and the end of the Ranas' 103-year regime.
This moment was foundational for modern Nepali democracy and symbolised India's active support for representative governance in the Himalayan region. However, King Mahendra's 1960 royal coup dismissed the elected cabinet and crushed Nepal's fledgling democracy. He dismissed pro-India politicians, and realigned Nepal's foreign policy closer to China – actions that sowed long-term distrust toward India.
Between 2005-'08, the power grab by Mahendra's son, Gyanendra, plunged Nepal into further instability. It accelerated the country's tilt toward Beijing, even as Gyanendera railed against Indian 'interference' in the kingdom's affairs.
These kings reinforced Hindu nationalism not to strengthen ties with India, but to consolidate internal control and assert Nepal's sovereignty in ways that often ran counter to Indian interests.
If Gyanendra were to return as an absolute ruler, he might tighten control through repression, exacerbating political instability and alienating both democratic forces and India. If he were reinstated as a constitutional monarch, his past record suggests he would resist ceding real power.
His fraught relationship with India during his reign raises questions about whether a restored monarchy under his influence would truly align with New Delhi's strategic interests.
Importantly, Nepal's monarchs have historically been treated as divine figures – incarnations of Vishnu – whose decrees were to be obeyed without question. This lends the institution a theocratic aura that undermines democratic scrutiny and public accountability.
By contrast, Nepal's elected communist leaders – while not without their nationalist posturing – have generally exhibited a pragmatic streak in their dealings with India.
Leaders such as KP Sharma Oli and Prachanda (Pushpa Kamal Dahal), despite fiery rhetoric during border disputes or political crises, have kept channels open for economic cooperation, hydropower projects, and transit agreements. Their elected mandates compel them to maintain at least a working relationship with India, since Nepal's economy remains deeply integrated with its southern neighbour.
Among other democratic actors, more moderate figures such as Sher Bahadur Deuba have shown greater amenability to Indian influence, emphasising stability and development over confrontational nationalism.
That said, parties such as the Nepali Congress and Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) have at times also echoed the call for a Hindu state, even as they oppose monarchical revival. The Congress Mahasamiti has formally endorsed the idea of a Hindu state, highlighting the complex overlap between religious and political identities in Nepal.
This complexity invites a deeper question: are today's royalist demonstrations more about restoring monarchy or about reinstating Nepal as a Hindu state? The two ideas are often conflated, but not all who support one necessarily support the other.
Many secular politicians across party lines are sympathetic to cultural Hinduism but wary of authoritarian centralisation under a monarch. The distinction is crucial, as it suggests possible scenarios where Nepal reverts to a Hindu identity without abandoning democratic structures.
This is where Nepali Hindu nationalism and Indian Hindutva are at fundamental conceptual odds: opposition to the BJP does not go hand in hand with also wanting a Hindu state, something that does not translate well in Kathmandu.
The fervour of monarchist supporters is often fuelled by a potent mix of frustration with democratic stagnation and anxieties over religious and demographic change. Some claim that the population of Christians and Muslims is rising disproportionately. One major driver is disillusionment with federalism itself. A popular phrase captures this sentiment: 'Earlier we had one king, now we have 761' – a reference to the number of governments at the various levels, from village council to federal.
This reflects a widespread belief that federalism has created layers of political inefficiency and corruption, without delivering real benefits. Public trust in federal structures has been further eroded by elite capture, bureaucratic inertia and poor service delivery at the local level.
The symbolism of one unified authority – the king – is nostalgically contrasted with a fragmented political system seen as unstable and ineffective.
Meanwhile, narratives around Christianisation and Muslim immigration are often exaggerated. According to the 2011 census, Hindus constituted roughly 81% of the population, Buddhists about 9%, Muslims 4.4% and Christians 1.4%. Updated estimates suggest Christians may now represent around 4%, with growth largely in urban and hill regions.
The increase is notable but still far from a major demographic shift. While incidents of communal violence have occurred in some border areas, the situation has been contained. There is no evidence of a mass influx of Muslim refugees from India's North East. These claims – largely circulated in Indian Hindutva circles – lack support in Nepal. The demographic fear-mongering seems more rooted in ideological agendas than in reality.
This paranoia aligns closely with the Sangh ecosystem's broader Hindu nationalist agenda, which often weaponises anxieties about religious minorities to mobilise support. Such ideological exports from India do little to stabilise Nepal's internal tensions and risk aggravating already delicate balances.
Nepal's democratic experiment since the end of the Maoist civil war in 2006 has faced severe challenges. Economic growth has been uneven and insufficient to meet rising aspirations. The World Bank reports that GDP growth averaged around 4% annually from 2008 to 2022 – well below the South Asian average of 6%-6.4%, especially given Nepal's already low base.
Structural problems like poor infrastructure, overreliance on remittances (nearly 30% of GDP), and limited industrialisation have hampered sustained development. Outmigration has soared: over four million Nepalis (roughly 13% of the population) now work abroad. Youth unemployment exceeds 30%, particularly in rural districts that were once Maoist strongholds.
Political instability compounds these economic woes. No elected government has completed a full term since the monarchy was abolished in 2008. Frequent reshuffles, coalition breakdowns, and party infighting have eroded faith in the system. Some recent pro-monarchy protests have turned violent, targeting private property and key government buildings. They reflect deep disillusionment, but not yet a decisive popular shift toward monarchy.
India's relationship with Nepal is complicated. The countries have open borders, which allow their citizens to travel and work freely in each place. But India's image in Nepal is shaped by grievances both real and imagined. On one hand, India has taken actions that have deeply affected Nepali society and politics. Two undeclared blockades by India stopping goods entering the land-locked country – in 1989 and again in 2015 – caused widespread hardship and are etched in public memory.
These episodes, coupled with allegations that India maintains deep political influence through Nepal's party elites and intelligence agencies, reinforce perceptions of Indian overreach. Nepal's landlocked geography compounds this sense of vulnerability, as trade routes, fuel access, and transit infrastructure remain subject to India's cooperation – or its withholding.
On the other hand, some anti-India sentiment is driven by persistent, though unfounded, conspiracy theories, most notably, claims linking India to the 2001 royal massacre. These theories lack credible evidence and contradict basic logic. India, a Hindu-majority nation battling its own Maoist insurgency at the time, could have had no reason to orchestrate the murder of a Hindu royal family to usher Nepal's Maoists into power. Yet the narrative persists, often amplified by nationalist or monarchist factions seeking to deflect blame or exploit public emotion.
The traction they get reflects deeper anxieties – about sovereignty, inequality in bilateral ties and a legacy of structural asymmetry. In this context, India is both an assertive actor and a symbolic scapegoat, viewed through a lens shaped by both history and myth.
For India, the stakes are high. A stable, democratic, and pluralistic Nepal remains the most desirable outcome. But the BJP's romanticisation of monarchy risks undermining that goal. Such leaders are not necessarily ignorant of Nepal's reality; rather, they may be cynically exploiting the monarchy narrative for domestic gain. The appeal of being seen as defenders of Hindu civilisation resonates with their core voters, even at the cost of diplomatic prudence.
The geopolitical stakes for India in Nepal are amplified both by China's assertive engagement and by Pakistan's covert operations. China's influence in Nepal has grown steadily over the past decade through strategic investments in infrastructure under the Belt and Road Initiative, increased diplomatic outreach, and soft power efforts that include media partnerships and cultural diplomacy.
Beijing has positioned itself as a 'non-interfering partner', which plays well with Nepali nationalist narratives – especially when contrasted with perceptions of Indian hegemony. Chinese-funded projects such as highways, hydropower stations, and digital connectivity initiatives have deepened Kathmandu's economic dependence on Beijing.
In recent years, there has been rising concern in New Delhi about the Chinese army's quiet but steady engagement with Nepal's security establishment.
Meanwhile, Pakistan's use of Nepal as a staging ground for anti-India jihadist activity presents a direct national security threat. Indian intelligence agencies have long warned of networks backed by Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence outfit operating through Kathmandu to smuggle arms, move operatives, and plan attacks inside India.
The porous open border between India and Nepal, though historically a symbol of close ties, also creates vulnerabilities that hostile actors have exploited.
In this strategic context, any political vacuum or instability in Nepal could become a doorway for adversarial infiltration – via economic capture, ideological influence or covert operations.
India must prepare for various trajectories: a strengthened democracy, a weakened federal system or a symbolic monarchical revival. Regardless, it should prioritise economic cooperation, institutional reform, and pluralism. Pragmatic diplomacy and visible development will do more to stabilise Nepal than ideological alignment.
India has already delivered substantial, on-the-ground projects, such as constructing high-capacity cross-border transmission lines and supporting major hydropower developments. India has enabled Nepal's first-ever power exports – to Bangladesh and Bihar – by integrating it into its electricity grid.
Rail links such as Jaynagar-Bardibas and Jogbani–Biratnagar have been completed, with work progressing on the Raxaul–Kathmandu corridor.
India has also invested in schools, health posts, cultural restoration, and rural housing across all seven provinces. These visible benefits – electricity, mobility, education, trade access, and jobs – not only improve lives but also physically integrate Nepal into a regional ecosystem that promotes mutual resilience and trust.
India's unique position – as both a powerful neighbour and the world's only other Hindu-majority nation – gives it enormous soft-power leverage. But this must be exercised with sensitivity and consistency. Betting on a crown over a constitution is not a sound strategy.
One unresolved question lingers: do Nepal's royalist supporters seek both monarchy and a Hindu state? The answer may determine the future direction of Nepali nationalism – and how India responds to it. A clear understanding of this dual demand will help India engage more with both Nepali state and society to effectively promote stability, respect sovereignty and build lasting ties with its Himalayan neighbour.